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ABSTRACT 
The terrorist attacks in the United States of America (USA) on 11 September 2001 
unquestionably caused anguish for the nation. Instead of seeking justice, the USA went on a 
retribution mission which led it to lose self-control as the terrorists lured it to behave like a 
rogue state. The stage was thus set for a cycle of violence between the protagonists, one 
represented by the self-centred USA, and the other by militant modern terrorists who do not 
value life, to lock horns in the international arena. This thesis demonstrates that the USA’s 
desire for vengeance led to the internationalisation of the war on terrorism, whose actions have, 
on numerous occasions, constituted an affront to the ethic of political liberalism which, being 
centred on liberty and the respect of the individual, demand justice and fairness, equality, 
tolerance, respect for the rule of law, and various individual rights such as freedom of 
conscience and non-discrimination.  
While there is no agreed upon definition of terrorism, this study showed that terrorism is an 
illegal form of warfare that thrives on the use of violence and intimidation which is targeted 
mainly at civilians to achieve political objectives.  This study demonstrated that the USA has 
taken advantage of the illegality of terrorism to persuade and coerce other nations to join it in 
the War on Terror which it has used, to a great extent, to pursue its strategic interests all over 
the world. This study shows how, in pursuit of its foreign policy objectives, the USA has 
adopted a rapacious foreign policy that disregards international law and multilateral 
institutions. The superpower has not hesitated to use force where it has felt that its interests are 
under threat. It has lost morality as it embraces various tyrants around the world while 
punishing those despots who are not on its side in the War on Terror. While exercising its right 
to hunt down terrorists and bring them to justice, it has failed to differentiate combatants from 
non-combatants. The extensive abuse of suspects in secret detention camps by its security 
forces, which has been characterised by a gross violation of individual rights, constitutes an 
insult to the just war principle of jus in bello.  
In the war, the USA has failed to strike a balance between national security and the requirement 
for the respect of individual rights. This study demonstrates how it has supplanted the rule of 
law by the ‘rule of men’ as Arabs and other minority groups have been profiled and detained 
arbitrarily as public officials have denied them their freedom of conscience and the right to 
equality. Liberal provisions which give suspects the right to legal representation have been 
unfairly and unjustly dispensed with as the criminal justice system has been replaced by 
military tribunals. This study shows how the government, which has exhibited a lack of 
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tolerance for minority groups, has denied individuals their liberty as it has moved them illegally 
from one country to another where they have been subjected to torture. This study concludes 
that the USA’s disrespect for individual rights and national sovereignty has made the War on 
Terror unjust, given its association with lawlessness, immorality and impunity. The USA’s 
actions confirm the thesis that the War on Terror constitutes a threat to the ethic of political 
liberalism and is indeed a threat to global peace and security.  
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background to the Research Problem  
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in the United States of America (USA) on 11 September 
2001, often referred to as 9/11, the USA President, George Bush, declared a War on Terror (WOT) 
and vowed revenge by fighting and defeating terrorists wherever they were.  In this 
internationalisation of the war on terrorism, countries were told that they were either on the side 
of the USA or against it. On the other hand, Islamic terrorists were seen to have adopted 
unselective, dastardly tactics in a war which they claimed to be aimed at the preservation of the 
purity of Islam against Western hegemony. The internationalisation of the war on terrorism has 
seen basic tenets of political liberalism such as nation-state sovereignty, observance of the rule of 
law, and individual rights being violated. In the USA, the administration has curtailed civil liberties 
through surveillance and monitoring of individuals and their communications, activities which 
have since become a standard norm for enhancing national security elsewhere in the world, thereby 
dealing a debilitating blow to the ethic of political liberalism.   
With one side arguably standing for Judeo-Christianity and secularism and the other claiming to 
represent Islam, and both maintaining that they are for freedom and justice, it looked like there 
was no room for compromise in the conflict. As ethical actions do not demand reciprocity, the 
question is whether the USA and allies can combat terrorism and win the WOT without sacrificing 
the values of political liberalism.  Given indications of the existence of deep-seated beliefs and 
value systems which drive each side to adopt extreme positions, there is a need for an intellectual 
disaggregation of the drivers of antagonism which seem to be anchored on identity and self-
interest. It seems that the core values and interests of each party constitute major drivers for 
intolerance and various unethical actions which are exhibited by the protagonists in the conflict 
which has sucked in different nation-states and subnational groups across the globe. 
1.2 Preliminary Review of Literature  
Though there are some differences in liberal thought, central to it are issues of equality, right to 
life and liberty, and diversity. Rawls (2005: 2-9) defines political liberalism as a self-standing 
doctrine that entails compromise, appreciating plurality and heterogeneity of society, and 
acknowledging each other as free and equal. These liberal thoughts are supported by libertarians 
such as Nozik (1974: 7-13) who argues that the government should be there only to promote life, 
liberty and property, thereby equating the state to a ‘night watchman’ where individual rights are 
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respected and nobody is threatened to act in certain ways that would have the effect of inducing 
certain kinds of behaviour. On the other hand, Hashmi (2002: 5) quotes John Kelsay explaining 
that for Islam, a just society is “one bound by limits set by God” in line with the Complementarity 
Thesis which sees religion and politics as playing supportive roles in advancing human welfare. 
In the case of the Islamic faith, rights exist in a framework where the individual is subordinate to 
society, where the conduct in the community is guided by the belief system. Despite the above 
stated ideals of liberalism, it seems in practice that the West is following Islamic thinking as the 
state is seen dictating the dos and don’ts in the WOT, where individual rights have been shelved 
in the name of state security. The excuse by the executive that liberal rights may need to be 
sacrificed temporarily in order to save democracy is viewed by critics as akin to the Vietnam War 
concept of ‘destroying the village in order to save it’.  
Strindberg and Warn (2011: 71) argue that since the declaration of the WOT both the USA and 
the terrorists have adopted a fundamentalist approach in the contest. Ahmed (2013: 80) accuses 
the USA and its allies of various transgressions of international law, which include extrajudicial 
killings, disrespect for nation-state sovereignty, and unilateral deployment of drones in other 
countries. Other related unethical commissions include torture, unauthorised monitoring of 
individuals’ communications and sharing of personal information across intelligence organisations 
worldwide. While acknowledging the need to fight terrorism in order to defend liberty, Ignatieff 
(2004: 33) argues that terrorism disorients democracy as it brings to the fore the question of ethics, 
given that the means to fight are surrounded by controversy. Noting that one of the foremost 
purposes of democracy is the protection of its members, the state is thrown into a dilemma as 
liberal rights and civil liberties put constraints on its actions.  
With the terrorists having undertaken to confront the USA head-on, there is a dilemma on what 
the state should do, as even engaging the terrorists whilst allowing for periodic adversarial reviews, 
as suggested by Ignatief (2004: 51), entails violating some individual rights while doing little and 
will help boost the menace.  Pronouncements by the likes of the late terrorist leader Osama bin 
Laden, who is quoted by Hoffman (2010: 82), swearing that “the US and those who live in the 
United States will never see peace before Muslims enjoy it” and the claim that they (the terrorists) 
have a duty to “construct the world as Islam requires” attracts a violent response from the USA 
and its Western allies. Such claims require a deep interrogation of the different belief systems to 
find out if indeed it is identity issues that are at the centre of the conflict, or if religion is being 
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exploited for nefarious reasons. The confusion is worsened by some provisions of the religious 
books such as the Qur’an where in one stance it encourages Muslims to fight all disbelievers as 
provided for in the Qur'an (Surah 9: 123) while at the same time it is against violence (2: 250; 
2:290). Whether it is a case of being read out of context or not, the scriptures are arguably used by 
some believers, and more so by extremists, to fight the others. But as the state takes head on those 
wearing identity badges of a particular group, it is seen as failing to maintain its neutrality status 
as demanded by the ethic of political liberalism, while doing nothing would be seen as an 
abdication of its responsibility of protecting its citizens.  
Adding to the challenges and paradoxes is the fact that while proponents of the WOT claim that 
the internationalisation of the war is meant to bring about democracy in the world and hence peace 
and security, the war is seen violating liberal values – ostensibly to defend the same.1 Liberalism 
argues that the justification for the existence of the state is, through a responsible government, to 
protect and guarantee individual rights and freedoms in pursuit of the ultimate goal of happiness, 
rights which, as argued by John Locke (1975), should not be interfered with. John Stewart Mill 
(1859: 13) adds further that liberalism entails respect for the diversity of opinions. Questions 
however arise as to what the nation-state can or has to do to combat terrorism without sacrificing 
the values of political liberalism. While Rawls (2005: 2-9) argues that liberalism entails the 
maximisation of basic liberties such as freedom of speech and freedom of conscience, challenges 
abound on the practicability of respecting the tenets in question given the nature of terrorism. If 
the end goal of liberalism is to maximise happiness, how can the goal be achieved if the war 
requires some sacrifice of some rights and freedoms? Or, alternatively, how can the end goal be 
achieved without a sacrifice of these rights and freedoms? Will a decision by nation states to 
respect these tenets wholesomely as they team up in the war against terrorism not give a free hand 
to the terrorists, thereby, in turn, deal a blow to the goal of maximising happiness? Given the noted 
tenets of political liberalism, which include the need for toleration2 of other cultures, there is need 
to explore what the real drivers of terrorism are, what means can be used to combat terrorism while 
respecting the values of political liberalism, and if indeed the philosophy of political liberalism 
can be sustained in the fight against terrorism to ensure international peace and security. 
                                                          
1 Arguments from various advocates of the WOT from leading scholars such as Jean Bethke Elshtain are discussed 
in detail in the forthcoming chapters.  
2 The term ‘toleration’ (instead of tolerance) is used by many scholars to refer to permission by government of 
various beliefs and practices mainly pursued by minority groups. 
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1.3 Research Objectives 
The study seeks: 
a. To explore the development of terrorism and its effect on the ethic of political liberalism.  
b. To determine the factors that have contributed to the internationalisation of the war on 
terrorism. 
c. To undertake a critical exploration of the beliefs and value systems of the belligerents to 
find out what drives each to disregard ethical approaches in advancing their respective 
causes. 
d. To explore possible ways in which the world can combat terrorism without sacrificing the 
values of political liberalism. 
e. To evaluate whether the ethic of political liberalism is a sustainable philosophy in the fight 
against international terrorism. 
 
1.4 Key Research Question and Research Sub-Questions 
1.4.1 Key Research Question 
In what ways is the internationalisation of the war on terrorism a threat to the ethic of political 
liberalism? 
1.4.2 Research Sub-Questions 
a. What has been the effect of terrorism on the ethic of political liberalism as it developed 
over time?  
b. What are the factors that have contributed to the internationalisation of war on terrorism? 
c. What are the fundamental differences between the warring parties that compel them to 
disregard ethical approaches in advancing their respective causes? 
d. How can the world combat terrorism without sacrificing the values of political liberalism? 
e. How sustainable is the ethic of political liberalism in the fight against terrorism? 
 
1.5 Theoretical Frameworks Upon Which the Research Project Will be Constructed 
The study will be anchored on Justice as Fairness Theory and Utilitarianism Theory. In the Justice 
as Fairness Theory, Rawls (2005: 2-11), suggests that all human beings have some inviolable rights 
such as right to life, right to freedom of speech and freedom of conscience, and justice should 
therefore be seen from an angle of fairness. Rawls (2005: 2-11) argues further that a peaceful 
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society – that is, one that is just, free and equal – leads to stability. He asserts that fairness entails 
seeing the society as “a fair system of social cooperation between free equal persons…” (Rawls, 
2005: 9). In this endeavour, justice entails among other things cooperation, which in turn calls for 
agreeing on some rules to guide conduct, as opposed to some party getting orders from some 
authority. Fairness further requires that “such things as threats of force and coercion, deception 
and fraud must be excluded” (Rawls (2005: 23).  
While there is a requirement for ensuring that individual rights are not violated willy-nilly in the 
fight against terrorism, rights are not absolute. The state may argue that there is need for security 
to secure the rights. The WOT may therefore call for the sacrifice of some rights in combating 
terrorism, given the amorphous nature of terrorism. To avoid abuse of state power on the one end 
and doing nothing on the other, a middle of the road option may be the adoption of the adversarial 
justification approach, as a “lesser evil”, to ensure checks and balances as suggested by Ignatieff 
(2004: 19-21). There will, however, still be counter-arguments that the approach is still a 
transgression of human rights as it condones a sacrifice of some liberties and freedoms. A situation 
where individuals and, moreso, states, cooperate as equal partners is, arguably, only idealistic. 
In his Utilitarian Theory, John Stewart Mill (1863: 7-17) argues for the maximisation of happiness 
as a moral obligation, that is, to ensure greatest happiness to the greatest number of people. Act 
utilitarianism means the act is right if it maximises utility while rule utilitarianism takes an act as 
right if it adheres to the rule and maximises utility.  Right or wrong is therefore a function of 
outcome. The Utilitarian Theory is against paternalism wherein, for example, state powers get 
abused to promote its interests at the expense of individual liberty, but it sees the role of the state 
as that of assisting the individual to achieve maximum happiness.  
Challenges, however, arise in defining and agreeing on the good. For example, the state may see 
the torture of a terrorist suspect as good if it will result in the saving of hundreds of lives yet it is 
clearly a violation of the individual’s rights, noting that it is unethical for a liberal state to use 
illegal means. The realism of the state focusing on helping individuals to maximise their happiness 
and remaining neutral when faced with terrorism is questionable. And more so, as noted by Hashmi 
(2002: 5), for Muslims happiness is not about material things but submitting to God as a moral 
obligation. 
Adding the ‘Lockean rights’ to the above theories, questions relating to how the state can fight 
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terrorists without constraining the liberty of individuals come to the fore. Adopting a 
consequentialist approach, that is, using morality to consider the interests of all parties affected, 
may, arguably, not produce the desired results in combating terrorism, and neither will the approach 
that espouses the deontological perspective – a requirement to follow the rules regardless of the 
consequences (LaFollette, 2007: 31). Islamists may argue further that there is need to restrain the 
licentious human being as leaving him3 alone will lead to further conflict as he attempts to satisfy 
his individual desires.  The study will therefore be guided by the above-noted theories while not 
being oblivious to other arguments from scholars such as Appiah (2005: 103) who contend that 
some Western liberal principles are nothing, but arrogant means meant to foist the Western 
civilization on the rest of the world. 
1.6 Research Methodology  
This study will adopt a qualitative research approach where attention will be paid to the conduct 
of the USA in the WOT. The study – which aims at unpacking ethical issues vis-à-vis the fight 
against terrorism – will adopt a historical analysis with a focus on the USA’s and allies’ pursuit of 
the WOT. Without losing sight of the fact that a historical approach may suffer from inaccurate 
information, the approach will allow for the consideration of various events in the WOT, thereby 
exploring ethical issues in the realm of time. A detailed analysis of past occurrences will allow for 
a contextual definition of the extremist approaches adopted by both sides, thus giving meaning to 
current seemingly meaningless events.  
Attention will not only be on the actual actions and stated objectives of the players. This study will 
also attempt to explore hidden intentions and meanings of actions. The qualitative study will thus 
explore the relationship between the USA’s and allies’ claims on being examples of democratic, 
liberal states, and actual action on the ground as it relates to the prosecution of the WOT. In that 
regard this study will pick a few examples which will include the USA’s invasion of Afghanistan 
and Iraq, the conduct of its ‘all-weather friend’, Israel, as the ally combats terrorism in the Middle 
East, the conduct of  countries such as China and Russia that suddenly became USA’s allies in the 
WOT as they used the WOT to suppress dissent in their countries, as well as the demeanour of US 
officials as they used various domestic legislation to profile suspected enemies of the state inside 
                                                          
3 The use of the masculine terms (him, his, man) is in this thesis gender-neutral and is thus used to refer to persons 
of both sexes. 
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the USA.  
It will be argued in this study that the USA has used the WOT not to seek for justice following the 
9/11 attacks, but for vengeful reasons and pursuit of strategic interests in the globe. It will be shown 
that the USA is, for all intents and purposes, transgressing the ethic of political liberalism while 
claiming to be fighting terrorists for doing the same. The study will thus undertake a critical 
analysis of the USA’s actions through the use of various cases in an attempt to answer the question 
of in what ways the internationalisation of the war on terror is a threat to the ethic of political 
liberalism. Taking a cue from Blaxter et al (2001: 64), who note that the qualitative approach 
allows for the exploration of minute detail thereby achieving depth, the review of the qualitative, 
historical data will allow for an analysis of why the players seem not to be concerned with 
individual rights as they pursue their goals. The qualitative approach should, therefore, allow for 
the focusing of attention on context as the research seeks for answers to the research question.  
By virtue of being desktop research, this study has made use of information from books from 
various university libraries, journal articles and internet sources, where official records and 
memoranda of prominent government and terrorist leaders have been scrutinised in an attempt to 
disaggregate their assumptions, value systems and motives. The approach keeps in mind the 
suggestion that what the terrorists say may give more information than what is intended. Sources 
to be utilised have included independent surveys, texts, declassified archival documents, symbols, 
communiques and declarations by national-, terrorist- and religious- leaders.  
 
1.7 Structure of the Thesis 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
Chapter 1 has introduced the study background with an overview of the literature, research 
objectives and related research questions, the theoretical framework, and the research 
methodology. 
Chapter 2: A Conceptual Definition of Terrorism 
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Chapter 2 seeks to come up with an understanding of what constitutes terrorism given the lack of 
an agreed upon definition of terrorism. That understanding will be used throughout the entire thesis 
for the discussion of various issues as they relate to the sections in question.   
Chapter 3: Terrorism in the Modern Era 
The aim of Chapter 3 is to review modern terrorism as the section takes note of the fact that 
terrorism has evolved over time despite its objectives remaining, by and large, unchanged. The 
idiosyncrasies of modern terrorism will provide a platform for subsequent discussions on issues 
which, among other things, relate to its effects and the effect of the responses to it, as well as the 
consideration of strategies to respond to it.  
Chapter 4: The Modus Operandi of Modern Terrorism 
Chapter 4 goes into greater detail in an attempt to find the drive and motivation behind the 
terrorists’ activities, which are viewed by fellow human beings as irrational. The chapter makes 
use of interviews and submissions by various terrorist leaders and operatives to try to understand 
the motive behind the terrorists’ unmitigated destruction of life and property.  While avoiding 
delving into the contentious ‘root causes’ debate, the chapter brings to the fore various issues that 
are assumed to constitute causes for terrorism and thereby subjects the factors to a detailed analysis 
while the issues in question are also evaluated against some empirical studies.   
Chapter 5: Islam and Terrorism 
Following a generic understanding of terrorism in the previous chapters and the possible 
motivation of terrorists in the last chapter, this section attempts to uncover the relationship of Islam 
and terrorism, given that most of the modern-day extremists claim to be acting in the name of 
Islam. The chapter ventures deep into the various provisions and demands of the Islamic faith as 
it seeks to evaluate the major driving force behind the religious extremists who clearly have the 
intent of inflicting maximum possible casualties and destruction.  
Chapter 6: The USA Foreign Policy and the Internationalisation of the War on Terrorism 
Though the USA foreign policy is, vis-à-vis the WOT, pronounced by the authorities as geared 
towards countering terrorism, this chapter argues that the USA is using the WOT to advance its 
foreign policy objectives. The chapter reviews various activities undertaken by the USA, in the 
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name of the WOT, and concludes that the activities in question are meant to advance its strategic 
interests all over the world and in particular in the Middle East, a region which constitutes a fertile 
recruitment ground for modern extremists.  
Chapter 7: The Ethic of Political Liberalism 
Having focused on the violation of various values of political liberalism in the previous chapters, 
Chapter 7 takes a detailed look at the ethic wherein it unpacks its constituent parts with the 
objective of using the findings to evaluate the USA’s counter-terrorism approach in the next 
chapter.  
Chapter 8: The United States of America Counter-Terrorism Measures as a Threat to the 
Ethic of Political Liberalism 
Chapter 8 takes a detailed look at various measures adopted by the USA following the 9/11 attacks. 
Making use of various pieces of legislation such as the USA PATRIOT Act and Counter Terrorism 
Financing, the chapter focuses on the effect of the measures undertaken by the USA in a bid to 
protect the homeland. The section also considers proactive counter-terrorism approaches such as 
surveillance and the effect of ‘warring’ terrorism on the ethic of political liberalism.   
 
Chapter 9: General Conclusion 
This chapter synthesises and consolidates the various findings of the study with an objective of 
utilising the major themes for consideration in the recommendations.  
Chapter 10: Recommendations 
This last chapter of the thesis proffers suggestions for consideration by the USA and various 
interest groups such as policy makers on how to combat terrorism and curb its proliferation while 
paying attention to the need to respect liberal values such as individual rights and freedoms, 
morality, the rule of law and provisions of international law.  
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CHAPTER TWO: A CONCEPTUAL DEFINITION OF TERRORISM 
2.1 Introduction 
Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in New York, the USA declared a war on 
terrorism and its then President George W. Bush went on to implore the whole world to be part of 
the war to eradicate terrorism. President Bush declared that terrorism was a global war and, in his 
speech, which served as a battle cry, stated unequivocally that there was no middle ground as he 
told the world that one was either with the USA or with the terrorists. The USA thus went all over 
the world in pursuit of the terrorists. As the USA sought for the cooperation of the whole world in 
eliminating terrorism, it found it not easy to rally the entire world in the fight against terrorism, 
given that there was – as is currently the case – no agreement on what constitutes terrorism. Given 
the lack of an agreement on the definition of the term ‘terrorism’, this chapter will start with a 
conceptual definition of terrorism, with the aim of coming up with a working understanding of 
terrorism.  This should assist in ensuring an objective analysis of terrorism and evaluation of its 
effects on the ethic of political liberalism in the forthcoming sections of the study.  The conception 
of what constitutes terrorism will help in the evaluation of response measures in the subsequent 
chapters of the thesis. The conceptual definition will seek to look at terrorism as a value free 
concept in the same manner that the term war will be discussed. It is only later on that ethical 
implications of the USA’s and its allies’ responses to international terrorism have on the values of 
political liberalism will be discussed.  
This chapter therefore endeavours to come up with a working definition of terrorism which will 
be used in subsequent chapters to support the proposition that the internationalisation of the war 
on terrorism is a threat to liberal values as well as global peace and security.  This chapter will 
discuss the different types of warfare briefly, namely, conventional warfare, nuclear warfare and 
irregular warfare, with the objective of locating terrorism in warfare. Since the term terrorism 
means different things to different people, it is useful to provide a conceptual definition of 
terrorism that will enable a more focused discussion in this study.  
2.2 Definition of Terrorism 
The Concise Oxford English Dictionary describes terrorism as “the unofficial or unauthorised use 
of violence and intimidation in the pursuit of political aims” while the Columbia Encyclopaedia 
relates terrorism to “the threat or use of violence, often against the civilian population, to achieve 
political ends”. Common to the two definitions above is the use of violence, which is aimed at 
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achieving some political objectives. The assumption here is that terrorists have some political 
objectives which they would want to be realised, and the means to the realisation of that end is 
intimidation and fear, as noted in the two definitions. It is the use of violence to achieve political 
objectives, as argued by Hoffman (2006: 6), which defines terrorism. Violence is meant to 
intimidate the target and create fear, thereby acting as a means of achieving the political objective. 
In agreement, Lutz and Lutz (2004: 194) add that it is the political goals that separate terrorism 
from other forms of violence, as terrorism aims at forcing policy or ideological changes, or a total 
change of government.  
The qualification of the violence as ‘systematic’ by the Columbia Encyclopaedia implies that the 
chosen approach to achieve the desired aim is not a mere reaction to an incident, but is a rational, 
well thought out action. Unlike some scholars who have equated terrorists to some ‘crazy animals’, 
given their desire to see extensive destruction and bloodshed, a number of scholars including 
Hoffman (1998: 7) argue that engagements with terrorists have shown that they are normal people, 
which is a paradox as ‘normal’ people are not expected to behave the way terrorists do. In support 
of his argument, Hoffman (1998) further advises that engagement with terrorists shows that they 
are “highly articulate and extremely thoughtful individuals” who make calculations in relation to 
options for a given outcome and “reluctantly” settle for the use of violence. This revelation should 
constitute a cause for both worry and hope. It is a cause for worry when supposed-to-normal human 
beings are seen marvelling in death and destruction, implying that it would take great effort to stop 
terrorists from engaging in such activities. But the fact that the terrorists are rational means that 
something can be done to stop them, or at least dissuade them from killing innocent individuals 
and destroying property.   
It is likely that the inclusion of the word ‘unlawful’ to describe the terrorists’ violence in the 
Concise Oxford English Dictionary definition is meant to support the understanding that only the 
state has an exclusive right to use force, subject to certain constraints, such as self-defence or with 
the authorisation of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) as provided by customary 
international law and the United Nations (UN) Charter (Article 2(4), Article 51, and Chapter VII). 
The provisions therefore disqualify subnational groups from using force for whatever reason and, 
moreso, unsanctioned use of violence, a sanction which also applies to state actors. The use of the 
phrase ‘especially against civilians’ by the Concise Oxford English Dictionary points to the 
understanding that terrorists focus their attacks on unarmed members of the society, for one reason 
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or another. There is consensus amongst scholars that terrorism is by and large directed at civilians. 
Lutz and Lutz (2004: 195) noted that the target audience extends beyond the victim of terrorism, 
that is, the civilian population. It is meant to influence the behaviour of a third party, which happens 
to be the government.  As argued by Neumann (2009: 71), the targeting of civilians by terrorists 
makes terrorism an illegal form of warfare, and this act on its own has various negative effects as 
will be explored in detail in the forthcoming chapters. Other than focusing on unarmed civilians, 
terrorists often prefer other soft targets which they see as symbolising the state. The understanding 
therefore is that terrorism is a kind of warfare, which just like all other types of warfare, though 
illegal, and is undertaken by a given actor to meet an objective – an objective which in almost all, 
if not all, the cases, has political connotations. Terrorists have found violence through the use of 
arms of war to be the ideal means to pursue the political objectives in question.  
Hoffman (1998: 7) argued that terrorism in the modern era is associated with the use of violence 
by non-state actors (subnational groups) to achieve some objectives, which are often political in 
nature. As opposed to stealth terrorism which is confined to given localities, modern terrorism is 
transnational as the fighters adopt more effective strategies such as aerial terrorism where they 
hijack passenger aeroplanes in the skies. With the hijacked planes travelling across countries and 
the passengers being invariably of different nationalities, the war on terrorism gets 
internationalised. Aerial terrorism thus turns the world into a global village and, as a result, attracts 
international media coverage. The entire world gets involved as casualties of this type of aerial 
terrorism is in the global village, and not necessarily one particular country. This phenomenon 
hence attracts different states to get involved in the ‘terrorist wars’ as they are affected by the 
actions of the terrorists in one way or another. As the war is internationalised, terrorists find reasons 
for avenging the attacks, thereby leading to the cycle of violence which characterises terrorism. 
Terrorists thus get the sought international audience which they use for propaganda purposes as 
they ensure that they subject the audience to maximum fear. Mass media, television in particular, 
is a handy terrorist tool for propagating terrorists’ grievances whilst instilling fear in the population 
to induce the government to give in to the terrorists’ political demands. 
Despite the brutality, cruelty and destruction of life and property exhibited by terrorism, the USA 
has not been able to get all countries of the world to cooperate with it in the fight against terrorism. 
There could be a number of reasons for the lack of cooperation, but the major challenge is likely 
centred on the old adage that ‘one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter’. The lack of 
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cooperation and hence the unavailability of an agreed upon definition of terrorism has contributed 
significantly to the continued use of terrorism as a form of warfare by various non-state actors. 
Since terrorism is a form of warfare, it is imperative that it is discussed in relation to other types 
of warfare, and, in particular, irregular warfare which, by virtue of including terrorism, poses an 
immense challenge to global peace and security.   
2.3 Conventional Warfare 
Scholars have distinguished three types of warfare, namely, conventional warfare, nuclear warfare 
and irregular warfare.  Conventional warfare, which is also known as regular warfare, relates to 
the use of firepower by a state actor against the enemy’s military and other targets that are regarded 
as the enemy’s centre of gravity. Conventional warfare, unlike terrorism which is directed at 
civilians, is guided by some conventions such as the Geneva Convention that prohibit the 
deliberate targeting of civilians. Conventional warfare is founded on a just war theory which is 
based on the principles of jus ad bellum and jus in bello. The principles in question provide checks 
and balances for verifying if the war, itself, and the means used are just (Brian Rend, 2000: 31).  
Weeks (2010: 43) explains that jus ad bellum, which means justice of the war, is about the reasons 
for going to war, which must be just. The just cause of the war places the responsibility of the 
intention of the war on the political leadership of the state, which in a democracy is answerable to 
the people, whereas the conduct of the state is expected to conform to international norms. This 
contradicts terrorism as terrorists are free to do what they desire given that they are answerable to 
themselves only. Rend (2000: 45) notes that the jus ad bellum principle includes the need for the 
war to be the last resort, the requirement for war to be waged with the right (just) intention, as well 
as the need for it to have a reasonable chance of success. As can be noted, these requirements – 
from which the terrorists are free – place constraints on the state in combating terrorism, which 
issues will be considered in detail in the forthcoming sections.  
Conventional warfare is also guided by the just war principle of jus in bello, which refers to justice 
in the (actual conduct of war. Justice in war is basically governed by two principles, namely, 
discrimination, a principle which gives immunity to non-combatants, and proportionality which 
calls for proportional use of force in response to an attack. Rend (2000: 46) notes that the jus in 
bello principle is meant to be a humanitarian consideration to limit the negative effects of war. 
As would be realised, all these conditions regulate the conduct of war by state actors. They prohibit 
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the use of force against “the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another 
state” (Rend, 2000: 178). They are meant to protect human rights and as well as act as a guarantor 
for international peace and security. The provisions, however, inadvertently, give a free hand to 
terrorists to take advantage of the constraints liberal democracy imposes on the state. The 
constraints give terrorists the opportunity to use violence to advance their political objectives while 
the state cannot, or rather should not, replicate the same means even when they are aimed at 
defending itself, as doing so would be against the principle of jus in bello. 
2.4 Nuclear Warfare 
Nuclear warfare relates to the use of atomic or hydrogen bombs for the purpose of annihilating the 
enemy within the shortest possible period of time. Unlike in conventional warfare where there are 
classical tactical objectives where troops usually hold ground, nuclear weapons are often directed 
at the enemy’s strong points and may indeed be targeted at the civilian population and 
infrastructure, as was the case during the Second World War. Sokolski (2004: 1) in fact advises 
that nuclear weapons were created for the bombardment of cities. This scholar notes that the 
weapons so far have one purpose “only for civilian destruction” (Sokolski, 2004: 1). Sokolski’s 
observation is arguably correct as history has recorded the use of nuclear weapons only twice – 
both by the USA against the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 during the Second 
World War. The use of nuclear weapons is therefore a form of warfare which exhibits some 
characteristics that resemble those of terrorism insofar as its non-discriminatory nature is 
concerned.  
The intentional targeting of civilians through the use of nuclear weapons and their devastating 
nature raises controversy on whether or not to classify such acts as terrorism. Confining the 
definition of terrorism to non-state actors would arguably leave out state actors which have in the 
past chosen, and may in the future choose, to target non-combatants, especially with the clear 
objective of inducing panic and fear in the civilian population, as was the case with the two nuclear 
attacks during the Second World War already mentioned. Nuclear warfare is associated with the 
concept of mutual assured destruction (MAD) which is a form of deterrent that gained prominence 
during the Cold War era (from 1945 to 1989). The nuclear capability possessed by the two 
superpowers, namely the USA and Soviet Union allowed for each party to retaliate should one 
initiate a nuclear strike. The resultant state of affairs therefore dissuaded either party from attacking 
the other as each was assured of retaliation (Sokolski, 2004: 37). It is worth noting that as a result 
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of MAD, nuclear weapons were never used in the Cold War era. The principle of deterrence 
remains in use today as a response mechanism to combat terrorism, as will be discussed in detail 
in forthcoming chapters.  
Jalalzai (2015: 47-51) indicated that there are at least 25 countries that possess nuclear weapons in 
the world. The nuclear states include Israel, which is yet to declare its nuclear arsenal, and its two 
neighbours, India and Pakistan. A number of scholars have expressed concern over the security of 
nuclear weapons, given the expected consequences if the weapons were to fall into the hands of 
terrorists. The fears are exacerbated by revelations of various incidents of theft of nuclear weapons 
material and information, more so given indications that terrorists are known to be actively looking 
for nuclear weapons.  
Jalalzai (2015: 51) claimed that the Iraqi government made a report to the United Nations (UN) 
advising that the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) terrorists managed, some time back, to get 
hold of some nuclear weapons in northern Iraq, a fact which, if true, should be a cause for worry 
in as far as international peace and security is concerned. This use of nuclear weapons by terrorists 
would be a diversion from the norm as terrorists have all along been associated with small 
weapons, which they can easily conceal as they manoeuvre around without dictation. The 
possession of nuclear weapons by the ISIS terrorist organisation, which, according to the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA), has between 20 000 and 31 500 fighters, and which is known to have 
an ability to recruit at a very efficient rate from all over the world, as revealed by Jalalzai (2015), 
would further complicate the definition of terrorism, given that nuclear weapons have all along 
been the preserve of state actors. This fear is confirmed by Hoffman (2010: 41), who urges the 
world not to rule out both secular and religious terrorists’ interest in securing and using nuclear 
weapons. Other than increasing the threat to global peace and security, the possibility of terrorists 
adopting nuclear warfare would blur the distinction between the different kinds of warfare.  
2.5 Irregular Warfare 
The third type of military combat, irregular warfare (IW), is an asymmetric means where indirect 
approaches are used to erode the power of a comparatively strong enemy, often with the objective 
of gaining influence over the population. This type of warfare may be used by armed criminal 
networks, insurgents, state and terrorists, and has often been used in various parts of the world by 
guerrillas fighting for independence. Examples of wars where fighters used terrorism to achieve 
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independence are the Algerian War of independence in the 1950s, the Zimbabwean Chimurenga 
in the 1970s, and the wars waged by the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in Northern Ireland and the 
(Jewish) Irgun in Israel against British colonial rule. It is critical that there be a clear distinction 
between guerrilla warfare and terrorism right from the onset to avoid falling into the trap of 
justifying terrorism by the motivation behind the act.  
Guerrilla warfare is one of the asymmetric approaches used for confronting a stronger enemy. It 
does not necessarily entail the use of terrorism, though guerrillas fighting for independence from 
colonialists are known invariably to have used terrorism in their struggles while they argued that 
they were not terrorists (Nichiporuk and Szayna, 2008: 71). Arguments for and against the use of 
terrorism by the weak are a subject of detailed evaluation in the forthcoming sections, suffice to 
mention that those fighting for freedom, even if using devious, illegal means, are known to have 
argued spiritedly that they had been forced to take up arms and use the unconventional approach 
in pursuit of justice, having been left with no alternative as a weaker party. 
States have been called upon, time and again, to respond to asymmetric attacks from non-regular 
formations. Strategic sense means that they too have to adopt IW if they are to be effective in 
combating the enemy. Even where the regular forces employ substantive military capability as a 
direct approach, IW requires the use of indirect approaches to counter the adversary’s military 
superiority. Nichiporuk and Szayna (2008: 71) advise that IW is a type of warfare that is 
interwoven with political and military factors, given that both political considerations and military 
operations play an important role in the success of the approach. These scholars note that as a form 
of warfare, IW “encompasses insurgency, counter-insurgency, terrorism and counter-terrorism” 
(Nichiporuk and Szayna, 2008: 9).  
Nichiporuk and Szayna (2008: 80-81) opine that there is a likelihood of an increased use of IW 
operations by the US Armed Forces given the threat posed by the Al-Qaeda transnational terrorists, 
and further caution that such operations often entail a long struggle. As opposed to regular warfare, 
IW is characterised by asymmetric threats and one major difference with regular warfare is that its 
success does not necessarily mean the physical defeat of the enemy, but rather the winning of the 
support, that is, allegiance, of the population. IW therefore includes non-kinetic operations such 
as psychological operations (often referred to as PsyOps). The success of PsyOps is embedded in 
the concept of legitimacy and credibility ((Nichiporuk and Szayna, 2008: 9). Success entails the 
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need for the target group for PsyOps to have faith in the entity undertaking the operations as IW is 
about competition for the sympathy of the population. IW therefore recognises that the population 
forms the support base without which the terrorists cannot win the war. The population constitutes 
the water in which the fish have to survive. Nichiporuk and Szayna (2008: 85) thus describe this 
form of warfare as ‘populationcentric’. The population-centred objective, however, does not 
preclude the use of military force in IW operations. Combat operations will be inevitable in various 
circumstances in IW but the ultimate aim is to win the support of the population. This entails the 
need for setting intermediate objectives which will invariably include assurance of personal 
security, the restoration of various essential services and amenities, economic development 
programmes, and erecting pillars to support good governance in an attempt to win the support of 
the population. In this regard, IW therefore places more weight on the support of the population as 
opposed to military victory ((Nichiporuk and Szayna, 2008: 85).  
Apart from the fact that IW is the very form of warfare used by terrorists, Cordesman (2002: 2) 
urges states to focus on asymmetric warfare, given the likelihood of it remaining relevant for some 
time to come. This scholar argues further that despite the risks associated with attacking a state as 
powerful as the USA, terrorists are likely to initiate attacks without considering the risks, and, for 
that matter, the very fact that one party is far more powerful relatively than the other creates an 
incentive for asymmetric warfare. He also further notes that IW is an attraction for those groups 
feeling left behind, in particular those facing “deepening economic instability, political instability 
and cultural alienation” (Cordesman, 2002: 2). Given the likely increase of terrorism directed at 
powers such as the USA as the terrorists pursue their grievances, IW is likely to remain at the 
centre of future conflicts, as is the case in the current era. 
In contemporary times IW which is utilised effectively by terrorists has become a major problem 
for the whole world. Terrorists’ disregard for the laws of warfare, and, in particular, the deliberate 
targeting of civilians and random choice of targets, where the battlefield is the whole world, seems 
to give adequate reason for the internationalisation of the war on terror. The unconventional 
approach to warfare provides justification to affected countries such as the USA to rally allies 
across the world to fight the unsanctioned illegal use of violence by terrorists.  
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2.6 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter aimed at coming up with an understanding of what constitutes terrorism. It took into 
consideration the fact that there is currently no agreed upon definition of terrorism. The term 
terrorism has been used loosely over time by various political players to refer to one’s enemies or 
political opponents.  Despite the lack of an agreement on the definition, terrorism is an illegal form 
of warfare that generally targets civilians and other soft targets which are often of symbolic value 
to the state. Terrorism uses unregulated violence to achieve political objectives through the creation 
of fear and use of intimidation. It is a strategy or tactic that is generally used by subnational groups 
to create power, which the terrorists use to try to force political change through non-democratic 
processes. Terrorism therefore constitutes a challenge to nation-states and the rules of warfare 
through its unregulated use of violence.  While motivation remains a critical element in trying to 
understand terrorism, it is the act, that is, the means used to achieve the objective, that defines 
terrorism.  
Having analysed the nature of terrorist attacks, this chapter concurred with various scholars that 
terrorism uses brutal, systematic violence, which is aimed at instilling fear in the target.  Though 
the violence is often directed at the civilian population, government has been the ultimate target 
audience. Terrorism is also characterised by the use of propaganda, which it blends with other tools 
such as the media and psychological operations to achieve its objectives. It was argued that the 
terrorists’ position that the end justifies the means places a great challenge in combating terrorism 
which uses a variety of weapons, ranging from small arms to explosives, and tactics which range 
from direct fire attacks to hijacking of aircraft.   
This chapter also attempted to compare and contrast terrorism with other forms of warfare, namely, 
conventional warfare, nuclear warfare and IW. It was shown that, unlike in conventional warfare 
where the ‘disciplined’ regular troops are subjected to principles of warfare, terrorists use any 
means to achieve their objectives. While the jus ad bellum principle demands that the cause for 
war should be just, this requirement does not mean anything to terrorists who are not answerable 
to anyone. Similarly, it was shown that the jus in bello requirement for the conduct in war to 
discriminate combatants from civilians is not applicable to terrorists as terrorists do exactly the 
opposite by targeting civilians. 
It was further shown that, like terrorism, nuclear warfare is a form of military engagement which 
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results in extensive destruction of property and deaths of innocent civilians. The argument was that 
it is actually a form of terrorism given its indiscriminate nature, an observation which would 
technically not leave out state actors in the definition of terrorism. A case was made for large-scale 
insecurity if terrorists were to get access to nuclear weapons, a development which would 
complicate the definition of terrorism further given the fact that nuclear weapons have all along 
been the preserve of nation-states.  
In the last section of this chapter it was demonstrated that as a form of warfare terrorism is located 
in the IW category as this type of combat embraces its asymmetric nature. The regular forces of 
the state are similarly forced to adopt an IW warfare approach if they have to combat the terrorists 
effectively.  It was shown that, as opposed to a focus on winning physical fights, IW calls for the 
winning of the hearts and minds of the population as each side attempts to alienate its opponents 
from the civilian population. The battle for the support of the population hence places constraints 
on the response strategies that can be used by the state as it is bound by the provisions of 
international law and norms while terrorists take advantage of these constraints to gain an upper 
hand.  
This chapter concluded that despite the use of legal conventional warfare and IW by nation-states, 
terrorists continue to disregard laws of warfare as they escalate their attacks on unarmed civilians. 
Terrorist use of violent, illegal forms of warfare has the effect of escalating the conflict as disregard 
for the rule of law allows terrorists to pick their targets all over the world. Their disproportionate 
use of force, which is contrary to the just war principles, allows them to kill as many civilians as 
possible in their pursuit of political change. Therefore, in an attempt to combat this form of illegal 
warfare, it is essential that the peculiarities of modern terrorism be investigated in the light of an 
understanding of what constitutes terrorism, a term which is used throughout this study to refer to 
the illegal use of force by anyone, mainly to attain political-related objectives.  
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CHAPTER THREE: TERRORISM IN THE MODERN ERA 
3.1 Introduction 
There is consensus among academics and national leaders that terrorism, which is an illegal form 
of warfare that is mainly targeted at civilians, is a major threat to global peace and security in the 
modern era. Terrorism has transformed over time from the old type which aimed at getting 
maximum publicity, to the current, which not only seeks attention, but also aims at inflicting 
maximum possible casualties. Unlike the old terrorist groups such as the anarchists and nationalist 
groups which had clear targets, the enemy of the modern terrorist is broadly defined; it is arguably 
anyone who does not belong to the terrorist group. Chapter 2 demonstrated that despite the lack of 
an agreement on the definition of terrorism, terrorism is an illegal form of warfare that thrives on 
the use of violence and fear, aimed mainly at innocent civilians, to achieve political objectives. 
Whereas the use of political violence was driven by both secular and religious grievances in old 
terrorism, terrorism in the modern era is linked mainly to the latter, which ironically, shows a 
penchant for unmitigated violence against other religious faiths and cultures. 
The first section of this chapter will discuss religious terrorism in the modern era. In this section 
the use of religion in pursuit of political violence vis-à-vis the conceptual definition of terrorism 
as discussed in Chapter 2 will be explored. The discussion on religiously-inspired terrorism will 
be undertaken in the milieu of the values of political liberalism which include pluralism and 
individual rights, alongside the cornerstone principles of a just war, namely, jus ad bellum and jus 
in bello. The discussion shall of necessity focus on Islam, which happens to be the religion that is 
used by most modern-day terrorists as a justification for their terrorist activities.  
The second section will explore the politics of modern-day terrorism, which happens to be a 
mixture of an endless list of grievances. In this section the writer will enquire whether the issues 
raised by terrorists do constitute genuine grievances, whether there are no alternative legal means 
to address the grievances, and whether there is a possibility for terrorism to disappear or subside 
were the grievances to be addressed. Noting the inspiration of faith in religious terrorism and the 
concomitant grievances of the perpetrators, the last section will discuss aerial terrorism, a tactic 
which modern terrorists have used extensively to seek for concessions from their enemies.  In this 
section the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) will be used as an example to explore the 
transnational nature and objectives of this modern type of terrorism. The PLO is a renowned 
terrorist group that was responsible for dramatic skyjackings in the mid-20th century. This chapter 
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will endeavour to establish the link between religious terrorism, the politics of modern terrorism, 
and terrorism in the skies, given the apparent desire of modern terrorism to inflict mass casualties 
while attracting maximum possible media attention – all factors which arguably led to the 
internationalisation of the war on terrorism.  
3.2 Religious Terrorism 
Religious terrorism is not a new phenomenon. It has been utilised in the past by ancient terrorist 
groups such as the Zealots-Sicarri, a Jewish religious terrorist group that operated in Judea in the 
first century, the Thugees which terrorised India in the 7th century and the Assassins, a secretive 
Shiite Muslim sect that operated between the 11th and 13th centuries (Hoffman, 2006: 71). Unlike 
the old religiously-inspired terrorist groups which had a clear ethno-nationalist agenda such as the 
desire for independence that would, in turn, allow them to practise their religion unhindered, it 
seems that the religious motive is the over-arching driver for most modern terrorist groups.  
Other than the Islamic-inspired terrorist groups, terrorism shares a long history with many other 
religions. Examples include the Jewish Irgun which undertook various terrorist attacks against the 
British in the mid-20th century and the Catholic Irish Republican Army and Ulster Freedom 
Fighters of Northern Ireland who claim loyalty to Protestantism. The late 20th century witnessed 
religious terrorist groups such as Aum Shinrikyo, which has links with Japanese Buddhism, 
attempting to bring forward the apocalypse by releasing nerve gas in a Tokyo subway, killing 
dozens of commuters and leaving 4 000 injured (Hoffman, 2006: 71). In the USA, anti-abortion 
groups have not hesitated to kill in the name of God. Even in prison they have shown no remorse 
as they have argued that they are proud for doing a most righteous thing. Other than organised 
groups, numerous individuals motivated by religion have been implicated in various acts of 
political violence. These include the Jewish extremist, Yigal Amir, who assassinated the Israeli 
Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in 1995 where he claimed to have been following God’s orders, and 
Timothy McVeigh who bombed the Oklahoma City federal office building in 1995, which resulted 
in the death of 168 people (Hoffman, 2006: 72).  
Nyatepe-Coo (2004: 31) argued that religious terrorism is characterised by more bloodshed and 
destruction. Religious terrorism generally exhibits no compunction or moral constraints as the 
respect for fellow human beings is lost in pursuit of some divine belief.  Hoffman (2006: 88) further 
argues that religious terrorists view violence as a “sacramental act or divine duty executed in direct 
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response to some theological demand or imperative”. It is arguably the belief in the supernatural 
that gives many human beings meaning to life, which for some leads to extremism. The beliefs 
invariably serve as a source of inspiration for the extremists to the extent that they are prepared to 
sacrifice their lives through violent acts in anticipation of a reward in the afterlife.  
Though there is clear evidence, for example, shown by the notes left by individuals who have 
committed suicide, that the extremists do expect some reward as a result of the use of political 
violence to kill ‘infidels’, there is a school of thought which argues that religiously-motivated 
violence is not an end in itself, unlike what some scholars such as Milton-Edwards (2006: 31) 
suggest. The argument is that the violence which is aimed at achieving apocalyptic ends – an end 
where the good would prevail over evil – is aimed at the establishment of a socio-political order 
that would usher in an ideology that is different from the one characterised by Western depravity. 
A close analysis of this objective seems to suggest a wish to induce humankind to see the world 
from a single prism and with the view being driven by the dictates of the Islamic faith. The 
researcher argues that religion is at the centre of everything; even if it may not be an end in itself, 
it cannot be separated from politics, at least in as far as Islam is concerned. Noting arguments by 
Rapoport (1988: 13) suggesting that the religious extremists would do anything to convince God 
that they are prepared to die for him, the extremists’ actions are clearly driven by religious 
objectives. The desire by one party to compel others to see the world from their point of view 
inevitably leads to conflict, retribution and an endless cycle of violence, which typically 
characterises terrorism.  
Law (2009: 281) notes that for Muslims, the monolithic God is the source for all authority as given 
in the Sharia law. Islamic fundamentalists inevitably see the USA and all other secular Western 
governments as illegitimate, hence their desire to save the world by fighting secularism. Guided 
by their absolutist doctrines, the Islamic extremists see the USA as ‘the Great Satan’ representing 
the forces of darkness. Killing the infidels is a sacramental duty for them and getting killed in the 
process makes one a martyr with an assurance of rewards in the next life. It is interesting to note 
how extremists - whether Muslim, Christian, secular, or otherwise - are quick to evoke the name 
of God to justify their arguments and actions. Welch (2006: 17) quotes a deputy undersecretary in 
the USA, William Boykin, advising that the war against terrorism was a war between a Christian 
America and Satan, and went on to claim that Muslims did not worship the real God but an idol.   
Ahman al-Zawahiri and Omar Abdul-Rahman, who were implicated in the assassination of 
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Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat in 1981, made it clear during their trial that they put their 
religion above everything else – typically an inherent undertaking of all religious fundamentalists. 
Rahman went on to declare that, “We owe to God obedience and no obedience is owed to those 
(referring to the President of the Republic) who disobey God” (Welch, 2006: 17). Raising similar 
issues at that time on the conduct of Sadat’s secular but undemocratic regime, Zawahiri is quoted 
as asking, “Where is democracy? Where is freedom? Where is human rights? Where is justice?” 
as he went on to advise the world that, “We will never forget” (Law, 2009: 96).  He raised all these 
questions and made the threats as he went through a list of individuals who had succumbed to 
torture from the Sadat government.   
The above questions, even if they were not rhetorical, would unlikely attract convincing responses 
from the USA and its Egyptian ally given that all issues raised by Zawahiri were about the tenets 
of democracy, which the USA and allies claimed to be championing. With the secular West having 
a totally different belief system which it is prepared to defend at all costs, the Muslim extremists 
are, on the other side, more than ready to use all force possible – including the sacrifice of life – 
for what they see as the good of humankind. As argued by Nyatepe-Coo (2004: 124), they are even 
prepared to “smite the infidel” with the conviction that they are helping the transgressor to have a 
better afterlife compared to what they (the ‘infidels’) would get if they were left alone. It is herein 
that Islam’s wish to help, if not coerce, others to decide what is good for them clashes with the 
Western liberal philosophy which emphasises the freedom of the individual. Whilst for Islam the 
state has an obligation for promoting life according to God’s will as observed by Jefferis (2010: 
71), for the West the relationship between the individual and the state is based on a social contract 
where the individual surrenders some personal autonomy to the state and is (in theory) allowed to 
pursue his own life, for as long as those activities do not infringe on the rights of others, while the 
state guarantees his protection. Nyatepe-Coo (2004) thus argues that the belief of giving primacy 
to religion, a religion that is not universal, is a source of perpetual violence in a diverse world.  
The Islamic belief is therefore set to put Muslims in conflict with the West, which happens to have 
a totally different value system. While it may be argued that each party should not be bothered 
with the beliefs of the other, the globalisation of the world forces different civilisations to 
intermingle, and it is during the unavoidable interaction that conflict is bound to ensue as each 
attempts to defend or convert the other to its side. Since time immemorial, all religions are known 
to have attempted to convert those with different belief systems through persuasion or use of force 
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where the former has failed. For Muslims, the jihad is the answer. Nyatepe-Coo (2004: 7) argues 
that the term ‘jihad’ has different meanings ranging from the struggle to realise God’s will to a 
struggle to convert non-Muslims to Islam, with the latter understanding authorising the execution 
of a holy war on behalf of Islam. The terrorist attacks by Muslim extremists may thus be seen as 
attempts by a purist religion to convert non-Muslims, thereby getting rid of decadence in the world. 
Nyatepe-Coo (2004: 7-13) further notes that Islam, like many other religions, acknowledges the 
need for warfare in times of need as provided for in some verses in the Qur’an such as Surah 9:5 
which says, “Fight and slay the pagans wherever ye find them and seize them, beleaguer them and 
lie in wait for them in every stratagem in war”. While the Muslims, just like any other religious 
practitioners, may cherry pick the scriptures to serve a particular need or justify a given course of 
action, they seem convinced that the will of God as dictated in the Sharia must always prevail. The 
individual rights espoused by the West must therefore be subordinated to God’s will (as 
commanded in the Qur’an). 
The Islamic belief system entreats them to deal with evils such as corruption, decadence, sexual 
permissiveness and homosexuality – all ‘sins’ which, they argue, are allowed and promoted by the 
secular West. Muslims’ relationship with the West, and the Americans in particular, is hence 
characterised by fear and contempt as they see the West as “…cultural imperialists, the destroyer 
of tradition and family and taken-for-granted patterns of life” (Mazarr, 2002: 31).  They therefore 
endeavour to force Westerners to change their way of life, which must be replaced by a conduct 
that adheres to God’s law. The process entails waging a war against the sinners. But jus ad bellum, 
as noted in the last chapter, demands, amongst other things, that the war must be waged with the 
right intention, meaning that the one initiating the war must clearly be desirous of ‘righting’ a 
wrong or getting a redress on a grievance. Given a grievance here which is clearly based on 
subjective moral values, which the attacker presumes should be applicable to all humankind, the 
war waged by terrorists becomes unjust. Even if there was a just cause for going to war, the 
execution of the war fails to pass the jus in bello test as it does not respect the immunity of non-
combatants. It thereby renders religious terrorism illegal, at least in as far as the law of warfare is 
concerned.  
It is clear that the numerous emotive proclamations noted above, while directed at respective 
Western governments, have a negative effect on the civilian populations which happen to bear the 
brunt of the conflict. The Western modernity, which scholars such as Hanson (1983) refers to as 
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‘Westoxication’ as a result of its destruction of tradition and the related globalisation, is arguably 
there to stay. Paradoxically, the same individuals who condemn the ungodly Western civilisation 
are unquestionably enjoying the benefits of the civilisation they despise. The forces of 
globalisation will inevitably continue pitting the ‘infidels’ against the Islamic extremists. It is for 
related reasons that scholars such as Eric Kraemer, quoted in Nyatepe-Coo (2004: 128), advocate 
for a ‘world-ethics’ perspective which would consider relations as they affect the whole world. 
This is meant to be a selfless approach which considers one’s group as “part of the solution in 
moral calculations” (Nyatepe-Coo, 2004: 128). The assumption is that an appreciation of one 
another’s culture and interests would reduce conflict and, resultantly, the incidence of terrorism. 
However, as noble as the idea could be, one may argue that the proposal has no guarantee for 
success given the argument that ‘jihadist terrorism’ is about imposing its views on others as 
interpreted from the Qur’an. Chaliand and Blin (2007: 71), argue that jihadist terrorism does not 
show a clear political vision but aims at mass radicalisation. Arguably, the goal of mass 
radicalisation is the establishment of a single belief system which would worship Allah in 
accordance with the provisions of the Qur’an. Should that be the case, as it seems to be, the 
adoption of the world ethics approach might not be successful in eradicating religiously-inspired 
terrorism.  
With such selfless approaches unlikely to be successful in addressing the grievances of modern 
terrorism, one possible alternative strategy is the use of force. It is, however, known from history 
that force normally attracts a countervailing power and an endless cycle of violence. The religious 
extremists are likely to capitalise on the use of force by the West to appeal to their followers to 
take up arms and respond in kind. The use of force gives the extremists a golden opportunity to up 
the ante in their manipulation of those who feel excluded and marginalised to advance their 
political objectives. They are quick to point out to their supporters that their own use of force is a 
response to the opponents’ attacks on them. Similarly, the use of violence by Muslim extremists 
naturally attracts violent resistance from the USA and its allies. Whilst the proposed world ethics 
approach may be worthy of attention, the demands of realpolitik in the realist world puts one’s 
national interest ahead of others’, thereby reducing chances of an amicable solution to religious 
terrorism. The differences in the value systems minimise the chances of finding a solution to the 
conflict.  As the West purports to uphold its liberal stance on the need for the whole world to have 
respect for individual rights, the Muslim world advances an agenda with a plethora of grievances, 
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mainly of a political nature, which extremists ride on in pursuit of their violent activities.  
3.3 The Politics of Modern Terrorism 
As noted hitherto, while some academics such as Weinzieri (2004: 9-21) suggest that the 
motivation of modern terrorism is nothing but religion and that all other issues are peripheral, there 
are some submissions, mainly from Muslims, both moderate and extreme, who argue that there are 
some politically-related issues which cause or at least act as drivers of modern terrorism. As 
already shown, it is not easy, let alone necessary, to try to isolate politics from religion. This is 
particularly so with Islamic terrorism given the fact that Islam is not only a religion but a way of 
life. Booth and Dunne (2002: 7) argue that the insensitivity of the West, and the USA in particular, 
constitutes a major driver of Islamic extremism. The oft-cited grievances include the selfish 
policies of the USA, effects of modernisation, and marginalisation. 
In 1996, terrorist leader Al-Zawahiri called upon the followers of Islam to “kill Americans and 
their allies, civilians and military, … as an individual duty for every Muslim” citing the continued 
presence of American troops in Saudi Arabia, the suffering of Iraq civilians as a result of sanctions 
imposed by the USA against Saddam Hussein, and the USA’s support for Israel (Law, 2009: 306). 
Justifying the 9/11 attacks, Osama bin Laden raised similar issues in 2001 as he told the West that   
It should not be hidden from you that the people of Islam have suffered from aggression, inequity 
and injustice imposed on them by the Zionist-Crusaders alliance and their collaborators; to the extent 
that the Muslims’ blood became the cheapest and their wealth as loot in the hands of the enemies. 
The blood was split in Palestine and Iraq… (Hoffman (2010: 101). 
The grievances advanced by the two terrorist leaders, and indeed by many other Muslim leaders 
and academics, centre on American policy in the Middle East, in particular its unqualified support 
for Israel. These are genuine issues which have been raised by various interest groups over 
decades.  The use of terrorism as the appropriate approach to address grievances is however open 
to debate. The aggrieved regard terrorism as a legitimate form of war given the unavailability of 
an alternative means to obtain redress. One may however question the contention that there is no 
alternative for redress as the aggrieved parties may appeal and seek peaceful means to get their 
complaints addressed. An attempt to follow that course of action would elicit another question on 
the wisdom of appealing to a system which is controlled by a power that is seen as responsible for 
the humiliation of citizens-turned-terrorists – the very power that is quick to condemn terrorist 
attacks against Israel but turns a blind eye when the Israeli government uses tanks to attack 
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Palestinian refugees and bulldozers to raze their homes, and continues to use force to seize more 
land from the Palestinians while building an illegal wall to separate themselves from the 
Palestinians. 
Most of the foregoing actions by the Israeli government fit the definition of terrorism as discussed, 
but it is not seen as such by the USA and its allies. The Israelis do not see any terrorism on their 
part, only on the side of the enemy as expressed by its Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, who 
described the terrorists as “… a new breed of man which takes humanity back to prehistoric times, 
to the times when morality was not yet born” (Primoratz, 2004: 65). The politician only sees 
barbarism on the part of the enemy though his actions are hardly different from those of his 
opponent. For him the lack of moral control, shame and remorse is only applicable to his opponent 
as he attempts to define terrorism by the Israeli’s motivation, not the act. Such arrogance and 
intransigence arguably increase hatred and resentment of the USA and those who enjoy its support.  
Addressing a joint session of the Congress in 2001, a few days after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the 
USA President George Bush, once asked a question “Why do they hate us?”, a question which 
continues to be asked by many Americans today. The USA’s dominance of the global order where 
those who are not its friends matter less, and where everything should be done on its terms, is a 
sure source of resentment and hostility against it. Its support for allied tyrannical governments 
such as that of Saudi Arabia, which has no respect for the very liberal rights that the US preaches, 
smacks of double standards that only serve to give an excuse to terrorists to use illegal violence 
against it and its allies. Booth and Dunne (2002: 32) argue that when the likes of (the late) Osama 
bin Laden raise such issues, they evoke sympathy from the aggrieved.  The grievances do not only 
arouse sympathy, they also summon anger from the affected, that is rage which invariably acts as 
a driving force for terrorism.  
Farber (2007) asks  
How can the U.S. preach to the world about justice when it permits Israel’s effort to subjugate the 
Palestinians by whatever means it deems fit to continue? Why does the superpower demand that Iran 
stop its nuclear program while defending Israel’s program at the same time? (Farber, 2007: 33). 
The USA is unlikely to come up with convincing explanations for these double standards as it is 
quite clear that it has adopted a realpolitik approach to its international politics, which entails 
putting its interests above those of the rest of the world. It is evident that the USA is using its 
economic and military power to protect its strategic interests. The USA’s actions lead to feelings 
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of hatred and resentment from Muslims who, in all this, see a Zionist-Christian agenda which is 
directed at disempowering them. In one of the many attempts to tackle the question why various 
small powers and terrorists despise and  hate the USA, Nyatepe-Coo (2004: 33), attempts to proffer 
an answer by asking a number of questions such as what would the world be like if the USA took 
a decision not to interfere in other countries’ national affairs, if it adopted a non-aggressive 
approach to the defence of its business interests elsewhere in the world, if it had no traceable record 
of trying to export its values by force to other peoples, or if it used a meaningful proportion of its 
wealth in efforts to combat disease and poverty in the developing world.  
While the answer may seem obvious to many, the Americans may suggest that nothing would 
change as the terrorists do not hate them for what they do, but the hatred is a result of nothing other 
than jealousy for their prosperity. Inevitably, such a response would agitate the aggrieved who 
would be more than willing to confront the USA. With the politically powerless finding no way 
other than the use of terrorism, it would be in the interest of the USA and its allies to consider 
grievances such as those related to the USA’s biased support of Israel and its meddling in the 
politics of the weaker, thereby attempting to explore whether that first step could not render 
terrorism an unattractive option. The haughtiness of the superpower does not help promote 
international peace and security. As terrorists attack it, they do not see the immorality of their 
response, they only see a need for stopping a megalomaniac power which promotes an unfair, evil 
system from continuing to subjugate them.  
For Islamists, the wicked system includes modernisation, which they argue thrives at their 
exclusion. Mazzar (2002: 71) argues that modernisation, which has led to the West fast outpacing 
the Islamic world, has a great contribution to the hatred of the West by Muslims, probably 
worsened by the fact that Muslim countries have over some centuries been ahead of the West in 
terms of development. In support of Mazzar, Lewis (2002: 13) sees the discourse on development 
being characterised by anguish as Muslim countries become obsessed with ‘who did this’ to them. 
The self-pity for being left behind by the West is exacerbated by the realisation that the scientific 
developments are often hostile to the Islamic spiritual understanding of the world when all 
developments, according to the faith, should be guided by the religion. Modernism and the 
resultant technological developments further promote the loosening of the influence of religion on 
individual lifestyles. Thanks to the developments in the communication and media sector, one is 
able to know what is happening in other parts of the world instantly and from time to time. This 
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development, among other things, leads to urban migration within and between countries as people 
move in search of greener pastures where, as suggested by Ali (2002: 3), “the G-string is seen next 
to a niqab”. The young, ‘cultured’ Muslim invariably gets a feeling of isolation as he encounters 
the new liberal lifestyles. Jefferis (2010: 33) argues that the change in the lifestyle opens cleavages 
for the adoption of radical messages. The conflict plays into the hands of extremists who happen 
to be mainly targeting this demographic group for recruitment while disgruntled youths find a good 
reason for embracing Islamic activism as it provides them with the means for change.  
The economic privations, coupled with encounters related to social dislocations and religious 
beliefs, give persuasive responses to earthly challenges and deliver youths into the hands of 
religious extremists. Mazzar (2002: 76) argues that as the ‘empire’ growths, it grows with 
commensurate feelings of exclusion and Islamism becomes a readily available means of protest 
against it. The protest takes a physical form as the Islamic clergy such as Ayatollah Baqer al-Sadr 
continuously urge the followers not to hesitate to destroy the evil world, which happens to have 
been shaped in the present form by others, and reconstruct it as the faith requires (Hoffman, 2010: 
103). Failure to do so would mean the death of Islam while reconstructing it implies destroying 
the current evil state, and, in this endeavour, terrorism becomes the means to achieve the end. In 
this regard, the political objectives of terrorism become evident. It becomes impossible to 
disentangle religion from politics as each drives the other in the true spirit of Mahatma Gandhi’s 
assertion that, “Those who say religion has nothing to do with politics do not know what they are 
talking about” (Jefferis, 2010: 1). 
Therefore, contrary to suggestions otherwise, there is nothing amiss with referring to terrorists as 
radical religious extremists for that is what they are. Calling them thus does not however absolve 
their declared enemies equally from being called extremists. The two groups are extremists of a 
different kind, religious and secular respectively. Ironically, the Western secular side bonds with 
Judeo-Christianity, a brand of religion which flows with Western civilisation, to form a potent 
force against Islamic terrorism. The religious West-cum-secularists, together with allies located 
elsewhere, is ready to suppress its opponents ruthlessly. It also invokes the name of the all-
powerful God when it is convenient, to punish its opponents, as do the Jews when grabbing, or 
‘reclaiming’ their land, as they prefer it to be seen. This is all done with a belief that the action 
would enhance the coming of the Messiah as noted by Todorov (2010: 16). Ali (2002: 70) shows 
the extent of intolerance all over the world and, indeed in the USA, where American nationals who 
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have nothing to do with Islam, even celebrated the 9/11 terrorist attacks as they claimed that it was 
God’s punishment for American depravity. Fundamentalism, which characteristically exhibits 
great levels of intolerance, provides breeding grounds for terrorism.  
 American Christian anti-abortionists who bomb abortion clinics and shoot doctors performing 
abortions also do so in the name of God, with a conviction that abortion is evil, and terrorism 
becomes an acceptable way of pleasing their god. Jefferis (2010: 65) used one American anti-
abortion activist, Shelly Shannon as an example, when she argued that she saw no difference 
between abortionists and Adolf Hitler after her arrest following her attempted murder of a doctor 
responsible for carrying out abortions. Proclaiming her determination to save the lives of unborn 
children, she was quoted remarking that, “It was the most holy, the most righteous thing I’ve ever 
done” (Jefferis, 2010: 70). In support of Shannon’s sentiments, another activist, Paul Hill, who had 
been jailed also for the murder of a doctor, was quoted writing from prison, unrepentantly, arguing 
that, “God condones murder when it is done to protect innocent babies from being aborted” 
(Jefferis, 2010: 71). Hill went on to argue that his claims were in accordance with the provisions 
of both the Old and New Testaments as well as what he referred to as ‘Moral Law’ – an inalienable 
duty which cannot be interfered with by government – as he referred to Acts 5: 29 in the Bible 
which calls for the faithful to obey God instead of man. Just like other fundamentalists, Hill could 
look forward to his execution as he expected rewards in heaven.  
The lack of tolerance is not only confined to subnational entities such as religious groups but also 
pervades state actors. The declaration by the then USA President George Bush in the aftermath of 
9/11 that, “this is civilisation’s fight” as quoted by Booth and Dune (2002: 295), where they added 
further that the fight was between the (Muslim) uncivilised world and the modern, civilised world 
inadvertently gave credence to Huntington’s (1996) thesis that the current conflict is no longer 
between political groups but different civilisations.  
Despite the fundamentalists’ attack on everything that is Western, they arguably do appreciate the 
value of modern technology, albeit in private, contrary to views of some scholars such as 
Fukuyama (1992), who argue that the Islamists distaste both Western values and modern 
technology. They do appreciate technology but would prefer to see it being used ‘responsibly’ 
where its application would be regulated by religious authorities. Such an arrangement would 
allow the Muslim leadership to retain political power and hence exercise influence on national and 
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international affairs. They are, however, not able to get their way given the strength of the opposing 
Western force, a reality which in turn, leads to feelings of exasperation, humiliation and resentment 
of anything that depicts the West. Terrorism thus becomes the safety valve.  
Though unpronounced, for likely fear of a backlash, the nuanced reaction of the West depicts the 
Muslim community typically as that of uncivilised barbarians who want to cling to ancient times, 
as argued by politicians such as the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. In all of this, the 
West sees hatred occasioned by jealousy among other things. The feelings lead to fear of continued 
brutal terrorist attacks on both the military and civilians as decreed by the extremist terrorist leaders 
who claim that they are acting in the name of Islam. Booth and Dune (2002: 19) quote Edmund 
Burke as opining that, “No passion so effectively robs the mind of all its powers of reasoning and 
acting as fear.” The insidious power of fear arguably also drives the West to resort to killing and 
other various forms of illegal punishments to ensure that the enemy does not kill their innocent 
women and children. It leads to the disproportionate use of force, contrary to the provisions of a 
just war, illegal treatment of prisoners of war in prisons such as Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib, 
and torture, issues which will be discussed in detail in forthcoming sections. As argued by Todorov 
(2010: 6), the fear of barbarians risks making Americans themselves barbarian. 
Unfortunately, in a typical case of extremism by both parties, reason does not seem to be a major 
consideration as each side aims at annihilating the other. While the USA’s politicians see Muslims 
as extremists who hate everything American, the religious extremists remain resolute in seeking a 
political order which is just, with justice seen from a Qur’anic perspective. In pursuit of ‘justice’, 
extremists are determined to “blow up things, kill people or seize hostages” as noted by Jenkins in 
Leon-Guerrero (2014: 431). The desire to kill as many people as possible in the midst of maximum 
possible media coverage to get world attention has led to the adoption of commercial aircraft 
hijacking as a strategy of choice by modern terrorists. 
3.4 Terrorism in the Skies 
Whereas 9/11 constituted a first in the use of hijacked aircraft as weapons, skyjacking has been 
used for some decades by individuals seeking for political asylum while terrorists have used it as 
an effective means of bargaining for concessions from their rivals. Nyatepe-Coo (2004) notes that 
international jet travel and technological developments in the media have aided terrorists to strike 
whatever targets they choose within a short space of time and get the publicity which the Zealots, 
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Assassins and Anarchists could not even dream of. Realising the high probability of their demands 
being met, the hijacking of aircraft becomes a very attractive option as terrorists take advantage of 
the enemy’s vulnerability at that point in time. Once terrorists strike, the targeted government is 
left with a number of options such as giving in to the terrorists’ demands, thereby leaving it (the 
target) in a weaker position, refusing to negotiate with the terrorists, an option which may buy time 
for other actions though with a risk of putting the lives of innocent civilians in danger, or storming 
the aircraft which further increases the risk to innocent lives.  
Terrorism in the skies was popularised by the PLO and its affiliates in the mid-20th century and 
was recently used effectively by the Al-Qaeda in the infamous 9/11 incident in 2001. The PLO is 
renowned for many daring skyjackings that attracted international publicity in the mid to late 20th 
century. One of the first reported incidents of aircraft hijacking by the Popular Front of the 
Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) terrorists, an affiliate of the PLO, was that of an Israeli El Al 
Airlines in 1968. The commercial airline, which was on an international airspace from Rome to 
Tel Aviv with 32 passengers of different nationalities, was carefully chosen as a symbolic target 
representing the PLO’s arch enemy, Israel. The terrorists, in collaboration with a state actor, 
Algeria, went on to demand the release of 1 200 Arab guerrillas held in Israel prisons in exchange 
for 12 Israeli male passengers following a pronouncement by the Israelis that one Israeli life was 
worth 100 Arabs. The plane and the hostages were eventually released unharmed following 
negotiations which resulted in their exchange with 16 Arabs captured by Israel soldiers during the 
Six Day War (Clutterbuck, 1975: 21). Negotiations with the terrorists, which meant giving in to 
some of their demands, played a critical role in averting a possible loss of innocent lives.  The 
incident led to extensive media coverage thereby meeting the terrorists’ objective of bringing the 
Palestinian grievances to the attention of the world. The giving in of Israel to the demands of the 
terrorists, though not necessarily submitting as demanded by the terrorists, arguably provided an 
incentive to the terrorists to consider undertaking more skyjackings thereafter.  
Hoffman (2010: 63) argues that although this was not the first flight to be hijacked in the history 
of the aviation industry, the incident marked the beginning of modern international terrorism 
through this kind of “broad political statement”.  It was a broad political statement in that the 
terrorists were able to advise not only the Israel government, but the whole world, that they were 
a force to be reckoned with. They were able to demand various concessions from the enemy with 
a potential for disastrous consequences if the target failed to oblige. The terrorists were able to 
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target a valuable asset symbolising the strength and pride of the nation – the El Al Airline – to trade 
the hostages for their colleagues, thereby challenging the invincibility of the state of Israel and all 
other nation-states affected by the skyjacking. The act communicated a strong message to the 
government that the non-state actor also had teeth, unlike in the past where aircraft were often 
hijacked to be used as a means of transport by political dissidents seeking for refugee status 
elsewhere. This time around the hijacking had the effect of granting recognition to the terrorists as 
the incident led to negotiations. The terrorists therefore found the strategy to be an effective means 
of bringing their cause to the attention of the world, which had hitherto shown no interest in their 
story. 
Buoyed by the success, the PLO and other terrorist groups became motivated to undertake similar 
missions with the same objectives. In 1968 the PFLP hijacked another El Al airline which had 
stopped over in Athens enroute from Tel Aviv to New York and, immediately after the hijacking, 
threatened to kill all Israeli passengers on board. The terrorists were not successful in this operation 
with their objective as Israel responded by attacking Beirut International Airport, in the process 
destroying 13 civilian aircraft (Ensalaco, 2008: 16). This was not the only time that the targeted 
government opted to storm a hijacked aircraft instead of obliging to the demands of terrorists.  
Lutz and Lutz (2004) showed a number of incidents where instead of negotiating with the terrorists, 
the targeted state responded by attacking the hijacked aircraft. One such incident was Sabena 
Flight 571 which was hijacked by the Black September, an affiliate of the PLO, on its way from 
Vienna to Tel Aviv on 8 May 1972. After landing the aircraft at Lod Airport, the terrorists 
threatened to blow it up if their demand for the release of 315 Palestinians in Israeli prisons was 
not met. Instead of cooperating with the terrorists, Israeli commandos, led by Ehud Barrack and 
including Benjamin Netanyahu, both of whom later became Prime Ministers of Israel, stormed the 
aircraft, instantly killing the two male hijackers and capturing the two women terrorists. All 90 of 
the passengers were rescued unharmed.  
Despite the lack of success in some hijackings, terrorists have not been deterred. On 4 July 1976, 
with the cooperation of the Red Army Faction (RAF) of West Germany, PFLP terrorists hijacked 
an Air France Flight enroute from Tel Aviv to Paris carrying 248 passengers and diverted it to 
Entebbe Airport in Uganda. The Ugandan President Idi Amin openly supported the terrorists who 
demanded the release of 40 colleagues who were in various prisons.  They later on released all the 
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passengers save for 94, mainly Israelis, and threatened to kill all of them if their demands were not 
met. Once again, the Israelis stormed the aircraft freeing all the hostages, albeit at the cost of the 
commander of the operation. In the following year, PFLP and German RAF terrorists in another 
joint operation hijacked a Lufthansa passenger aircraft and diverted it to Rome, and eventually to 
Mogadishu after flying via some cities for refuelling. The terrorists all got killed when a German 
GSG 9 counter-terrorist unit stormed the aircraft, leading to the rescue of all 86 passengers and the 
deaths of the two hijackers (Lutz and Lutz, 2004).  
By storming the hijacked aircraft, the targeted government would be trying to send a message to 
terrorists that they did not condone such acts of political violence, as negotiating with them would 
send a signal of recognition. However, the use of force to free hostages is risky as it can lead to 
loss of innocent lives as happened with Egypt Flight 648 wherein an attempted rescue mission led 
to the death of 60 of the 92 innocent passengers. In such circumstances, over and above the loss 
of lives, there is financial loss resulting from damaged or destroyed aircraft.  
While the state normally adopts this course of action as a last resort, the loss of lives or material 
goods, however, seems generally not to be an issue for terrorists as for them the end, namely, 
getting the world to appreciate their cause, justifies the means. An example is the simultaneous 
hijacking of three airlines by PFLP terrorists on 12 September 1970, where the terrorists evacuated 
one of the aircraft and went on to destroy it in full coverage of the media. Ensalaco (2008: 31) 
noted that throughout the episode the terrorists advised the passengers of their grievances and their 
wish to bring the plight of the Palestinian people to the attention of the world. Lutz and Lutz (2004: 
26) quotes Leila Khaled, the 26-year old female master hijacker, some years after the incident 
dubbed ‘Skyjack Sunday’ arguing that, “No-one heard our screams and our suffering …we were 
obliged to explain to the world that the Palestinians had a cause.” Indeed, the Palestinians, 
arguably, had and still have a cause. They have the right to emancipate themselves from the yoke 
of the Israelis and determine their future under their own government. This right, however, does 
not detract from the fact that terrorism constitutes an illegitimate use of force insofar as 
international law is concerned when it gives an exclusive right to the use of force to the state under 
certain conditions. Terrorists argue that they have a right to resort to terrorism since they have a 
legitimate cause. This seems to ignore the consequences of the use of the approach. Using the term 
‘utilitarian calculus’, Primoratz (2004: 69), argues that the consideration of the wrongness of 
terrorism should not even be bothered with the issue of consequences, but should take note of the 
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fact that, “Certain fundamental human rights, the rights to liberty, personal security, life, property, 
and respect, are typically violated by acts of terrorism.” 
On the other hand, for terrorists, the violent act is a justified ‘explanation’ to bring their cause to 
the attention of the world. The targeting of innocent civilians and destruction of an aeroplane worth 
millions of dollars is inconsequential. Whilst terrorism in the skies, just like most other forms of 
terrorism, targeting civilians, most of whom have nothing to do with the terrorists’ grievances, 
terrorists find skyjacking as a potent weapon to gain maximum publicity, thereby ensuring that the 
whole world hears their cause, as argued by Leila Khaled (Lutz and Lutz, 2004). There is hardly 
anything random about this form of modern terrorism as the targets are chosen carefully to meet 
the objective. What is seen by many politicians and academics as the ‘senseless’ nature of modern 
terrorism is only incomprehensible in the critics’ minds as they assume that such violence belongs 
to the ancient era. For the terrorists, the skyjacking of aeroplanes full of civilians is a conscious, 
well thought-out decision which is aimed at forcing the world not only to talk about them, but also 
to talk with them as they demand concessions which they see as just. They are aware of the power 
of the media which allows for the broadcast of such shocking incidents across the nations as they 
happen. The deliberate dramatization of the incidents and the resultant shock is an effective 
strategy for putting terrorists’ grievances on the world agenda. Indeed, this was the case with 
terrorists’ hijacking of the four planes and their use as weapons on 9/11. Hoffman (2010: 63) quotes 
George Habash, the PFLP founder arguing, in 1970, that hijacking a plane was more effective than 
killing hundreds of Israeli soldiers as they try to get the world to have empathy for them. Modern 
terrorists have argued constantly that they are not bandits but persecuted people, with the PLO, for 
example, emphasising that they have no land following the takeover of their land by the Jews, and 
that they have no other means of forcing the indifferent world to be sympathetic to their cause.  
For terrorists the decision to use this kind of political violence which, among many examples, 
includes the simultaneous hijacking of four planes in the well-publicised Dawson Field Hijackings, 
which led to the blowing up of two aircraft after evacuating the passengers, is only irrational in the 
eyes of those who cannot empathise with them. So was their decision to attack a plane full of 
civilians, most of whom were Puerto Rican pilgrims, at Lod Airport in 1972 as vividly narrated by 
Law (2004). The death of 24 innocent passengers was not the result of wanton killing but a means 
of getting the world, which they felt had turned a blind eye and closed its ears, to see them and 
hear their screams. As once argued by the late PLO leader, Yasser Arafat, modern terrorists do 
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acknowledge the deaths but contend that they are a fact of war. They argue that the deaths must be 
seen in the same light with those of Palestinian women and children who are killed from time to 
time by Israelis. The innocent civilian is thus taken as collateral damage in a struggle the terrorists 
see as just. But the targeted states hear nothing of that as the terrorists’ war fails to abide by the 
dictates of a just war.  
For the targeted countries, terrorism in the skies calls upon all countries to join hands as terrorists 
know no boundaries. The fact that nationals of one country will end up in an airport of some other 
country as a bargaining instrument of terrorists internationalises the war against terrorism as the 
affected state gets forced to act to save its citizens. In this way, the USA and indeed many other 
countries see the WOT as an international war that serves to defend all democratic, liberal countries 
despite the consequences of the war.  
3.5 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has shown how modern terrorism uses violence and fear, which in almost all the cases, 
is directed at innocent civilians to achieve political objectives. Terrorist violence is a well-
calculated strategy utilised by extremists in pursuit of given objectives, despite the 
incomprehensibility of the act and the public’s view as ‘wanton’ killing,  Whilst a number of 
scholars contend that religion is an end in itself for most modern terrorists, in this chapter it has 
been argued that that may not be true as terrorists undoubtedly use religion to camouflage their 
political aims, which are enmeshed in religious doctrine.  Modern terrorism is thus associated with 
militants who are inspired by religious beliefs to use extreme violence to get their grievances 
addressed. For fundamentalists, despite the type of religious doctrine, religion is a source of 
inspiration; it exhibits no moral constraints in search for justice, as seen from their lenses. The lack 
of tolerance of the Islamic extremists and their insistence on wanting the whole world to see things 
from their point of view, and hence the use of violence when the world fails to do so, leads to a 
collision course with the liberal West. As each side attempts to defend itself, both inevitably go 
into an offensive mode, thereby unleashing violence on each other. This in turn leads to an endless 
cycle of political violence which is characterised by increased levels of destruction and bloodshed. 
With these revelations, it was argued that the proposed world ethics approach which is meant to 
take on board the concerns of all stakeholders in the search of a solution to the current terrorism, 
while worth not dismissing outright, may not yield positive results given the uncompromising 
stance of each side.  
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It was also argued in this chapter that old terrorism, whether anarchist, anti-colonial or left wing, 
by and large had clear objectives such as the removal of tyrants, self-rule and elimination of the 
capitalist system, respectively. Modern terrorism also some well-articulated grievances such as the 
USA’s unconditional support of Israel, a state which the USA has stood by despite evidence of it 
practising state terrorism against the Arabs. The USA’s support of Saudi Arabia is a typical 
example of its double standards where it finds nothing wrong with supporting an undemocratic 
regime while at the same time being quick to condemn the Taliban government for oppressing its 
people.  
The list of grievances, which includes marginalisation and the encroachment of Western liberal 
lifestyles into Muslim countries as a result of globalisation, leads to hostility towards the USA. 
The bottled anguish, characterised by feelings of helplessness and fuelled by religious 
fundamentalism which provides for only one righteous way, persuades young men and women to 
take up arms to right the wrongs. It has been argued in this chapter that it is in this regard that 
aggrieved citizens turn into terrorists and take deliberate decisions to hijack aeroplanes where they 
direct their violence towards innocent civilians, most of whom have nothing to do with their 
grievances.  
The acknowledgement of the availability of grievances as a possible driver of terrorism, however, 
does not constitute a condonation of terrorism, but seeks to unveil issues which may motivate it. 
It was argued that there is nothing to be lost by attempting to evaluate the nature of grievances 
which have been cited by terrorists as excuses for undertaking some actions which ordinarily 
would not be associated with normal people. The seemingly insane actions of terrorists, 
characterised by a desire to inflict as much harm as possible on their opponents and their lack of 
concern for their lives, calls for an attempt to try to understand what motivates and drives terrorists 
to behave in the way they do. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: MODUS OPERANDI OF MODERN TERRORISM 
4.1 Introduction 
The last chapter demonstrated that terrorists are convinced that there is a need for revenge and 
destruction of the other party if justice has to prevail in the world. It was argued in the previous 
chapter that, driven by emotions, humiliation, and a potpourri of grievances, terrorists seethe with 
anger as they are convinced of the need to clear all obstacles on the way to the achievement of 
their goals. The extremists’ view of the world as bifurcated calls for the elimination of the out-
group and, in the process, absolute violence - with no restraint - is visited on the other side. Add 
religious extremism which happens to see its own belief systems as sacrosanct and violence as a 
divine duty, the political violence escalates unabated.  
Having unravelled how modern terrorism uses violence and fear to undertake various seemingly 
senseless acts to achieve politically-related objectives, this chapter seeks to take a more detailed 
look at how terrorists operate and, hence why they do what they do. The chapter takes note of 
arguments by some scholars that the modus operandi of modern terrorism, which is associated 
with unconstrained destruction of life and property, suggests that terrorist operatives are, by and 
large, not normal people.   With Chapter 2, on the other side, having shown that terrorists do engage 
in deliberate plans to execute well thought-out goals, this chapter endeavours to dissect terrorism 
through an evaluation of their activities at individual and organisational levels. The chapter argues 
for a need for a detailed understanding of possible drivers of terrorism in a bid to develop effective 
strategies to counter it. It adopts a position that an attempt to understand terrorists does not translate 
into condoning their actions but, to the contrary, such a study should go a long way in proffering 
appropriate strategies to counter terrorism while paying respect to the basic values of political 
liberalism.  
The first section of this chapter will utilise Lewis Richardson (2006) three-level analysis, namely, 
the individual-, societal- and transnational- level to examine the drivers behind terrorism. It is 
noted that the different factors feed into one another though the individual influences arguably 
carry more weight given that the ultimate decision to join terrorism is, by and large, a personal 
decision (though influenced by other factors) whilst transnational factors have a minimal 
comparative effect. The section will use the modus operandi of various individual terrorists to 
analyse the possible motivation behind their actions. The section assumes that an attempt to 
uncover the motivation of terrorism may go a long way in addressing the causes, which might, in 
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turn, make terrorism an unattractive option for addressing grievances. The section takes note of 
the argument by some scholars that terrorism has no ‘root causes’ as terrorists are regarded (by 
that school of thought) as extremists who resort to political violence to have things done according 
to their wishes. That notwithstanding, the section will not delve into the ‘root causes debate’ as the 
subject requires, on its own, an unadulterated study.  
Noting that terrorists join respective organisations as individuals, the second section will go further 
and attempt to evaluate the predisposition of individual terrorists in a group setting. Issues relating 
to the use of terrorist propaganda and the role played by the media in that regard, symbolism in 
the choice of targets, and the place of psychological warfare in terrorism will be explored. The 
section will utilise Martha Crenshaw (2011) instrumental approach and organisational process 
theories to evaluate the interaction between the individual terrorists and the terrorist organisation 
in pursuit of terrorists’ goals. The last section will look at how terrorists attempt to externalise the 
causes of terrorism as they justify their actions. The first sub-section will focus on the extremist 
view of the world while the second part takes a closer look at the justification for political violence 
by religious extremists. The section will explore the relationship between terrorism and religious 
beliefs such as the belief in the afterlife.  Stout and Schwab’s (2002) pyramid approach will be 
used to assess the effectiveness of various terrorist strategies which are aimed at ensuring that the 
initiative is taken away from the state, thereby forcing the government to react to terrorist moves. 
4.2 The Driving Force Behind Terrorists’ Actions 
Victoroff and Kruglanski (2009: 21) argue that terrorists’ brutality, callousness and their wanton 
destruction of property drives many people to conclude that terrorists are not normal people. 
Despite such feelings and indeed earlier research which suggested that terrorists had some 
biological challenges, current research shows that terrorists are not at all mindless or capricious 
(Hoffman, 2010: 229). Assuming that terrorists are normal people, it follows that there is a need 
for finding out if there are any common factors that drive them to want to kill and destroy with 
abandon. An understanding of what motivates terrorism and why it occurs should help in coming 
up with strategic options to counter it. Cinar (2009: 94) advises that, “Understanding why people 
resort to terrorism is an essential prerequisite for determining how to respond.” The individual-, 
societal- and transnational- level analyses that follow hence seek to appreciate the driving force 
behind the inexplicable terrorist destruction of life and property. 
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4.2.1 Individual Level Drivers 
Cinar (2009: 96) suggests that issues that drive individuals into terrorism constitute of various 
factors which include historical and political grievances, economic deprivation, ideological 
influences and religious-related issues. These issues and other related ones, such as ideology, 
influence feelings at a personal level which, arguably, serve to push one to act to right the wrongs. 
Richardson (2006: 41) however notes that there is an argument that terrorists generally see the 
world from a Manichean view, that is, in black-and-white terms, ‘us’ and ‘them’, good and evil, 
and thereby blame the other side for their woes. With the use of several examples, he notes that 
interviews with arrested terrorists point to the fact that they are, on the general, selfless individuals 
who act on behalf of communities that they identify with. An example is of one Omar Sheikh who 
was born and raised in London by wealthy parents who were of Pakistani descent. His former 
teacher described him as a youngster who was “… good, all-round, solid and very supportive 
pupil… he was in the premier league of students” (Lewis, 2006: 38). Sheikh enrolled at the London 
School of Economics where he read applied mathematics, statistics, economics and other related 
subjects. A compassionate teenager, at the age of 18 Sheikh compromised his life by saving that 
of a man who had fallen on the tracks of an oncoming train at the Leytonstone tube station. Sheikh 
later became a terrorist and was convicted in 2002 for the murder of Daniel Pearl, a Wall Street 
Journal reporter. He pleaded not guilty though in one of his court appearances he went on to claim 
responsibility for various terrorist incidents such as the attacks on the Kashmir Parliament, the 
Indian Parliament and the American Culture Centre in 2001. Looking at Sheikh’s background, it 
is difficult to understand why he decided to be a terrorist. Sheick explained later in an interview 
that while at the London School of Economics, they observed the ‘Bosnia Week’ where he and 
other students watched a film called The Death of the Nation, a film which “stole my heart” 
(Richardson, 2006; 38).  
Just like Sheikh, the famous German terrorist leader, Michael Baumann, explained in an interview 
how the killing of an innocent German student demonstrator by the police in 1967 had instantly 
turned him into a terrorist. It is from such anecdotes that scholars such as Richardson (2006) argue 
that radicalisation of individuals into terrorism seems to be closely linked with individual 
experiences and history where the individual happens to identify with the suffering of the subject. 
Revelations by many other terrorists such as Renato Curcio, a former (Italian) Red Brigades 
terrorist leader, who narrated how the merciless shooting at farm workers, which led to the death 
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and injury of many, including children, explain how personal experiences have turned many 
individuals into a terrorism. Intellectual Curcio’s claims are in sync with those of Vellupilai 
Prabakharan, a poorly educated Tamil terrorist leader, who explained in an interview how the 
ruthless atrocities against the Tamil people compelled him to take up arms (Richardson, 2006: 42).    
There seems to be a deep-felt desire by terrorists, despite their political persuasions, backgrounds, 
geographical locations and era in which they operated, to avenge the suffering of fellow kinsfolk.   
Their explanations on why they became terrorists often invoke a sense of identification with the 
suffering of colleagues.   The grievances may, of course – as has been the case on many occasions 
– be exploited by extremist leaders to induce support from the masses.      
The case of Osama bin Laden may further illustrate the observation. Just after the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks, bin Laden boasted that the Americans had ‘tasted’ what the ‘Muslim nation’ had been 
subjected to over 80 years, which included “…humiliation and disgrace, its sons killed, and their 
blood spilled, its sanctuaries desecrated” (Richardson, 2006: 43). Osama bin Laden thus sees 
himself and other terrorist leaders as altruistic servants of the people. The terrorists’ selflessness 
in the desire to correct the injustices seems to differentiate them from common criminals who are 
driven by self-interest. Explaining the conception of his idea to bomb the New York Twin Towers, 
bin Laden argues that the Israeli-American alliance against people of the Middle East represents 
an aggression gone too far. He claimed that a direct impact to him was the Israeli invasion of 
Lebanon in 1982, with the support of the US    Sixth Fleet, where he experienced the “bombing, 
killing and wounding of many”, which he equated to a crocodile devouring a child, who could do 
nothing but scream (Richardson, 2006: 43). The USA leadership, on the other hand, saw such 
claims as deceit as it associated bin Laden   with an extremist ideology whose members were ready 
to sacrifice their lives in pursuit of radical objectives.  
Bjorgo (2005: 19) argues that radical objectives include ideology which is exploited by ideologues 
to get support. Dipak G. Gupta, in Bjorgo (2005), notes the importance of charismatic leadership 
in terrorism where these ‘political entrepreneurs’ are able to mix various grievances relating to 
history, religion, economic issues, and the like, to create a strong motive for individuals to see 
terrorism as the way out to the solution of their problems.  By delineating the world into ‘us’ and 
‘them’, the leaders invoke group identity which allows the group to face the enemy head-on. In 
the Muslim community, political speeches and teachings in madrasas (Muslim religious schools) 
act as important tools in galvanising followership and hence in calling up the followers to take up 
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arms against the enemy when the need arises. While the leader would point out to issues that relate 
to political, economic, religious, social and other related factors, the scholar argues that the factors 
may, on their own, not be sufficient to drive an individual into terrorism. Emphasising the 
importance of leadership as a motivating factor in terrorism, the scholar suggests that, “Political 
violence takes place when a leader gives voice to the frustration by formulating a well-defined 
social construction of collective identity…” where he paints in effective terms the images of the 
differences between ‘us’ and ‘them’ (Bjorgo, 2005: 19). The ‘political entrepreneurs’ will hence 
exploit grievances and ensure they develop into frustration and anger thereby driving individual 
terrorists to undertake deadly attacks without fear of death. The innocent citizens-turned-terrorists 
do not think twice as they are motivated to sacrifice their lives as did one 28 year- old Henadi 
Jaradat who blew herself in a busy restaurant in Haifi to avenge the killing of her brother and 
girlfriend by Israeli soldiers as she took with her 21 other lives while wounding 51 others 
(Ankerson, 2008: 41).  
Bjorgo (2005) argues that individuals may be motivated to become terrorists by issues such as 
ideology, or other selfish interests such as looting and rape (thereby referring to them as 
‘mercenaries’), while other people (‘captive participants’) may be forced by fear to go along. 
(Victoroff and Kruglanski, 2009: 29) support the view and add that issues of privilege that may 
accrue as a result of joining the terrorist ranks may act as an attraction to terrorism in regions such 
as the Middle East where violence is prevalent. In such areas impoverished youths may find 
satisfaction in joining a terrorist group, which would “provide a route for advancement, an 
opportunity for glamour and excitement… a chance for demonstrating one’s courage”.  
Whittaker (2004: 50) suggests that motivation, which he relates to “forces which impel action to 
realise desires, wants and goals” has the effect of driving individuals to do what the average person 
would consider not to be normal. He argues, as alluded to in Chapter 2, that terrorists do set 
themselves clear goals and go on to calculate the risks associated with the desire to attain the 
objectives in question. Their motive centre around the want to cause fear and uncertainty while, in 
the process, getting maximum possible publicity. The fact that there is consensus that the terrorist 
violence is premediated implies that terrorists are rational actors, despite their seemingly senseless 
actions (Whittaker, 2004: 51). These actors are known to go through a deliberate planning process, 
referred to as an ‘estimate’ in military strategy, to assess the best possible course of action to 
achieve the objective with minimum casualties. Whittaker explores terrorist motivation through a 
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review of the profiles of three prominent terrorists, namely, Timothy McVeigh, Theodore 
Kaczynski and Osama bin Laden. (The actions of Timothy McVeigh and Osama bin Laden have 
been alluded to in the previous sections).  
An anger-driven, alienated McVeigh, who happened to be a product of a broken family, undertook 
a well-planned attack, noted as the deadliest terrorist attack in the USA before 9/11, on Alfred P. 
Murragh Building using an explosive-laden truck resulting in the death of more than 185 people, 
including 19 children (Whittaker, 2004: 65). For McVeigh, the building was a symbolic target 
which suited his needs for revenge and publicity. The attacker did express his regret for the death 
of innocent lives and went on to note his wish to be executed by the authorities, arguably to attract 
publicity.  
Theodore Kaczynski, a mathematics professor, was a serial killer who sent letter bombs to 
individual targets in the USA who seemed to have been picked at random over a period of 18 years. 
Despite being a product of science, the terrorist professor was found with various materials which 
included, among other things, write-ups calling for a revolution against modern industrialism. As 
was the case with McVeigh, the professor exhibited extreme careful planning of all his terrorist 
activities and did not hesitate to justify his actions. While in prison he continued with his 
publications and even directed that the proceeds of his work be appropriated among his victims as 
compensation (Whittaker, 2004: 66).  
Osama bin Laden was a tycoon who held a university degree in economics. His socialisation 
included the need to defend Islam against infiltration by the West. He turned into a warrior 
following the then United Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR)’s invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, 
leading to his establishment of Al-Qaeda. He continued in a similar fashion after the USA’s attack 
on Iraq and went on to declare a war against all enemies of Islam, who included Israel, corrupt 
Muslim governments as well as all capitalists and communists.  Bin Laden, a charismatic leader, 
chose his language carefully and ensured that it resonated with the grievances of the Muslim and 
Arab populace (Whittaker, 2004: 66).   
Whittaker (2004: 57) showed that all three terrorists took responsibility for their actions, for which 
they gave justifications. The terrorists, however, did not seem to be bothered by the consequences 
of their actions except for Professor Kaczynski who offered some monetary help from the proceeds 
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of his publications. The scholar describes the three terrorists as being in a ‘moral disengagement’4. 
In this instance the individuals are seen attempting to deal with their conscience by dehumanising 
the opponent, characterising it by associating it with derogatory terms such as ‘imperialist 
exploiters’, ‘the Great Satan’, and the like, as they “ascribe guilt and worthiness of punishment” 
while giving appealing terms to themselves (Whittaker, 2004: 91). The characterisation of the 
enemy through name-calling is all meant to justify terrorists’ immoral actions as they remove the 
human qualities from their opponents. Making the enemy sub-human justifies the types of attacks 
while motivating individuals to join various terrorist groups. Jones (2010: 31) noted that adopting 
that position allows the terrorists to elevate themselves into a stage where they see nothing wrong 
with their monstrous acts but only moral justice in their actions as empathy disappears. Similarly, 
Stout and Schwab (2002: 71) agreed with this assertion and added that all terrorist groups would 
always want to “externalise the cause for terrorism” thereby making the opponent responsible for 
the result. These scholars argued that the extremists do so by using what they refer to as ‘linear 
logic’ which claims that the other party wants to destroy them and therefore they must act and 
destroy the other party before they are destroyed first.  
Whether the grievances are genuine or not, the blame for the terrorists’ actions have to be on the 
other side.  The motivation behind the terrorists’ actions becomes so strong that they must take the 
chosen course of action despite the moral consequences. Whittaker (2004: 62) noted further that 
motives act as a strong driver to the realisation of given goals. They cause action when groups 
conclude that ‘there is no other way’ to do it. Those that relate to “values, purposes and inspirations 
relating to security” are sacrosanct and terrorist groups are seen fighting for them despite the cost, 
whilst they may be patient with secondary and long-term ones (Whittaker, 2004: 62). The 
overriding point is that the terrorists are prepared to kill and destroy property once they are 
convinced that the action would advance their cause. 
To explore the driving force behind terrorism, Kruglanski and Fishman, in Viktoroff and 
Kruglanski (2009: 37), make use of the syndrome and tool approaches. The syndrome approach 
looks at terrorism as some ‘disease’ which is related with ‘persecution mania’. This forces terrorists 
to be permanently on guard and ready to deal with attacks from the enemy. On the other hand, 
                                                          
4 Moghaddam, F.M. and Marsella, A. (2004: 134-136) define moral disengagement as a process of attributing 
blame and dehumanising the rival where, in this instance, the terrorist convinces himself that ethical standards are 
not applicable to him. He is therefore able to inflict maximum possible harm on his opponent without any remorse.  
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instead of focusing on the uniform properties of terrorism, the tool approach focuses on the use of 
terrorism as a means to achieve a given set of objectives. Various terrorist memoirs and 
communiques show why a group of terrorists got motivated to undertake a particular operation at 
a given time.  
Victoroff and Kruglanski (2009: 157) argued that “terrorism (is) a rational strategy, one in which 
the benefits exceed the costs for its employers”. The assertion implies that terrorists choose the 
strategy after a deliberate consideration of pros and cons of proceeding with a given course of 
action. Terrorists do so as they are aware of its immorality and, hence, they have to find moral 
justifications to motivate themselves to undertake the action. Victoroff and Kruglanski argue that 
terrorists have to give themselves a victim status in all the occasions, then turn themselves into 
‘soldiers’ and get prepared to defend themselves and, where desirable, die for the cause (Victoroff 
and Kruglanski, 2009: 157). They must see themselves not as the aggressors but as responding to 
aggression and injustice from the enemy. Rapoport (1988) argues that terrorists will go all the way 
to justify the use of violence, and its use has to be now.  He further contends that terrorists 
restructure their behaviour to deal with moral anxieties through the use of bold, inspiring 
statements such as “That which is destroying us must itself be destroyed” or slogans such as that 
of the legendary international revolutionary, Che Guevara, which stated that “The present belongs 
to the struggle and the future belongs to us” (Rapoport, 1988:160). Such statements have the effect 
of acting as a rallying point for terrorists.  
Probably in addition to Whittaker’s three terrorist profiles, one may add two more terrorist 
characteristics in an attempt to understand the thinking and hence evaluate the terrorist mindset. 
Mahmoud Abouhalimia, the terrorist convicted for the bombing the World Trade Centre in USA 
in 1993 showed no sign of remorse in an interview after his arrest. He, instead, argued that he was 
not a terrorist but that the terrorist was the USA which was responsible for the daily slaughter of 
innocent people, both directly and indirectly, all over the world. He further added that his was a 
response to the USA’s terror which it was unleashing on other nations as a means of forcing them 
to follow its dictates. His grievances included Muslim leaders who failed to abide by the provisions 
of Islam and he went on to advise that he hated the USA not for its Christian values, but for its 
secularism, its involvement in ‘religious politics’, which included its support for Israel and other 
enemies of Islam. Abouhalimia went on to describe secular people as people “moving like dead 
bodies” as he equated life without religion to “a pen without ink” (Victoroff and Kruglanski, 2009: 
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423).  In the interview, he further referred to the US Department of Justice as the ‘Department of 
Injustice’.  
Pronouncements by (Abouhalimia), a former Afghan militant, depict an intelligent individual who 
had unlimited grievances with the status quo. It may not be true that he had nothing against 
Christianity, as extremists of his type always want to equate the evils of secularism with those of 
other religions, in particular Christianity, which is the major religion of the Western world. 
Absolving Christians in his target group could therefore not have been genuine or may constitute 
the usual inconsistencies which characterise terrorists. In general, his actions and statements show 
that his attacks were all meant to send some message to his American ‘tormentors’, that unless 
they changed their attitude to the world, they were bound to face the wrath of Muslims.  
Victoroff and Kruglanski (2009: 425-426) described a 1998 interview with one Dr. Abdul Aziz 
Rantis, a founder member of the Hamas terrorist group, where Rantis extolled suicide attacks as 
he decried the use of the term ‘suicide’ in preference to the Arab term istishihad, which literally 
translates to ‘self-chosen martyrdom’. The terrorist leader went on to claim that terrorist missions 
were part of a Muslim’s religious obligations and that all Muslims would be happy to die as 
martyrs. He argued that the issue of killing innocent Israeli women and children did not arise as 
the war was not only with the Israeli state, but with the whole society. Just like Abouhalimia, Rantis 
went on to claim that terrorists had nothing against Jews and their religion but were against their 
conduct against Palestinians, which made none of the Israelis innocent. In an attempt to glorify 
martyrdom, he asked if there was any reason for Muslims not to die fulfilling God’s will, given 
the fact that all human beings will someday die.  
The outpourings from the two terrorists - one an operative and the other a prominent leader, who 
also happened to hold a doctoral degree (in paediatric medicine) - expatiated some emotions which 
were driven by deep-felt grievances. To them their terrorism was defined by Israel’s endless 
onslaught on innocent Palestinians where the word ‘innocent’ would be applicable only to their 
side. They were thus more than keen to get the Israelis to experience what the Palestinians have to 
endure on a daily basis; it was a case of revenge at whatever cost. As noted by one activist, the 
Palestinians were forced to “write letters to Israel” metaphorically by way of attacks complaining 
about the Israelis’ occupation of their homeland while confining them to squalid refugee camps 
(Victoroff and Kruglanski, 2009: 427). It is these kinds of revelations that have led some scholars 
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to focus on the ‘root causes’ of terrorism in an attempt to find out what could be the driving force 
behind it. 
4.2.2 Societal Level Drivers 
Richardson (2006: 55) notes that societal level drivers of terrorism include issues such as changing 
economic conditions – of which poverty is a major ingredient - politics, ideology and religion, 
which happen to afflict communities. The root causes theory hence includes issues such as poverty, 
education, and grievances related to religious faith (Victoroff and Kruglanki, 2009: 103). Despite 
the grievances being assumed to be a major driver of terrorism, empirical research has so far not 
found any direct link between terrorism and the suggested causes. Research by Pape (2005) on 
both the leadership and operatives of the Salafi jihadists, for example, showed that most terrorists 
came from the middle and upper classes of the society while only 17 percent had been unemployed 
before they became terrorists. Whilst poor economic conditions are likely to affect people and 
cause instability, Bjorgo (2005) notes that there is no evidence that poverty constitutes a motivating 
drive for terrorism, though it may have an effect when combined with other factors as feelings of 
hopelessness and humiliation take centre stage. A combination of various factors may constitute a 
drive for terrorism as may be the case with the Palestinians who are unable to lead normal lives in 
the Israeli-occupied territories. However, in a counter argument, Jitka Maleckova, in Bjorgo (2005: 
35) argues that there is no evidence that the Palestinians and other individuals who have resorted 
to terrorism are generally worse off than their fellow citizens. In a study of the Hezbollah, the 
scholar found out that only 28 percent of the deceased members came from impoverished 
communities compared to 33 percent of the population that experienced similar conditions, a result 
which was not statistically significant to link terrorism with poverty (Bjorgo, 2005: 35). Similar 
results were produced on a study on the Palestinian Jihad and Hamas terrorist groups. Richardson 
(2006: 56) went on to argue that poverty may be a motivating factor when combined with other 
grievances, but the fact that poverty-stricken regions such as Africa – the world’s poorest continent 
– do not produce the highest number of terrorists shows that there is no direct link between poverty 
and terrorism. In that regard, issues such as poverty should be considered as ‘risk factors’ that may 
add on to the motivation of an individual to join some terrorist group. As noted hitherto, one may 
not experience the grievance himself, but feelings of outrage may drive him to be a terrorist, just 
as the individual could be influenced by other factors such as ideology and religious beliefs.  
Instead of religious grievances being a cause for terrorism, as was the case here and there in ‘old 
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terrorism’, Jerrold M. Post, in Bjorgo (2005: 57), argue that modern terrorists do not only intend 
in influencing the West but are “killing in the name of God” who is expected to notice their deeds 
and reward them accordingly. Under the influence of their priest, rabbi or ayatollah, their objective 
is to have as many mass casualties as possible. Religious extremists are socialised to hate all those 
of different religious beliefs as argued by Hoffman (2006). While old terrorism generally limited 
their aggression to those the terrorists had a direct grievance against, religious terrorists have a far 
much wider target which happens to include all those with different religious faiths (Hoffman, 
2006, 230). The scholar argues that for the religious terrorist, instead of violence having an 
instrumental purpose, it is an end in itself, that is, “… a sacred duty executed in direct response to 
some theological demand or imperative” (Hoffman, 2006: 239). The violence is thus not a response 
to any religious grievance, but it entails the use of the religion by the extremists to serve their god. 
The violence is hence unregulated as was the case in the 9/11 attacks, the Aum Shinrikyo Tokyo 
subway nerve gas attacks in 1995 and many other religious extremists’ attacks. Hoffman quotes 
terrorist leader al-Zarqawi confirming this assertion by commanding his followers to ensure that 
that the goal of eliminating ‘infidels’ must never stop even if it affected unintended casualties such 
as women and children (Hoffman, 2006: 240).  
Richardson points out that though Islam has been touted as the major source of terrorism, religious 
extremism is not confined to Muslims. As acknowledged in the previous chapters, the scholar 
shows that most religions have had an association with terrorism in the past, just as atheists have. 
He argues that the religion (Islam) which happens to have a followership of about one fifth of the 
world’s population is often exploited to canvass for support from its followers where it is used as 
a “a badge of ethnic identity” (Richardson, 2006: 62). While some extremists find Islam handy to 
advance their objectives, so do Jewish extremists who make use of the Torah to, for example, 
justify why Judea and Samaria belong to the Jews. Religion hence becomes a tool, not the cause 
of terrorism, for the modern religious terrorist. This deduction is further demonstrated by the 
(hitherto discussed) Japanese cult, Aum Shinrikyo, which having failed to win a single seat after 
fielding 24 candidates in the Japanese parliamentary elections in 1989 went on an invigorated 
violent campaign to appeal for support (Richardson, 2006: 62). The terrorist leaders will therefore 
not hesitate to blend societal factors with personal grievances and other factors induced by 
international developments to motivate individuals to join terrorism.  
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4.2.3 Transnational Level Drivers 
As discussed in detail in Chapter 3, terrorists have blamed globalisation for the abuse of the 
developing world by the West. Past sections did show that Muslims – both moderate and extreme 
– perceive globalisation as a threat to Islam given its negative influence on the Islamic tradition. 
As such, the assumption is that the effect of globalisation on the community may drive individuals 
to join terrorism. Richardson (2006: 62), however, argues that globalisation is not a driver of 
terrorism. He notes that there is no evidence to the effect that countries that have benefitted most 
or least from globalisation have produced most terrorists. Typically, the Republic of Ireland, 
Singapore and Switzerland, which are at the top of the globalisation index on the one hand and 
India, Singapore, Iran and Egypt, on the other hand, which are at the bottom of the index, have no 
association with terrorism.  
Lutz and Lutz (2015), however, have a different view as they argue that a close analysis of 
terrorism shows that globalisation has an effect on terrorism. The scholars go further to assert that, 
“Increased globalisation has contributed to outbreaks of terrorist violence” (Lutz and Lutz, 2015: 
1). They argue that as globalisation has an effect of undermining traditional values, it leads to the 
dissatisfaction of community leaders and their followers. Naturally, the leaders will oppose the 
changes that disadvantage them, and the resistance may be violent. One example is that of Boko 
Haram, an anti-Western religious terrorist group founded in Nigeria. The scholars note that locals 
seem to be attracted to the terrorist movement as a result of the effects of global capital which has 
led to many of them to lose their social status (Lutz and Lutz, 2015: 6).  
Such feelings were supported by Coker (2002) who argued that globalisation encourages religious 
extremism. The scholar notes that some 30 years ago there was no known religious terrorist group 
operating in any part of the world, but with globalisation gaining momentum, Muslim-related 
terrorist groups accounted for 25 percent of all deaths related to terrorism after 1980 (Coker, 2002: 
3). Though not directly acknowledging the link of globalisation with terrorism, the US Secretary 
of State …. argued in 2001, just after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, that though few powers, if any, 
could match the US military strength, globalisation had the effect of increasing the USA’s 
vulnerability as the increase in the challenges brought about by globalisation had an exponential 
increase in new risks (Coker, 2002: 3).  
Therefore, even if there was no empirical evidence confirming that globalisation does motivate 
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terrorism, it is argued that developments associated with globalisation do, at least, facilitate 
terrorism. In one of his campaign speeches in 2000, George W. Bush noted that the relatively free 
movement of people and their intermingling made it difficult to pinpoint on who the enemy was 
whereas in the past the USA was clear on who its enemies were given that “it was us versus them” 
where the them were known (Coker, 2002: 9). He added that in the globalised era one is not sure 
who the enemies are though they are known that they are there. In an illustration of how 
globalisation aids transnational terrorism, Coker (2002), showed how Algerian al-Qaeda terrorists 
who were responsible for the assassination of an Afghan warlord, Ahmad Shah Mosood, just before 
the 9/11 terrorist attacks, managed to travel across the globe to execute their mission where they 
used Belgian passports after having been issued with visas in London. Harsche (2001) therefore 
suggests that the free movement of people and finances, which is occasioned by globalisation 
allows for cooperation and conflict at the same time as the extremists are benefitting from related 
developments, which they utilise to their benefit while at the same time denouncing them.  
Therefore, while there is no confirmed cause and effect relationship between globalisation and 
terrorist motivation, just as there is no known single cause of terrorism, globalisation, imbued with 
other political, economic and social factors, may have an effect in increasing political violence in 
aggrieved parties.   
The various individual factors touted as drivers of terrorism therefore seem not to constitute 
necessary and sufficient factors for terrorism. Be that as may be the case, Victoroff and Kruglanki 
(2009: 104) suggest that the issues in question can serve as ‘combinating factors’ where different 
variables work together to influence an individual to take that critical step to join terrorism. Based 
on the findings of one researcher, Marc Sageman, the authors give an example of Arab Muslims 
who are sent by their wealthy parents for studies in Western countries where the different culture 
quickly alienates them as they are engrossed with feelings of shame and inadequacy. The same 
applies to the young Muslim Arabs who feel unwelcome in the ‘unfriendly’ French society. Noting 
that these factors may be relative or absolute, the relative deprivation, combined with radical 
Islamic teachings back at home, easily drive the youngsters into violence, which they readily 
embrace “to restore their dignity, gain a sense of spiritual calling, and promote their values” 
(Victoroff and Kruglanski, 2009: 39). There is, in other words, a need for some belief system - be 
it religion, self-determination, or some other - to drive individuals to embrace terrorism, and in 
this regard, terrorism becomes an instrument to attain the objective.  
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Victoroff and Kruglanski (2009: 35) subscribe to the school of thought which opines that terrorists 
are normal people who take deliberate decisions to execute their plans, despite the abominable 
nature of their operations. They note that there is nothing new or abnormal with the desire of 
individuals to commit mass murder or even opt to take their own lives in the process (an issue 
which was raised on several occasions in the previous sections), though that may sound 
contradictory to the human being’s instinct for survival. The desire to abandon one’s life and 
commit atrocious terrorist acts, in search of fulfilling some goal, is given a higher status when 
individual terrorists are subjected to group norms in their day to day lives. 
4.3 Terrorist Organisational Dynamics 
The conceptual definition of terrorism in Chapter 2 argued that almost all terrorist acts are 
deliberately planned to communicate a message to the target audience. In this regard, issues such 
as the ideology and internal dynamics of the organisation are central in coming up with important 
decisions which, among other things, relate to the choice of targets and strategies and tactics to be 
employed. Hoffman (2006: 37) showed that left-wing terrorist organisations such as RAF and the 
Red Brigades of Italy chose to target prominent individuals who symbolised the political and 
economic exploitation of the masses. They were, in the process, careful to avoid ‘innocent’ civilian 
casualties. For terrorists, the kidnapping and murder of the Italian statesman, Aldo Moro, in 1978 
and that of the German business tycoon, Martin Schleyer, in 1977 were directed at the system, with 
the terrorists describing Moro as “the demiurge of bourgeoisie power” (Hoffman, 2006: 231).  The 
terrorists thus regarded the two prominent individuals as not innocent but culpable in the existing 
exploitative system. Similarly, religious terrorists have been seen targeting those who do not share 
their faith or those who are seen to be standing on the way of the realisation of their beliefs. 
Generally, all the actions are meant to attract attention of the target audience to the cause of the 
terrorists’ organisation.  
The need to attract attention to themselves and symbolism are critical elements of most terrorist 
groups. Bommi Baumann, one of the terrorist leaders of the 1970s West Germany 2nd of June 
Movement, gave a vivid explanation of the terrorist attempt to bomb the Jewish Community Centre 
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on the eve of the Crystal Night.56 The terrorist leader explained that this was a well thought-out 
operation meant to attract extensive attention and media coverage. The choice of the target and 
date was meant to show similarities between Hitler’s persecution of the Jews and the Jews’ 
oppression of the Palestinians, typically in a fashion referred to as ‘armed propaganda’ by some 
scholars. Propaganda and symbolism go hand in hand in most terrorist operations. Hoffman (2006: 
103), for example, notes that nationalist terrorist organisations will plan their activities so 
meticulously that the violence would be ‘tolerable’: it has to be of the right proportion to be 
appreciated by the population and somehow understood by the international community. The 
violence has to be well-modulated to have the desired effect, while not attracting a massive 
crackdown from government. This strategy, Hoffman (2010: 162) argues, was used effectively by 
the Irish Republican Army (IRA) terrorist group when its leaders made sure that the level of 
violence would “only be enough to distort the private and public life” of the targeted population. 
Terrorist actions and their communications therefore suggest that terrorists are not irrational but 
are articulate planners with clear objectives. Hoffman shows that the message left by PLO terrorists 
after the 1972 Munich Olympic Massacre was meant to elicit sympathy as they pleaded with the 
world to understand that 
We are neither killers nor bandits. We are persecuted people who have no land and no 
homeland. We are not against any people, but should our place here be taken by the flag of 
the occupiers … why should… with all ears deaf to us? (Hoffman, 2010: 163). 
While such messages are meant for the external audience as a plea for international support and 
sympathy, terrorist groups work hard to create and sustain confidence among their members. The 
various activities are therefore also directed at the internal stakeholder. Terrorists want their 
members to view the challenges they encounter from time to time as temporary. In the case of 
religious terrorists, Hoffman (2010: 169) suggests that terrorist leaders would want their followers 
to have an understanding that their future is “divinely decreed and the terrorists themselves are 
anointed to achieve it”. Media coverage hence becomes an important element for the success of 
                                                          
5 The word ‘normal’ is used in this chapter in its literal sense to refer to a person who is “not suffering from mental 
disorder”. See The Concise Oxford English Dictionary, (2000:863). 
6Crystal Night refers to the night of 9 November, 1938 when supporters of Adolf Hitler’s Socialist National Party 
attacked and destroyed Jewish properties and set on fire various synagogues to demonstrate their hatred of the 
Jews.  
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terrorism. 
Whittaker (2004: 53) has shown how terrorist organisations make extensive use of the media for 
propaganda purposes, an action which is often linked to psychological warfare. The author advises 
that this is akin to a war of attrition which has the major aim of pushing the opponent’s resolve to 
a point where it will crack. On a similar note, Sloan (2006: 93) argued that there is nothing which 
points to the insanity7 of terrorists despite the unbelievable level of violence as terrorists engage 
in psychological warfare. The author affirms that the more senseless an attack looks, the more 
sense it makes for the terrorists, as the attackers are convinced that the action will influence the 
target audience to put pressure on the government to accede to their demands. Terrorists know very 
well that their cruel attacks make news and that they will therefore attract free publicity from 
journalists and, unconsciously, from the target of the attack. Despite there being higher occurrences 
of deaths from other causes such as accidents, the terrorists’ crafty use of the media shows high 
levels of effectiveness in the application of propaganda.8 Being aware that violence makes news, 
terrorists will seek to dramatise their attacks to attract media coverage as journalists endeavour to 
‘break the news’. Similarly, the psychological warfare gets the desired effect as the audience gets 
convinced that “what happened there may happen to me” (Sloan, 2006: 95). It is therefore the 
impact and psychological effect of the attack that allows terrorist organisations to attract attention 
from the sought audience. Similarly, Viktoroff and Kruglanski (2009) demonstrated how the death 
of 241 American troops in Lebanon in 1983 from a single suicide attack and the shooting down of 
two USA Black Hawk helicopters in Somalia in 1993, followed by the dragging of dead bodies of 
American soldiers in the streets of Mogadishu, Somalia, led to a national outcry which resulted in 
the withdrawal of American forces in both countries. The Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine (PFLP) leader, George Habash, summed up the purpose of propaganda and psychological 
warfare when he said in 1970 that, “… we force people to ask what is going on…” (Viktoroff and 
Kruglanski, 2009: 378). 
Hoffman (2010: 176) added that publicity is a major success factor for terrorism and that, for 
terrorists, it is not important whether the publicity is positive or negative. What is of essence is 
that it brings attention to them; they must be noticed. The scholar takes note of a communique 
                                                          
7 The words ‘insane’, ‘sane’ are used in their literal sense where the latter refers to an individual who is “not 
mentally ill” as defined in in The Concise Oxford Dictionary, (2000: 1132). 
8 Victoroffi and Kruglanski (2009) showed that in a 10-year period spanning from 1973 to 1982, terrorism claimed 
3,509 lives compared to an annual death toll of 45,000 resulting from road accidents.  
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issued by the terrorists following their attack on Puerto Rican Christian pilgrims at Lord Airport 
in 1972 (discussed earlier), which stated that the attack was meant “to shock the world down to its 
knees”, as it did.  While terrorist motives were often clear in ‘old terrorism’, some have remained 
obscured. Victoroff and Kruglanski (2009: 98) advise that if one wants to know what makes 
terrorists do what they do, one has to ask them. These authors revealed that in their interviews with 
both religious and secular terrorists, they found the social environment, for example, schools for 
secular terrorists and mosques in the case of Muslim extremists, to have a great effect in 
influencing the future of the youths. In most of the cases, feelings of victimisation made it easy for 
them to merge individual identity with the values of the terrorist organisation. They suggested that 
the desire for individuals to achieve success seemed to have influenced the individual terrorists to 
join the terrorist organisation to fight for a cause as the assumed success of the organisation 
allowed the individual to identify with it. In the process, the organisation takes over the life of the 
individual terrorist and no room is left for individual decision-making. At this point the individual 
self-worth is tied to that of the group. The success of the terrorist group, as a result of the mayhem 
it creates, gives prestige to its members and hence the creation of a cycle where more violence is 
required to increase the group’s prestige. The terrorist operative therefore sees the struggle as 
personal as his or her individual goals merge with those of the group. Orders from the leadership 
are therefore taken as given. 
Rapoport (1998: 150) used the example of Indian Sikhs’ fear of extinction, assimilation by the 
Hindu majority, and their fear of secularism as an articulate expression of their grievances. An 
unhappy community, the Sikhs have argued that they have a right to be what they are and, similarly, 
that they have a right to fight and defend their faith. Rapoport quoted the Sikh leader, Jamal Singh 
Bhindanwale, exhorting his followers to be prepared to die for their cause as he told them that, 
“Unless you are prepared to die, sacrificing your own life, you cannot be a free people…The Sikh 
faith is to pray to God… and then act careless to consequences to oneself” (Rapoport, 1998: 150). 
In various other pronouncements, the Sikh leader declared the Indian Prime Minister and 
government and several other players which included the press and Sikhs seen as not loyal to their 
faith as the enemy. He emphasised that he failed to understand this category of Sikhs who “but 
were born to mothers…and not born to cats and to bitches” as he declared that such people 
deserved instant death (Rapoport, 1998: 176). This inflammatory language from the Sikh 
leadership, representing the organisation, was bound to attract action from the faithful followers 
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as they would not hesitate to take the lives of those seen not to be loyal to God and the faith. 
Using the example of the same Sikh leadership, Rapoport (1998: 167) noted the difficulties 
experienced by the Indian government in the 1980s as it was not clear what exactly the group 
wanted, given the continuous shift in their goals and, worse so, the fact that there was no agreement 
among themselves. Authorising the assault on the Golden Temple in 1984, Prime Minister Indira 
Gandhi advised the world that she had tried everything possible to address their demands, but to 
no avail.  
The prevarication and lack of clarity of terrorist grievances is probably best explained by Victoroff 
and Kruglanski (2009: 11) who assert that terrorism’s objective is to “shatter the myth of the magic 
of governmental power, to fan faith and ardour among members of the organisation and the 
people”. Though some terrorist organisations may or may not have clear objectives, terrorists have 
a propensity for deliberately moving goal posts as a means of ensuring organisational survival. In 
concurrence with this view, Martha Crenshaw (2011) went on to explain the behaviour of terrorist 
organisations by way of the instrumental approach and the organisation process theory. The 
instrumental approach sees terrorism as a deliberate choice to achieve a political end wherein the 
terrorists seek to intimidate and influence the rival, that is, government, to change its political 
position. In response to external stimuli, the non-state actor makes calculations on the costs and 
benefits of various options vis-a-vis the objective to be attained. Crenshaw (2011) showed a 
number of occasions where the terrorist organisation would resort to violence, for example, in a 
situation where the costs were calculated to be low, or where it was pursuing a vital goal, that is, 
despite the costs, or where the members could not stand the status quo, and where the probability 
of success was considered to be high. She argued that for religious extremists, the drive to go on 
the offensive and the resultant extreme destruction may have been occasioned by the fact that the 
constituency was not an earthly one. With no fear of alienating important stakeholders such as 
terrorist supporters, all restraints were eliminated.  Using the example of the 1960s Weathermen, 
Crenshaw (2011) suggested that since the chances of such terrorist groups succeeding were 
minimal, their despair would drive them to take high risks and they would therefore not hesitate to 
cause massive destruction, as was the case with religious extremists.  
The organisational process theory looks at the internal processes within the organisation as it 
adopts the view that the basic purpose of any organisation is self-maintenance. As such, it sees 
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terrorism as a struggle for survival where the organisation has to offer its members various 
incentives to induce and ensure loyalty. Cordes (2002: 21) used the term ‘auto-propaganda’ to 
emphasise the importance of motivating internal stakeholders through various means that are 
meant to address the morale of the terrorists and to give justification for various terrorist activities.  
Alongside the incentives meant to attract members into the organisation and retain them, crafty 
terrorist organisations ensure severe initiation costs where members are made to commit acts 
which will make it difficult for them to consider leaving the organisation, which now assumes the 
role of the protector. The barriers to exit also lead to an escalation of the terrorist violence. So is 
competition among terrorist groups to ensure relevance as well as being a means to avert defection 
to other terrorist groups.  The actions of the organisation and its members are thus influenced 
mainly by organisational dynamics and not necessarily by strategic options as a result of the 
ambitions of the organisation’s leaders being tied to the welbeing of the organisation, which has to 
survive (Cordes, 2002: 21-25). 
These well-crafted strategies by terrorist leaders give rise to shared feelings among the individual 
terrorists, and these feelings give strength for group action. The group and individual terrorists 
thus get the conviction that there is no other way but to fight. With such motivation, Cordes (2002: 
31) suggested that terrorists move to the stage of insinuating a war in its literal sense to get into 
action, having justified their cause. The scholar argued that terrorists see a crisis in such a scenario, 
and will create one if necessary, as they replicate actual war conditions. As they face the enemy, 
which they could have created, they adopt appealing terms such as ‘armed struggle’ for their side. 
The terrorist organisation is therefore absorbed with the need to play a critical, influential role in 
creating and maintaining a radical mindset which acts as a tool for rationalising terrorism.  
4.4 The Extremist’s Mindset 
As noted in the preceding sections, the extremism associated with terrorism makes it difficult to 
understand the motives and drivers behind the spate of unlimited destruction of life and property 
that characterises modern terrorism.   The readiness, if not the wish, of extremists to die, which 
flies in the face of a human being’s instinct for survival, raises questions on why they do what they 
do, as discussed in the previous section. Having argued that terrorists are, in the general, rational 
human beings who make well-calculated choices from various options to pursue given strategic 
objectives, the two following sub-sections go further to uncover the modus operandi of terrorism 
as depicted by the terrorist personality and thought processes. 
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4.4.1 Fundamentalism 
Viktoroff and Kruglanski (2009: 201) argued that psychological warfare has a far greater impact 
than the physical effect. Noting that terrorist psychological warfare is readily supported by 
violence, Strozier and Jones (2010: 11) characterise fundamentalism as including “dualistic 
thinking; paranoia and rage in a group context; an apocalyptic orientation that incorporates distinct 
perspectives on time, death and violence; a relationship to charismatic leadership; and a totalised 
conversion experience”.  Strozier and Jones (2010: 47) argue that dualistic thinking entails the 
individual seeing the world in ‘partial terms’, that is, as ‘part objects’. It is a rigid view of the world 
where the extremist fails to see the complete world and, hence, the positive role of others. It is 
about a Manichean view of the world, which focuses on the differentiation of the good from the 
bad, where the extremists are good while the others make up the bad which deserves elimination.  
The terrorists’ view of a divided world, coupled with grievances which centre on persecution, drive 
the extremists to blame others for all their misfortunes as they see everything around them as evil.  
Scholars such as Strozier and Jones (2010: 19) and Silke (2009: 110) concur that the extremists’ 
behaviour is motivated by the want to pay attention to their own welbeing. Their suspicion of 
others drives them to have rage which, in turn, puts them on the hypersensitive, defensive side. 
With that state of mind, the terrorists are not given to make any compromises. Silke (2003: 78) 
added that they are ready to strike at any opportune moment, in defence, as they see others 
persecuting them. Strozier and Jones argued that the extremists’ feelings of uselessness, compared 
to the superior opponent, drive them into ‘vengeful destruction’. The level of destruction entails 
unlimited aggression and vengeance, which he further described as “cruel, lustful and insatiable” 
(Strozier and Jones, 2010: 25).  
The extremists’ belief in the apocalypse allows them, as will be discussed in the next section, to 
mete out unlimited violence on their enemies. The lack of remorse is aided by the availability of 
charismatic leaders in the terrorist ranks in the likes of Osama bin Laden and various members of 
the clergy who preach for the need to eliminate all opposing forces. The charismatic leaders are 
able to regulate the behaviour and realm of the lives of the followers, which Strozier and Jones 
(2010) suggest is even easier for youths who happen to have a weak identity formation. Strozier 
and Jones added that in the case of the youths, whether with an ideal or poor socialisation, this 
demographic group is easier to manipulate into terrorism given their disposition for 
experimentation. Feelings of humiliation and a host of other grievances would certainly add to the 
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urge to avenge their misery. The aggrieved who feel persecuted hence see no torment as too 
extreme when applied to their opponents and “no humiliation is too great for those who have 
exploited one’s own impotent hopelessness” Terman (2010: 25).  
Human beings are by nature proud and self-respecting. Once they are made to feel impotent and 
experience a sense of hopelessness they are bound to react to prove otherwise. It is in that regard 
that Terman (2010: 21) suggested that such insulted and injured individuals derive pleasure in 
avenging what they see as harm caused by others to them, hence the unmitigated cruelty associated 
with terrorism. The desire for revenge results in boundless rage to right wrongs and its unrelenting 
nature leads to what Heinz Kohut describes as “narcissistic rage” (Terman, 2010: 25). Terman 
argues that the external situation coupled with the state of the individual and the internal meaning 
he makes of the situation, influences his reaction to various occurrences. For the terrorist group, 
the perceived threat on it evokes an aggressive response to defend and protect itself and its belief 
systems. The scholar added that the threat to the ‘group-self’ “would give stimuli for the most 
violence-prone mindsets and the most violent and cruel group actions” (Terman, 2010: 26). The 
infamous 9/11 incident is a case in point. 
In agreement, Muenster and Lotto (2010) argued that a scan of various terrorist attacks showed 
that humiliation can drive individuals to commit extreme acts of violence as they lose faith in the 
world around them. Making use of interviews conducted by James Gilligan, a renowned American 
psychiatrist, on some political prisoners, Strozier and Jones showed that most prisoners preferred 
death over living a life with no dignity, and hence a preference to sacrifice their bodies for their 
souls. Feelings of helplessness and perceptions of injustice have a major effect in driving 
individuals to engage in political violence. Muenster and Lotto (2010) further suggested that this 
is especially the case when the perception of injustice is public, that is, when it is felt by the 
community, not just by one or a few individuals. Given options for a flight or fight, as happens 
when individuals perceive a threat to themselves, a number opt for the latter by joining the terrorist 
ranks (Strozier and Jones, 2010: 53). 
With grievances turning into humiliation, the development agitates blame and anger. The blame 
which is attributed to the other party leads to retaliation which also acts a safety valve for shame. 
With all the blame and the anger having been placed on some other group whose members are 
regarded as not being virtuous, the stage is ripe for moral disengagement and hence the 
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rationalisation of inhuman killings as the killers tell themselves that ‘there was no other way’ 
(Strozier and Jones, 2010: 53). The 9/11 terrorist attacks on the USA maybe understood from this 
perspective. The young, educated terrorists must have felt greatly humiliated by the Americans 
who, they were convinced, denied Muslims space to ‘shine’ like them in their own countries given 
the USA’s support of corrupt governments in the Middle East. Americans had to pay for promoting 
the respect of man instead of God as revealed by Hoffman in a pre-recording by one of the 
attackers, Ibrahim Ahmed Haznawi, who prayed, “Oh Allah, I sacrifice myself for your sake, 
accept me as a martyr. We shall meet in eternal Paradise with the prophets, honest people, martyrs, 
and righteous people” (Hoffman, 1998: 136).   
While the extremists found a cause for attacking those they viewed as dishonest and depraved, the 
Americans were throwing back the same words at their attackers. They also engaged in a similar 
language of “the evil scourge of terrorism” with terrorism being a plague which is spread by 
“depraved opponents of civilisation” (Chomsky, 2003: 48).  The Americans are likely to have been 
asking the same God to punish the terrorists for committing the murders of innocent citizens. They 
must have felt the same kind of humiliation after the terrorist attacks and thus went for an all-out 
war against the Afghans as they viewed the attacks as unfair victimisation. The Americans could 
also have wanted to prove the terrorists wrong, given the usual suggestions by the latter that 
Americans were unlikely to sacrifice their lives as they loved life the way the Mujahideens (Islamic 
Afghan fighters) loved death. Adopting the same extremist mindset, the Bush administration laid 
all the blame on the ‘others’ for the attacks.  In search of justice, the state apparatus disengaged 
morally as they targeted enemies within and without the boundaries of the USA. Raising ethical 
issues, Whittaker (2004: 105) argued that the consideration of terrorists as “savage, mindless or 
barbaric” gives a good excuse for the state to undertake coercive operations against those seen to 
be a threat against its interests. This is in conformity with the realists’ school of thought which 
argues that it is in the right of the state to pursue its self-interest. A focus on own interests entails 
ensuring the security of the state, despite the consequences, while ‘moralists’ emphasise the need 
for curtailing the power of the state to avoid promoting immoral behaviour, as they note the 
consequences associated with a massive clampdown on suspects.  
Strozier and Jones (2010: 63) gave examples of Muslim youths in French prisons and other 
Western countries and the Palestinian youths in Israeli jails, most of whom would be likely to join 
terrorist groups upon release as a result of perceived racial prejudice. Activities perceived to be 
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undermining the Islamic faith, such as the embarrassing body searches which the Palestinians were 
subjected to in Gaza by the Israeli military on a constant basis, or the Americans’ expedition in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, the Russian suppression of the Chechens, and other related activities, 
arguably, drove the aggrieved to seek justice from their tormentors. Strozier and Jones (2010: 144) 
went on to suggest that their grievances drive the tormented to “humiliate the humiliator”. Victoroff 
and Kruglanski (2009: 54) agreed with Strozier and Jones and went on to suggest that humiliation 
seemed to combine with other factors which included political and economic grievances to 
encourage martyrdom. 
 Over and above genuine grievances, Victoroff and Kruglanski also revealed that at times terrorist 
leaders have been known to offer material rewards to the youths to take up risky terrorist 
operations. A case in point is that of Ismail al-Masawabi whose family is reported to have received 
a cash payment in excess of one thousand United States dollars following his successful 
recruitment as a suicide bomber. The payment allowed the family of the suicide bomber to move 
from a squalid refugee camp to an apartment, which it managed to furnish with brand new 
appliances following his successful attack on two Israel officers in 2001 (Victoroff and Kruglanski, 
2009: 126).  The scholars go on to argue that although factors such as economic distress are critical 
and may indeed constitute a motivation for the willingness to die, as has been the case with a 
number of Palestinians in the Israeli-occupied territories, the elements on their own are not 
absolute determinants in the decision to join terrorism. A combination of various factors such as 
demographics, as was the case with the Palestinians, may however drive individuals to the tipping 
point where that decision is made with no regret. Moghadam (2009: 53) gave an example of the 
living conditions in the Israeli-occupied territories where a population of 1.2 million people, with 
50 percent of them under the age of 14 years, were cramped up in a small, dense area where the 
inhabitants had to live in humiliating, inhuman conditions. The population’s desperation and 
feelings of hopelessness, which were the result of frustration and feelings of insult from the Israeli 
military on a daily basis, forced the poor, uneducated youths into political violence, which entailed 
attacking those they felt were responsible for their condition. Moghadam quoted one elderly 
Palestinian stressing that, “Every good Muslim understands that it’s better to die fighting than live 
without hope” (Moghadam, 2009: 129). It is herein that individuals claiming to be defending their 
dignity and faith are seen playing a leading role in political violence.  
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4.4.2 Religious Extremism 
Strozier and Jones (2010: 57) suggest that religious fundamentalism is not confined to any 
particular religion, but that most, if not all, religions in the world are known to have a history of 
violence. Several scholars note the default violent response of religious groups when they perceive 
that their belief systems are under threat, as indicated in preceding sections. Strozier and Jones 
observed that, in the case of Christianity, fundamentalism has had the effect of pushing the faith to 
the right side of the political divide while Islam has been associated with jihadist violence. Jewish 
extremists have been known to be driving the agenda for millennialism which seeks to get ‘back’ 
Jewish land. Cordes (2002: 40) concurs with the observation through an illustration of various 
supposed-to-be religious symbols and hymns that are associated with violence. Sikhism is, for 
example, represented by a martial symbol - referred to as a khanda - which depicts a two-edged 
sword. In the case of Christianity, the scholars note various war songs such as ‘Onward Christian 
Soldiers’ and ‘Fountain Flowing with Blood’. Most religions are, in fact, awash with violent 
messages leading to some scholars to suggest that violence and religion are close associates. Jones 
(2010: 31) even argues that religion has a well-known history of giving moral justification for 
bloodshed where individuals have been radicalised to see only the morality of their actions while 
they view those who do not share their faith as inhuman. 
A number of scholars see current religious fundamentalism as a response to modernism and 
secularism which it views as a threat. As opposed to orthodoxy which aims at preserving what is 
there, religious fundamentalism is driven by the need to change something to suit its ideology 
(Strozier and Jones, 2010: 64).  Fundamentalists see political violence as the only means to achieve 
the objectives in question.  Hoffman (2010) argues that the fundamentalist mindset is characterised 
by fear, especially for those who feel much weaker in comparison to those they regard as 
opponents. The mindset is characterised by distrust, that is, suspicion of others, and other related 
issues such as perceptions of persecution and victimisation. The extremists see the persecutor as 
not bothered with their welbeing, a state of affairs which Strozier and Jones refer to as paranoid 
gestalt. The distrust and suspicion of others calls for the elimination of the opposing destructive 
force at whatever cost. This decision is influenced by the religious extremists’ conviction that the 
ideal can be achieved “only with the destruction of the destructive force”, which entails 
“eliminating them before they eliminate us” (Strozier and Jones, 2010: 49).  
The ‘us and them’ Manichean view of the world, coupled with other beliefs such as the apocalypse 
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which gives believers a look forward to be reborn in a new world while sinners perish in a violent 
way, drives religious extremists not to feel accountable to the current world as they attempt to 
cleanse it of all evil.  The fundamentalists thereby see violence as the only means for the attainment 
of their religious objectives. Beliefs in an apocalypse, millennialism, and other intolerant views 
serve to radicalise many in various faiths and thus motivate them into fundamentalism where 
hatred drives them to kill in thousands without remorse. Strozier and Jones (2010: 45) refer to such 
as a state of mind as a ‘malevolent mindset’ that is preoccupied with re-organising the world in a 
way which meets fundamentalist belief systems. Their faith in their god, whom they are quick to 
turn to when in fear, requires them to constantly appease him as he can easily get angered. With 
this belief system, the researcher suggests that the extremist leaders have a readily available 
opportunity to manipulate their followers to do what they want. They are able to convince them 
that God has sanctioned their violent activities, notwithstanding the fact that on several occasions 
the opponents do give good reasons to the fundamentalists to unleash violence on them.  
An example of one such opportunity is that of the Front Islamique de Salut (FIS) of Algeria which 
was denied the right of forming a government by the military after winning the elections in 1992 
(Khosrokhavar, 2010: 65). One may also add the case of the Egyptian General Abdel Sisi who also 
overthrew the government of Mohamed Morsi in 2013 after the latter had won elections. The 
general went on to arrest Morsi and his Muslim Brotherhood followers after accusing them of 
various crimes. Khosrokhavar (2010) argued that such naked violations of democratic rights give 
ammunition to jihadists to resort to violence as they see their rights being trampled on. They 
therefore seek revenge whenever and wherever possible. The Islamists see political actors such as 
the Algerian and Egyptian military as ungodly given that they deny them the opportunity to form 
a God-fearing government, which is unarguably their right if that is what the majority of the voters 
want. Khosrokhavar in fact suggested that if some Middle Eastern and North African countries 
such as Algeria, Egypt and Jordan were allowed to conduct free and fair elections, the results would 
be likely to come out in favour of the Islamists. The researcher adds that the undemocratic political 
dispensation in the countries in question is likely to persist given the support the regimes get from 
the West. While preaching democracy, the West fears that the emergence of unfriendly Islamic 
governments in the region would be a threat to its strategic interests. The fight for political space 
between the West and the Islamists means continuous instability as the extremists are convinced 
that they have the right and capacity to change the world, with the support of God who will 
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certainly respond at the right time.  
Stout and Schwab (2002: 71) further argued that the religious extremists’ view of a dichotomised 
world gives them a sense of crisis which calls for urgent action to ensure that good triumphs over 
evil.  They argued that since a sense of crisis is in almost all the circumstances related to feelings 
of a threat, fundamentalist Muslims see the West, which boasts economic and military superiority, 
as bent on obliterating Islam. Driven by both emotional and instrumental aggression, religious 
extremists are bound to square up with the West as they seek to defend themselves and avenge 
various Western onslaughts on Islam, whether real or perceived. Through emotional aggression, 
they seek to hurt those who have done the same to them while also applying aggression as an 
instrument to achieve some defined objectives. In all the cases, the extremists attempt to create 
maximum fear and uncertainty as they force government to channel resources on security (Stout 
and Schwab, 2002: 71). The extremists therefore seize the initiative as the state reacts to their 
moves. Stout and Schwab (2002: 16) suggest that the extremists’ aim here is “to lay an enormous 
tax on every aspect of the enemy’s society”. The claim is evident when one looks at the high 
security budget of countries such as the USA which allocates a substantial proportion of the 
national budget to defence annually.  
The tax is not only in monetary terms, but in many other forms, which include liberty and liberal 
rights as the various security measures entail taking away some individual rights from the citizens. 
Stout and Schwarb (2010: 17) suggested that the state is often found reluctant to relinquish that 
power once the situation returns to normal. With the scholars showing almost 50 percent of the 
adult population in the USA viewing “government as a threat to the rights and freedoms of ordinary 
Americans” in a survey conducted before 9/11, one may be persuaded to believe that the figure 
would likely be higher today following the government’s imposition of more stringent measures 
in the aftermath of 9/11.  
Using a strategy based on a pyramid, Stout and Schwarb (2010: 31-33) position the terrorists at 
the apex and supporters and sympathisers at the base. The terrorists, in their usual modus 
operandum, deliberately seek a violent response from the government with the objective of 
alienating the population. They thus drive the state to attack them at the apex with a hope that some 
strikes would land at the base and, hence, agitate civilian revolt. The terrorists would then be able 
to mobilise the sympathetic to join the supporters to fight the government, thereby giving 
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legitimacy to their violence. The base is therefore able not only to join in the struggle, but also to 
give both cover to the terrorists and a pool for recruitment. Stout and Schwarb noted that the 
extremists would quickly capitalise on the reckless use of power by the state, including genuine 
mistakes, assuming they were. Examples of such cases include the killing of innocent women and 
children in Libya in 1986 after the USA’s missiles missed Muammar Qaddaffi’s residence or the 
targeting of a medical facility in Sudan in 1998, which was thought to be a bomb-producing 
factory. Such ‘errors’ were seen as an attack on Muslims and Islam. In this way the terrorists 
attempted to exploit religion to justify their violent activities and sacralise their demands and 
grievances to give “moral sanction to violence” as suggested by Stout and Schwarb (2010: 182).  
In concurrence with the above arguments, Khosrokhavar (2010: 69) makes note of the extremists’ 
desire and disposition to use whatever means possible to defend their faith when they perceive it 
to be under threat as they give themselves the appealing task of destroying the ‘godless’. Rapoport 
(1998: 146) even suggested that, “Muslims do not dread death (but) they wish it for the sake of 
Islam.” They refuse to live life for the sake of it. They seek dignity by dealing a deadly blow to 
Western interests.  In their belief on the need to resist the globalised world, which they see as 
serving the interests of the West, they are prepared to avenge every act of injustice that is 
perpetrated by the West. For religious extremists, revenge equals heroism as they seek to create a 
world where they would be able to be “active, not passive; dominant, not dominated; humiliators 
not humiliated” (Rapoport, 1998: 149). Rapoport argues further that ‘peaceful revenge’ as pursued 
by the Germans and Japanese after their defeat in the Second World War would not be not an option 
for the religious extremists who argue that the only language the West understands is violence. 
They justify their actions by pointing out at the West’s intransigence and self-righteousness as they 
replay its unconditional support of its Israeli ally in the Middle East (a recurring theme in Muslims’ 
grievances) and, hence, the requirement to fight and eliminate ‘satanic religions’ and secularism 
(Rapoport, 1998: 149).  Quoting various provisions of the Quran, such as Sura 22: 39-40, religious 
extremists declare that the wronged have a right to fight as God can only help those who help 
themselves. The fighters see their violence as holy as shown by one Hezbollah leader who was 
quoted by Milton-Edwards (2006: 39) claiming that, “Islam is not a religion of violence. Islam is 
a religion that gave its followers the legitimacy to resist the aggressors based on justice and 
preciseness”. 
The foregoing revelations suggest that while it is difficult to understand the behaviour of modern 
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terrorists, which is characterised by what people view as ‘wanton’ destruction of life and property, 
an interaction of several factors ‘behind the scenes’ gives motivation for the terrorists to act in a 
seemingly senseless manner. Religion becomes a handy tool for use by the terrorist leadership to 
rally their followers to a cause which they all subscribe to. Humiliation – perceived or real – gives 
them the energy to go the extra mile to inflict harm on their adversaries as they see themselves 
revenging the untold suffering wrought on them by their enemies.  The dichotomised worldview, 
where the out-group is seen as responsible for all the ills experienced by the faithful, helps to create 
the stage for confrontation between the West and the extremists who claim to be responding to 
humiliation and aggression from the West, under the banner of Islam.  
4.5 Concluding Remarks 
The unmitigated attacks and the destruction of property by modern terrorists that is viewed as 
senseless by observers has driven many scholars and analysts to hypothesise that terrorists are not 
sane. The proposition is exacerbated by the terrorists’ lack of concern of their lives, which is 
contrary to the human being’s instinct for survival.  Various researchers have therefore developed 
an interest in finding out why terrorists behave in the manner they do. The purpose of this chapter 
was therefore to explore what drives terrorists to kill and destroy property with reckless abandon, 
contrary to expectations of fellow human beings, with a hope that such findings would help in 
designing response strategies, which, while effective in combating terrorism, would not violate 
values of political liberalism. 
The chapter made use of submissions from various terrorists from different backgrounds who were 
interviewed over time and indications pointed to the fact that while terrorism is driven by a 
combination of many factors, individual experiences played a prominent role in the motivation for 
terrorism.  A review of Martha Crenshaw’s profiling of three prominent terrorists, namely, Timothy 
McVeigh who was responsible for bombing the Alfred P. Murragh Building in the USA, Theodore 
Kaczynski, a professor turned into a serial killer, and the charismatic al-Qaeda terrorist leader, 
Osama bin Laden, showed that all the three exhibited clarity in their thought processes though they 
were all driven by different reasons to kill innocent people and destroy property. There two 
additional examples of Mahmoud Abouhalimia who was responsible for the 1993 bombing of the 
World Trade Centre in the USA, and Dr. Abdul Aziz Rantis who was a founder member of the 
Hamas terrorist group, similarly showed results of individuals who identified with their kinsfolk 
and were thus determined in using force to correct what they viewed as injustices.  
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The findings further revealed that the terrorists - whether imprisoned, retired, or having succeeded 
in their goals - generally take responsibility for their actions, and do so with pride as they are very 
clear of what they want. They set goals and undertake meticulous planning through a cost-benefit 
analysis of the various options to ensure that whatever operation they undertake, they get the best 
results from it. 
This chapter showed that what the average human person generally sees as mindless vis-à-vis 
terrorists’ destruction, actually makes much sense to the terrorist as the act is purposeful. Their 
desire is to ensure that the act attracts as much attention as possible to themselves and their cause. 
It was argued in this chapter that terrorists, just like any other ‘normal’ individuals, have a 
conscience which they have to deal with. With high levels of intellect and a clear state of mind, 
they work hard to shift the blame for their murder and destruction to the opponent and see the 
opponent as the terrorist. They tell themselves and make themselves believe in their conviction 
that they are responding to the enemy’s aggression even when they are the aggressors. They, in the 
process, have to dehumanise the enemy and strip it of all human qualities thereby giving room for 
callous murder and destruction. 
 It was argued in this chapter that terrorists are generally highly motivated to undertake various 
acts of aggression which they take as a response to humiliation that is caused by various political 
and socio-economic grievances. In this regard, it was demonstrated how humiliation constitutes a 
great motivator for extremism as terrorists are primed to do anything, despite the consequences, to 
redeem their pride. They will use whatever kind of revenge necessary to get ‘justice’ from the 
enemy. The revenge hence acts as a means to rationalise terrorist violence as they take their attacks 
as a response to aggression by the enemy.  
This chapter also concurred with the view that individual root causes may not be strong enough to 
compel individual law-abiding citizens to join terrorism, but it was noted that combined, especially 
with deep-seated values, certain grievances easily influence the decision to join terrorist groups to 
right the identified wrongs. It was shown that terrorist leaders play a critical role in motivating the 
followers where, at the end, they are prepared to do anything to advance the organisation’s cause, 
even if the deeds in question may be regarded as inhuman by bystanders and the affected. Other 
than the various terrorist activities being directed at an external audience, the operations are also 
used as internal communications for the terrorists themselves, which, among other things, is meant 
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to raise confidence and boost the morale of the operatives. The terrorist organisation is seen 
escalating its brutality in an attempt, not only to attract attention to itself, but also to neutralise 
competition from other terrorist organisations, thereby giving pride to its members. The continued 
intensity of terrorist violence raises exit costs to the organisational members as their continued stay 
in the organisation gives them hope for security. It was shown, therefore, that given this mindset, 
the terrorists are driven to continue and increase their violence, which in the public eye, looks 
senseless. With the organisation’s need for survival blending with the individual’s need for the 
same, the two become one for all intents and purposes.   
Lastly, this chapter showed that fundamentalism, especially that which is related to religious 
beliefs, encourages extremists not to be bothered by the consequences of their actions. They see 
themselves as having an obligation to destroy evil in the name of God. It was argued that the self-
centredness that characterises religious extremists makes them see persecution even where its non-
existent; there is somebody on the other side who is bent on destroying them. They have to fight 
and destroy him before he gets an opportunity to annihilate them. Modern terrorists, who claim to 
be acting in the name of Islam in service of the will of God, argue that they have a right and 
responsibility to destroy the out-group, the evil, for good to prevail.  
 
  
 68 
 
CHAPTER FIVE: ISLAM AND TERRORISM 
5.1 Introduction 
Having explored the driving force behind the individual terrorist and his relationship with the 
organisation under which he operates, this chapter takes a closer look at the Islamic religion which 
has frequently been accused of fanning terrorism. It seeks to utilise the general understanding of 
the terrorist mindset to explore the driving force behind the violence perpetrated by those groups 
that claim to be acting in the name of Islam. While taking into consideration arguments in Chapter 
4 that Islam is being abused by militants to advance their extremist, selfish objectives and 
suggestions that the majority of Muslims do not believe in the use of terrorism to get their 
grievances addressed, this chapter explores the link between the extremists’ violent activities and 
the tenets of the faith which they claim to follow. By the same token, the chapter seeks to appreciate 
the USA’s response to the extremists’ actions and demands.  
 
The first section of this chapter examines political Islam – the link of the Islamic faith with politics. 
It notes the endless number of deaths and injuries, together with the destruction and damage to 
property and infrastructure occasioned by those who claim to be resisting aggression. The section 
takes a look at the influence of the Qur’an on the violent activities undertaken by Islamic 
extremists, the effect of Islamic revivalism on liberal values, and fundamentalism which will be 
used as tools to analyse the violence associated with Islam. The second section explores the 
concept of the jihad as articulated in the Qur’an and as interpreted by Muslim leaders, clergy and 
fundamentalists. This section will review how the jihad has evolved to be associated with a holy 
war which seeks to eliminate anything and everything that is non-Muslim. The third section goes 
further to look at the jihad through suicide attacks. The section explores the religious justification 
for martyrdom, its strategic intent and related issues which act as drivers for this chosen course of 
action and the consequences thereof, especially as they relate to the reaction of the USA and its 
allies.  
 
5.2 Islam, Politics and Violence 
History is awash with incidents of violent terrorist attacks perpetrated in the name of religion, with 
the example of the suicide bombardment of the New York Twin Towers on 11 September, 2001 by 
Islamic extremists giving a poignant reminder. Chaliand and Blin (2007: 93) define political Islam 
as the use of Islam to achieve objectives which are related to institutional structures and the 
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sociocultural environment. The objectives in question are guided by the dictates of Islam whose 
activities, in turn, follow the provisions of the Qur’an and the hadith.9 Hashmi (2002: 103) explains 
that all “religious systems create boundaries between their believers and outsiders” in affirmation 
of their membership to the belief system. For Muslims, one major delimitation is the Shahadah 
which states that, “There is no god but God (and) Muhammad is the messenger” (Peterson, 2007: 
141).  The vow has the effect of demarcating boundaries between Muslims on the one side, and 
atheists and believers of other faiths on the other side. This is especially so as the Shahadah claims 
that every child is born Muslim, and therefore converting to Islam from some other faith is seen 
as ‘reverting’ to where one was born. This declaration, which seeks to have all humankind to 
believe in one God and accept Muhammad as the messenger of Allah, creates spiritual and physical 
boundaries between Muslims and non-Muslims and, to a good extent, between extremist and 
moderate Muslims, as will be discussed in the following sections.  
 
David Cook (2005: 71) argues that Muslim radicals genuinely believe in the supremacy of Islam 
as the only truth. They shun fellow Muslims who do not abide by the tenets of the faith to the spirit 
of the letter and warn them against risks associated with paying lip service to God. In that spirit, 
they warned Pakistan that it would suffer natural disasters as Allah’s punishment for the 
government’s handing over of Ramzi Ben-al-Shibh who had been implicated in the planning of 
the 9/11 terrorist attacks. They even suggested that there was a risk of Allah withdrawing Islam 
from that country as it did with Turkey following the nation’s failure to resist efforts by  Kamal 
Ataturk in destroying Islam in that country. Noting that the definition of Islam by radical Muslims 
espouses the willingness to fight and “love for anything or anybody defined as Islam or Muslim, 
and hatred for their opposites or opponents” as noted by Cook (2005: 71), it is evident that the 
extremists are convinced that all what they are doing is in fulfilment of God’s wishes. The faith, 
in tandem with all other religious beliefs, shows an Islamic mythology which gives the fighters 
special protection from Allah. They get to believe that wounds inflicted in battle, which would 
otherwise kill them, will heal instantaneously.   They witness fire from heaven consuming enemy 
aircraft in battle while the enemy cannot afford not to retreat as its soldiers see hundreds of angels 
on the side of the mujahideen while animals bring in food to the starving fighters (Cook, 2005: 
71). The power of belief in the supernatural has, since time immemorial, given strength to 
                                                          
9Abdul Basit (2012: 27) defines the word hadith as the “prophet’s words, acts, and deeds.”  
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humankind in times of need. The faith drives the fighters not to retreat as they are convinced that 
they are executing the violence in the service of God’s will. It prepares them to be ready to sacrifice 
their lives for the sake of Allah.  
 
Indeed, as genuine as the belief could be, it has the effect of interfering with the rights of others 
who happen not to share the same belief systems. The related Islamic view of the one God 
governing the world and, as such, the expectation that everything in the world ought to be done in 
accordance with His will, sets the Muslims on a collision course with the others. Islam’s demand 
that man has an obligation of surrendering to Allah’s will, where that will is governed by the 
Qur’an, a collection of religious doctrine which is subject to man’s interpretation, sets the stage 
for conflict.  Instead of the disagreement remaining a contestation of ideas, the dispute has 
aggravated armed violence as the West has vowed never to allow itself to be subjugated by a rival 
culture while the other, argues that ‘pagans’ and ‘infidels’ have to be brought to the ‘straight path’. 
This is in spite of the provision of the Qur’an (2: 256), which says that there should be no 
compulsion in religion.  
 
Pronunciations by various Islamic leaders and actions of different fundamentalist groups point to 
a state of a caged Muslim community which exhibits signs of fear and suspicion of the West; they 
see the West as being obsessed with an agenda of destroying Islam. Such fears are, among other 
things, fuelled by what analysts see as the reckless use of the term ‘Islamic fundamentalists’. 
Neumann (2009: 19) defines religious fundamentalism as the literal interpretation of the holy texts, 
while John Esposito (1992: 16), similarly acknowledges that fundamentalism is all about strict 
adherence to the foundations of a given religion. Milton-Edwards (2006) sees fundamentalism as 
the defining picture of Islamism and as a central feature of Islamic politics in the 20th century. 
Esposito (1992: 16) notes that the term is now used derogatively to refer to extremists who have 
resorted to terrorism to replicate the past. Martin and Barzeger (2010: 11) have noted that Islamism, 
in the eyes of the West, refers to Islamic groups who opt to use violence to achieve their goals. 
They argue that this is an unfair and unfortunate deliberate misrepresentation of Islam as the West 
always attempts to understand issues outside their culture using their standard of measure. Martin 
and Barzeger see the use of the term as “biased, heavily loaded with prejudgements and ideological 
presumptions, pro and con, and mostly con” as it links the term with “terrorism, violence, 
backwardness, fanaticism, oppression, and so forth” (Martin and Barzeger, 2010: 64). They argue 
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further that this unfair view of Islam is all meant to caricature those the West does not agree with, 
thereby providing justification for its aggression while labelling Muslims as fundamentalists. 
 
The term fundamentalism is invariably used by many writers and commentators interchangeably 
with Islamism. Ayubi (1991: 73) argues that the term ‘Islamism’ is used pejoratively as a 
euphemism to demonise Islam, given that it attempts to equate Islam with terrorism.  He suggests 
a need to abandon the term as he argues that it is not correct to argue that the religion is prone to 
violence. This is in spite of the numerous atrocities committed in its name. His argument is that 
intolerance is not unique to Islam – an issue which this researcher also suggested in Chapter 3 
through an illustration of how all different types of terrorist groups have used violence, right from 
the ancient times to the modern era, in an attempt to force change in policy. Lawrence (1991: 33) 
supports this argument by pointing out that the West uses the term selectively to refer to those with 
whom it does not agree. In agreement with Lawrence, the researcher would like to use the example 
of the Mujahideen militants who fought the Russians from 1979 to 1989 in Afghanistan. Though 
exhibiting all qualities of terrorism, the militants were never referred to as Islamists or terrorists 
by the USA and its Western allies. They instead regarded them as freedom fighters. The same 
militants who have not changed their modus operandi in any way, but only their hitherto (USA) 
friend to an enemy, are now referred to by the Americans as Islamists or terrorists. 
 
On the other hand, Jenkins and Godges (2011: 62), argue that there is a clear difference between 
Islam, the religion and Islamism, which is an ideology. They argue that the ideology is driven by 
motives which entail the use of violence as a means to the attainment of the objective as they 
exploit genuine and perceived grievances.  Other scholars such as Ayubi (1991: 35) argue that there 
is nothing wrong with the term ‘Islamism’ as the term simply describes a broad interpretation of 
Islam and the politics around it. It is about the role of Islam in guiding politics and the conduct of 
society in the contemporary Muslim world. Fuller sees Islamism as the flag - an appeal to religion 
– to galvanise Muslims in a ‘higher calling’ to resist Western imperialism. In this regard Islamism 
does not constitute a cause for the USA’s intervention all over the world but a response to it.  
 
There should be nothing sinister about the use of the term ‘Islamism’ as, in its true sense, it relates 
to the revivalism of the faith and its return to the founding fundamentals.  On its own, the term 
does not in any way imply violence. Unfortunately, various pronouncements by Muslim clerics 
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and other religious leaders elsewhere over a period of time point to a revivalist Islam that is 
predisposed to the use of force to achieve its goals and is hence the likely association of the term 
with violence. Ayubi (1991: 93), argues that there is a general feeling in the West that, “Islam is 
violent…and Muslims are prone to wage war, or jihad, against their enemies…”.  
 
To appreciate Ayubi’s (1991) argument, one may use examples of Muslim ideologues such as 
Hasan al-Banna, the founder of the extremist Muslim Brotherhood, who has advocated openly for 
the use of violence to create a theocratic (Islamic) state. Hoffman (2006: 96) quotes one prominent 
Islamic cleric, Ayatollah Muhammad Baqer al-Sadr, as preaching that Muslims have two choices, 
that is, either to accept the world as it is today, having been shaped by others into the current state, 
with the attendant consequences of allowing for the demise of Islam, or to destroy it and get it 
reconstructed in accordance with the dictates of Islam. The same cleric went on to claim that not 
only does Islam permit violence and coercion to spread the faith, but that such tools may be a 
necessary means to achieve the end which is divinely sanctioned. A strong Islamic faith gives 
conviction to the leadership, the clergy and the followers that Islam is the religion of God, a claim 
which they would want to be understood by the whole world. Similarly, in his speech marking the 
new Iranian year in 1980, Ayatollah Khomeini implored all Muslims to adhere to and spread the 
Islamic law, as he reminded them that Islam championed the rights of the oppressed (Hoffman 
(2006: 96). The clergy went on to remind his followers that, “… our attitude to the world is dictated 
by our beliefs…” whilst urging them to ensure that other powers and superpowers should be made 
to be cognisant of this fact (Ayubi, 1991: 93).  
 
Hoffman (2006: 98) has given numerous examples of Muslim leaders advocating for an ‘all-out’ 
war, with the example of the Hamas Covenant explicitly stating that, “Israel will exist and will 
continue to exist until Islam will obliterate it, just as it obliterated others before it.” There are many 
examples of such pronouncements by Muslim leaders and clerics such as Mustafa Chamran, 
Hussein Mussawi and the likes of Islamic law professor Ibn Taymiyyah, journalist Abu-al-A’la 
Mawdudi, and Islamic writers such as Sayyid Qutb and Ayman al-Zawahiri, as well as the 
infamous Osama bin Laden. The common denominator of all these Islamic authorities is the clearly 
defined goal of the elimination of what they describe as Western decadence and the creation of an 
Islamic caliphate through the use of violence. All use, and, critics would argue, abuse the Qur’an 
to legitimate their actions. For them, those who engage in ‘evil’ acts such as sexual promiscuity 
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and drunkenness are legitimate targets as they are enemies of Allah. While these individuals could 
be labelled as extremists, the radicals who claim to be ardent followers of Islam are just too many 
to ignore. Given observations by Neumann (2009: 72) that various religions adopt violence when 
the leadership concludes that their message has failed to get through or when their path to attaining 
power gets blocked, there is a requirement to explore the issues behind the controversial 
pronouncements. 
 
Islam, just like any other religion, is arguably obsessed with itself. Muslims take Islam as the true 
will of the one God, Allah; Islam (rightfully) believes in its own covenant with Allah. In the process 
it fails to see other faiths in a similar light, which often leads to a confrontation which is 
characterised by militancy in the struggle to survive and outshine others. With this stance, Islamic 
leaders have been calling for Islamic revivalism – a vehicle, referred to by Milton-Edwards (2006: 
82) as a “liberation theology” – that is meant to liberate the Muslim community from the control 
of other civilisations. Milton-Edwards (2006: 90) noted that this quest for emancipation and 
identity has an ultimate objective of creating an ummah – a community of believers – with no 
artificial boundaries, where Muslims would have unsanctioned worship and practice of Islam in 
accordance with the dictates of the Qur’an and the hadith. All humankind would, in the society in 
question, give unquestionable allegiance to Allah as they follow the teachings of the Prophet who 
is the embodiment of the Qur’an (Milton-Edwards, 2006: 90-91).  
 
Unquestionably, such a quest, once again, places Muslims on a collision course with the West. It 
does, at the least, lend support to Samuel Huntington’s controversial clash of civilisations thesis, 
which suggests that religious and cultural differences would be the main source of future wars 
(Huntington, 1996). While Islamic fundamentalists see empowerment, and their version of justice 
and liberty in such an outcome, the West sees nothing less than a threat from a violent religion 
which happens to exist in a real world where power is taken as a zero-sum game. This view of the 
world as being divided into dar-al-harb (the evil world) and dar-al-Islam (the abode of peace) 
where the former, which is inhabited by apostates and infidels, has to be destroyed to create the 
latter, is a threat to basic individual rights, which the USA and its Western allies purport to promote. 
The desire for a radical revival of Islam, in effect fundamentalism, which Milton-Edwards (2006: 
9) describes as an “extreme attachment to faith and religious revivalism at a fundamental level”, 
is seen as a formidable threat to global peace and security. Its totalitarian approach and lack of 
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tolerance for pluralism attracts a countervailing force to stop its spread.   
 
The conviction of the need to fight and defeat Muslim extremists is supported by various scholars 
who argue that political Islam believes in the use of violence to impose its version of justice in the 
world. Martin and Barzegar (2010: 109) argue that the Islamists “seek domination over systems of 
political power”, not just to ensure (a version of Islamic) morality, but to govern the society in a 
theocratic manner. This desire entails the introduction of the Sharia law, which would allow for 
the literal interpretation of the Qur’an and, hence, the related practice.   With the conviction that 
Islamism is a real threat, and with analysts such as Zuhdi Jasser, as quoted by Martin and Barzegar 
(2010: 109), arguing that Islamism entails “building the Muslim individual, the Muslim family, 
the Muslim society, the Muslim government, the Muslim state, and the caliphate, which in turn 
will spread Islam around the world”, the West, and indeed atheists and those who believe in other 
faiths, have a reason to be concerned. If the hierarchy of objectives were to end with the building 
of a Muslim state within defined boundaries where Muslims constitute the majority and where 
they so wish, the aspiration would be less worrisome as that is what liberal democracy provides 
for. Its expansionist desires in that regard do not happen to be different from those of the imperial 
USA, as will be discussed in detail in the next chapter. This is more so given the revelation that 
Islamism undoubtedly enmeshes religion and politics into an ideology that insists that only the 
Sharia, as the divine, supreme law prescribed by Allah, should be the law to govern conduct in 
such a society.  
 
The West has a reason to be concerned given past experiences such as the 1979 violent ousting of 
its Shah ally out of power in Iran as it watched helplessly. Some scholars such as Milton-Edwards 
(2006) suggest that the Islamists’ victory in Iran led to a major worry in the West which felt that 
Islamic militants would be buoyed by the success and decide to consolidate their victory by 
spreading their revolution to other Muslim countries. It is for such concerns that it has been argued 
that the USA and allies found a compelling reason to invade Afghanistan to remove the Taliban 
government, which even before then, was believed to have harboured wishes of using its success 
story to establish a caliphate after overcoming the Russians.  The USA, however, has no problem 
in treating extremists as allies for as long as they (extremists) are not opposed to the machinations 
of the USA and, especially, if they decide to confront the USA’s enemies, as did the Taliban against 
the Russians. For the then friendly mujahideen, the fact that the militants were terrorists in deed 
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did not mean much for the liberal democratic principles of the USA which chose to ignore all 
issues relating to morality and ethics, while at the same time it found all the vigour to oppose 
equally similar Islamists in Iran, as noted by Ali (2002: 31-39).   
 
Both moderate Muslims and fundamentalists can easily read through such double standards and 
selfish policies that are projected by the USA and its allies, a situation which avails a god-sent 
opportunity to the extremists to advance their agenda. Fundamentalists will, without question, 
execute proclamations issued by the clerics to the letter and spirit of the word. They understand 
the interpretation of the law by the clerics as final and, using their value systems, are not bound to 
recognise that some of those declarations may be an affront to basic liberties such as freedom of 
conscience, which seeks to leave issues of faith to personal discretion as opposed to coercion. The 
cited Islamic leaders’ and clerics’ embracing of terrorism to change the world order has compelled 
the USA and its Western allies to respond equally with force, and, on a number of occasions, with 
excessive, illegal force. Unfortunately, as noted hitherto, such a reaction leads to a cycle of 
violence and finger-pointing. It is under such circumstances that Muslim extremists are seen giving 
themselves the task of using force to defend their religion as they emphasise the need to establish 
or restore the caliphate where Islam would be practised freely, hence, the call for a jihad.    
5.3 The Jihad 
The word jihad has been used by the Western media and various authors as a synonym for holy 
war. Jihad is a contested term even among the different sects of Islam, with the various strands of 
the faith using, and even abusing, the concept to meet a variety of objectives.  Literally, the Arabic 
word jihad means to struggle or strive. Springer, Regens and Edger (2009: 17-19) describe jihad 
as a religious struggle which is based on an evolving pervasive ideology as it acknowledges the 
inseparability of politics and religion. In this regard, the struggle may therefore be for religious or 
political purposes. Many scholars note that the jihad entails the spread and defence of the Muslim 
faith but are quick to point out that the term does not mean holy war. Though that may be the case, 
they acknowledge that it does allow for the use of force where necessary. With that understanding, 
Esposito (1992) defines jihad as, “Striving to lead a life in God’s way, creation of a just, moral 
society, and to spread Islam through preaching, teaching or armed struggle … which duty may be 
fulfilled by the heart, by the tongue, by the hands, and by the sword” (Esposito, 1992: 30). 
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Cook (2005: 42) divides these many types of struggles into two categories, namely, the greater 
jihad, that is, a spiritual struggle against self, and the lesser or outer jihad, which may involve 
military actions. He further asserts that the basic idea of the jihad, whether spiritual or outer, is to 
“disconnect oneself from the world, whether bodily (as in battle) or spiritually”. Looking at the 
two broad categories of the jihad, issues relating to the spiritual struggle should be of no concern 
to third parties as this constitutes a relationship between the individual and his god – and for 
Muslims the only one God, Allah. Freedom of conscience allows exactly that: the individual has 
the freedom to have his covenant with his god without coercion. It is likely that the inseparability 
of religion and politics, which gives a mission to spread the faith, not only with the heart and 
tongue but by the sword, lead to seeing the jihad as a pervasive ideology (Springer, Regens & 
Edger, 2009: 31). As one disconnects oneself from the world, spirituality and emotions take over, 
and in such a state the jihadists are primed to do anything in service of Allah’s will as they see it.  
It is the result of such actions that the West relates the jihad to a holy war – a holy war that relies 
on the sword to spread the faith. The militants’ claim that the jihad is a religious duty and their 
desire is to use the sword to fight both atheists and ‘People of the Book’, a term often used to refer 
to Christians and Jews, to install the ‘legitimate’ Islamic law serves to escalate the confrontation. 
 
Cook (2005: 19) alludes to what has been referred to as ‘sword verses’ in the Qur’an, which the 
extremists utilise to justify their violence. The verses in question include Surah 9:29 which 
commands Muslims to “fight all those who do not believe in God”, Surah 4:76 which states that 
“those who believe fight-to-kill in the cause of Allah”, and Surah 9:5 which promotes the killing 
of idolaters. With its unquestionably eschatological goals, Islam has thence been viewed by many 
outsiders as a religion of the sword. It is seen as a religion that prefers the use of violence as a 
coercive tool to achieve Allah’s will. Such conclusions emanate from the pronouncements of the 
many Muslims clerics and leaders, though it may not follow that they all represent views of the 
majority. Springer, Regens and Edger (2009: 31) give an example of some of these prominent 
Islamic leaders: One professor in Islamic law, Ibn-Taymiyya, encourages Muslims never to allow 
for the subordination of Islam to the state. He goes on to argue that there is no difference between 
the rulers who failed to enforce the Sharia and apostates. As such, the rulers in question should be 
regarded as legitimate targets for attack by the jihadists. He, together with the likes of Mawdudi, 
who regards the jihad as a battle between good and evil, argues that the jihad has to be elevated to 
the same level of the five pillars of the Muslim faith, namely, Shahada (oneness of God), Salat 
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(prayer - five times a day), Zakat (alms-giving to the needy), Saum (fasting), and Hajj (pilgrimage 
to Mecca). In that regard, there is justification for the use of force of arms to ensure that God’s will 
prevails.  
 
The researcher observes that the noted Muslim authorities, and many unmentioned ones, seem to 
give prominence to the outer jihad, or at least arguably, seem to use the inward jihad to give 
spiritual and moral support to the ‘jihad of the sword’. The jihad thereby entreats the faithful to 
come forward and be prepared to shed their blood in defence of the faith. Akbar (2002: 30-35) 
argues that while Islam is embodied in peace, it commands Muslims to fight to defend their faith, 
which is a duty for all Muslims. This is despite this type of jihad being the lesser one. In spite of 
the continuous use of the term ‘lesser jihad’, there is no evidence that the jihad of the sword is in 
anyway subordinate to the spiritual jihad.  The researcher sees the inward struggle here being used 
as a convenient tool to instil discipline in the actual fight where the real game is the physical fight 
to ensure the defeat of evil – labelled as apostates and infidels – by those who claim to be acting 
in the name of Islam. The jihadists are, arguably, conveniently disregarding various calls for 
peaceful co-existence in the Qur’an and Prophet Muhammad’s challenge to the Muslims to 
compete peacefully with followers of other religions in doing good, as provided in the hadith. 
 
In an attempt to profile the extremists, one may contest that there is no evidence showing that the 
jihadists are pious Muslims, that is, believers who are consumed by the prescribed Islamic way of 
life. A good number of extremist leaders such as Osama bin Laden are not known to have followed 
the teachings of Islam to the letter and spirit of the faith. Whilst claims that some pornographic 
materials were found on Bin Laden’s laptop are not substantiated, these individuals, together with 
many members of their social class, are known to have been westernised and happen not to have 
been active members of the Islamic community. Therefore, with the extremists being ‘untrue’ 
Muslims, the Western ‘Islam-sponsors-terror’ line of argument gets watered down. This 
observation may justify the need to view the militants as mere extremists who have decided to 
address their grievances in violent ways.  
 
Given the strength of the enemy, a conventional confrontation becomes untenable. While the 
extremist resort to arms may indeed be in self-defence, as do argue the jihadists, the objective of 
the creation of the caliphate turns the jihad into an offensive one where the use of terror becomes 
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the ideal means to achieve the end. As noted in Chapter 2, terrorism in the name of religion has 
been used extensively since time immemorial to achieve various objectives. Neumann (2009: 94) 
notes that religion, being a major source of identity, gives clarity and “a sense of direction and 
purpose” where the destiny and social environment seems unclear. Economic statistics reveal that 
the lifestyle of billions of Muslims today is far below that of their Western counterparts. The 
Human Development Index (HDI) of 2017 shows a few Middle Eastern Arab countries having an 
HDI ranging between 0.816 and 0.85 compared to around 0.9 for most Western and North 
American countries.10 The low scores of the Middle East countries show an inferior level of living 
standards and other indices such as life expectancy. The rampant corruption in the oil-producing 
Muslim countries where the wealth is allegedly appropriated among the ruling family members 
and their cronies, the USA’s support for the corrupt regimes (to be discussed in more detail in the 
next chapter), and perceptions of a Western onslaught on Islam constitute a recipe for uncertainty 
in the socio-economic environment and the destiny of Muslims in their individual and collective 
capacities. The disgruntlement, grievances and lack of clarity lead individual believers into the 
hands of extremists who are more than willing to use the Qur’an and the hadith to give them a 
sense of purpose.  The outer jihad thus becomes a readily available weapon of choice for the 
achievement of the illusive satisfaction, thereby justifying that others see Islam as a religion of the 
sword. But, ironically, others seem not to appreciate that they are also complicit in the terrorism, 
as has been the recurring theme in the previous chapters.   
 
One Jordanian journalist, Fu’ad Husayn, makes a revelation of a “2020 Jihadist Plan” which he 
learnt from terrorist leader, al-Zarqawi in 1996. Fu’ad Husayn had been locked in a Jordanian jail 
together with al-Zarqawi as a political prisoner. The objective of the plan, which is the ‘restoration 
of the caliphate’, entails attacking some sensitive targets which are associated with the USA’s 
interests, thereby luring the USA to over-react, an action which would act as a recruitment tool for 
the extremists. This would lead to an all-out confrontation between ‘good’ and ‘evil’. The end state 
would be the establishment of the caliphate in appreciation of the belief that, “The foremost duty 
of Islam in this world is to depose jahilliyah11 … and to take the leadership into its own hands…” 
in accordance with the teachings of Qutb (Springer, Regens & Edger, 2009: 78).    
                                                          
10 The United Nations Development Programme Human Development Report is available at 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/composite/HDI. (Accessed on 5 July, 2017).  
11Springer and Regens (2009:20) note that the word jahilliyya means a state of ignorance. Muslims often use the 
term to refer to the time of idolatry and darkness, that is, before the advent of Islam. 
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Springer et al (2009: 90) support this point of view as they argue that the jihad is aimed at forcing 
a change in the mindset of its opponents. The objective of the Islamists is to use the ideology to 
make their actions legitimate, thereby forcing policy change. They argue that it is a well calculated 
approach which uses religion to unite the followers all over the world to rally behind Islam to fight 
those who oppose them. They point out that this is the understanding which enabled Osama bin 
Laden to get some 150 volunteers to leave Sudan for Afghanistan in 1996 (Springer et al (2009: 
15). They argue that the drivers for Islamism are both political and religious. The drivers provide 
a strong philosophical foundation, through a shared ideology, which binds extremists together, 
despite their physical locations. The inseparability of politics and religion allows the mushrooming 
of volunteers for the prosecution of the jihad. The scholars summarise the extremist conviction in 
the cause by arguing that, “Whether it be by crashing a plane into a building, car bombing an 
embassy, hijacking, or kidnapping and beheading, every operation, legitimised by the ideology, 
aims to send a message to the enemy in the hope of influencing a policy change or simply 
destroying morale” (Springer et al, 2009: 15). 
 
The evil which Qutb and other Muslims clerics refer to generally constitutes the Western liberal 
way of life. It, among other things, includes secularism, which separates religion from the state, 
and the concept of pluralism. Milton-Edwards (2006: 77) draws attention to one leading Muslim 
cleric, Yusuf al-Daradawi, who urges Muslims to reject the concept of pluralism since, by virtue 
of it being not in tandem with the Sharia, is anti-Islam. From a similar point of view, Hashmi 
(2002: 91) noted that the Islamists see international law as being modelled on Western standards 
and, therefore being applied unevenly; it is applied only to the extent that it does not have a 
negative effect on Western interests (as alluded to in previous sections). Muslims would, given this 
argument, prefer the use of Islamic laws as enshrined in the Sharia. Apart from ensuring their 
version of justice which is not about rights and entitlements, the laws in question would protect 
the Islamic community from penetration and infiltration, as noted by Hashmi (2003: 93).  
 
There are numerous such intrinsic feelings which relate to issues of identity. Dunne and Booth 
(2002: 120) acknowledged the issues in question as serving the role of providing a sense of 
belonging and confidence, though, on the other hand, self-image may provide a sense of hatred for 
others. The portrayal of Islam and the Muslim community as being under siege drives believers to 
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coalesce around their religion to defend themselves. The natural reaction, as noted by Appiah 
(2005: 71), is that the opposition of a given practice which relates to an identity of a people is 
invariably met with resistance. In this regard, the resistance has seen a flourishing of political 
violence elsewhere on the globe. Hoffman (2006) gives an example of the Hezbollah terrorist 
group which, in a communique in 1985, argued that they had a right to fight and defend what they 
regarded as a noble cause, as the group stated that, “Our way is that of radical combat against 
depravity and America is the original root of depravity” (Hoffman, 2006: 91). 
 
Given a world characterised by suspicion and mistrust, the stage is set for a violent confrontation 
as each side wants its values to prevail. What Muslims see as jahilliya, the West, where it is 
convenient, sees nothing evil about it, as freedom of conscience allows man to believe or not to, 
and, if to believe, which faith to follow. As such there is no justification for allowing the Qur’an 
and Islam to have supremacy over humankind. Doing so constitutes injustice and coercion which 
should be and is bound to be resisted by all those who opt not to believe in Islam. The Islamists’ 
goal of establishing a caliphate where the ‘truth’ will prevail fails to appreciate the fact that value 
systems of different peoples are not and cannot be universal. Just as the West has no right to impose 
its own model of democracy in the world, Muslims should appreciate others’ inner feelings, which 
happen to guide their determination of right or wrong, notwithstanding the fact that there are some 
universal values such as the sanctity of life which should be respected by all of humankind. 
Fairness and freedom of conscience should allow those who do not want to believe not to do so 
and those who opt to believe to do so and proceed to be congregates of a religion of their choice.   
 
The researcher acknowledges the role of religion as constituting an important part of identity in 
most societies. Various faiths have, however, from time to time, used force to spread their gospel 
in a bid to convert others, though that may not be the central teaching of the faith. In many 
instances, extremists of different persuasions have appropriated religion to advance selfish ends. 
This has seen the jihad, which Muslims claim is primarily intended to be an internal spiritual 
struggle, being hijacked to support the extremists’ war against the West. Knapp (2003: 33) argues 
that the jihad has been turned into a violent struggle for real and perceived social, political and 
economic injustices. While the jihad may have been meant for self-defence, probably a justifiable 
cause given the USA’s and Western allies’ hegemonic tendencies in the current world order, there 
is no question that extremists are exploiting and manipulating Islam for selfish, egoistic ends. The 
 81 
 
use of fundamentalist rhetoric by Muslim leaders and clergy to justify the jihad and thence its 
association with terrorism leads to global instability. It is with this realisation that Milton-Edwards 
(2006: 63) concludes that Islam is now associated with violence and bombs. One would add that 
it is not the religion per se that is responsible for the violence, but the extremists who carefully and 
selectively pick and choose the so-called ‘sword verses’ in the Qur’an to support their agenda. 
Suggesting that most Muslims and indeed most Pakistanis do not support the use of force to 
achieve politico-religious objectives, El-Hussein (2008: 160) quoted former Pakistan President 
Musharraf acknowledging in 2002 that the extremists are a threat to the world as he urged people 
to get rid of the ‘Kalashnikov and weapons culture’. The Kalashnikov and weapons culture, 
however, still persists today as extremists extol death by promoting martyrdom which they regard 
not only as one particular expression of resistance but the strongest form of the jihad.   
 
5.4 Martyrdom and Suicide Operations 
Some scholars have argued that that there is a difference between martyrdom and suicide. Springer, 
Regens and Edger (2009: 142) define martyrdom as “those (operations) performed by one or more 
people, against enemies far outstripping them in numbers and equipment, with prior knowledge 
that the operations will almost inevitably lead to death”. Cook (2005: 26) noted that the word 
‘martyr’ originates from the Arabic word shahid, translated into Greek word ‘martys’, which 
means to witness. The witness would relate to those individuals who in appreciation of the truth 
were willing to sacrifice their lives as a testimony. The Concise Oxford English Dictionary 
describes suicide as “the action of killing oneself intentionally”. Sheikh Yusuf al-Qardawi, a 
prominent Palestinian theologian, describes suicide as merely taking one’s life whereas martyrdom 
is a heroic sacrifice which relates to “killing yourself for your religion and your people” (Hoffman, 
2006: 161). While a number of extremists have attempted to justify martyrdom and suicide 
operations, the Qur’an forbids suicide as shown, for example, in Surah 4:29 and Surah 2:195, 
despite the number of current suicide attacks being attributable to those who claim to be faithful 
to Islam.12 Because the Qur’an does not permit suicide, a number of Muslim scholars have 
attempted to differentiate martyrdom from suicide. In the current discussion the terms will be used 
interchangeably to relate to the act of killing others while in the process killing oneself for a 
                                                          
12Surah 4:29 and Surah 2:195 commands the followers as follows: “…do not kill yourselves…” and “Do not throw 
yourself with your own hands to destruction…”. 
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politico-religious cause, with the understanding that the martyr commits suicide in order to achieve 
a given objective. In a clear case of the use of suicide and martyrdom interchangeably, Victoroff 
and Kruglanski (2009: 77) have suggested that suicide should be viewed as either altruistic or 
fatalistic. A person committing altruistic suicide sees suicide as a duty as a result of that 
individual’s identification with a given group.  The individual is prepared to sacrifice his or her 
life for the good of a collective purpose. Those who commit fatalistic suicide see life as 
meaningless. Such a state of mind may be the result of extensive political oppression, economic 
deprivation or other such related causes. The expected glory in afterlife, in the case of the religious 
extremist, gives a motivation to the believer to take his or her life. Needless to say, various factors 
under each category may work hand in hand to induce suicide (Victoroff and Kruglanski, 2009: 
77-79). 
 
History is replete with acts of martyrdom dating back to the 12th century.  Hoffman (1998: 84-85) 
showed that there is nothing new with martyrdom as he gave an example of the early Assassins 
who are recorded as having engaged in self-sacrifice missions in pursuit of religious objectives. 
Cook (2005: 26), similarly, reveals that martyrdom can be traced back to Christians and Judaists 
in ancient times where the believers refused to compromise their faith, but instead opted to die 
under torture as a means of proving their faith. Likewise, Muslims were seen doing the same under 
persecution from the Meccans, although the Muslims were predisposed to seek actively for 
martyrdom as opposed to death being the end result of the stance (Hoffman, 1998: 84-85). 
  
In modern times, the press is awash with headlines carrying stories relating to individuals who 
have used various means, especially explosives, to kill their enemies while also getting killed in 
the process. It is evident that suicide bombers are prepared to forego their lives in pursuit of 
something which, to them, is more valuable than their lives. Fields (2004: 117) suggested that 
suicide bombers “despair of this life or the cost of remaining alive in suffering, indignity, shame 
or pain”. She argued that their actions are driven by some perspectives of faith which teach them 
not to value life, at least the current life, as a better life awaits them in Paradise. Islam, and indeed 
various religions, see death as the way to a better destination. Various analysts do concur that 
suicide attacks are driven by extensive suffering and deep feelings of humiliation occasioned by 
daily experiences of pain, as in the case of Palestinians under Israeli occupation (issues which have 
been discussed extensively in the previous chapters). 
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Ahmed (2013: 122) told the story of a 17-year old Chechen girl, who, in anger against the Russians 
and her fellow Muslim men for their inaction, drove a truck full of explosives into a Russian 
military base, together with a 16-year old friend, as they committed suicide. The teenagers left a 
pre-recorded message advising that the life they were living was not worthy and noted further that, 
“Every person will die and live his life behind… So why do we not choose the best way to die?” 
Research shows that martyrs have included individuals of a different social standing such as 
Zeyrep Kinaci, a married, degreed female x-ray technician who blew herself up killing ten Turkish 
soldiers in June 1996 as she lamented the oppression of the Kurds (Ahmed, 2013: 122-123). 
Similar feelings were expressed by Khan, one of two survivors out of 43, who escaped death on 
his way to Pakistan to join the Afghanistan jihadists. Khan is quoted as regretting that he did not 
get killed in the sojourn as his surviving robbed him of joy in Paradise now that he had to continue 
enduring endless suffering to which he was being subjected on earth (Akbar, 2002: 213). 
 
These cases and many others give support to the argument by Springer, Regens and Edger (2009: 
71) that those who choose martyrdom do so in appreciation of their comparative weakness against 
their enemy. Sheikh Ahmed Ibrahim Yassin, a Hamas spiritual leader, supports this thesis and 
suggests that the militants had no choice but to use suicide attacks as they lacked arms and “not 
even artillery with which to fight evil…” (Cook, 2005: 99). Having appreciated the comparative 
weakness, and under the push of deep-felt and humiliating grievances, the aggrieved are ready to 
turn themselves into lethal bombs to square up with the enemy.  The despair apparently drives 
individuals to opt to kill the enemy in a manner where the attacker’s death is almost guaranteed. 
In almost all cases, religion plays the central role in inducing the person to make that decision, 
which the suicide bomber sees as ‘the best way to die’.  The pain and suffering and the resultant 
deep-felt grievances seem to compel individuals of different demographics – men and women, the 
elderly and teenagers, married and single – to opt to leave their families behind as they sacrifice 
their lives for a cause.  
 
Despite these seemingly compelling reasons for suicide bombings, many Muslims, however, are 
not in support of the theology of suicide attacks. Peterson (2012) showed that the practice has 
recently been condemned publicly by prominent Muslim leaders such as Abdul Aziz bin Abdullah 
al Sheik of Saudi Arabia and Mohammed Sayed Tantaw, a prominent Sunni cleric. Peterson argued 
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that the silence from many Muslims does not imply support for suicide bombings, but disapproval 
of Israel’s humiliation of the Palestinians.  
 
Cook (2005: 39), on the other hand, argued that suicide missions entail the sacrifice of one’s life 
for the sake of Allah. Suicide bombers are driven by a willingness to die in the process of fulfilling 
Allah’s will. It is however noted that, in the process of appeasing God, the consequences for 
innocent civilians who get killed are immaterial; they see them as collateral damage. Cook (2005: 
39) argued further that since the extremists also want to use the act to communicate a message and 
given the fact that their cause is always related to their faith, this means of warfare makes every 
Muslim a potential target for recruitment. This is the case given the disparities in the living 
standards of most Muslims in comparison to their Western counterparts, as already noted (HDI, 
2017: 82). This is also the case with Muslim immigrants who find the Western lifestyle hostile in 
their adopted countries. The researcher adds that the feelings of despair are felt equally, if not more, 
by well-educated Muslims who have an even better appreciation of the disparities in question. 
 
The numbers responding to the call for martyrdom are therefore bound to be aplenty despite the 
fact that the Qur’an forbids suicide. The fundamentalists have found a way of going around the 
prohibitive verses and have succeeded in selectively picking the scriptures which they can utilise 
effectively to promote their violent activities using some appealing language couched, for example, 
in ‘self-defence’ and ‘religious duty in fulfilment of Allah’s will’. In this way, they are able to 
appropriate Islam using the “we versus them cosmos” as alluded to by Fields (2004: 166). The 
dichotomisation of the world allows the extremists to hijack the Qur’an and the hadith to justify 
their violent activities as they selectively pick verses in the Qur’an to exhort those who believe in 
Islam to fight ‘them’. They are able to exploit real and perceived grievances to their advantage to 
induce the believers to fight the others using illegal, barbaric means which have the effect of 
claiming the lives of innocent civilians, all this in exchange for rewards which the faithful 
ostensibly find difficult to resist. 
 
Just as the assassins are known to have sought martyrdom inspired by of heavenly rewards, modern 
martyrs may look forward to pleasant rewards in Paradise such as the companionship of 72 
beautiful, young virgins who would provide permanent company to the faithful in Paradise 
(Hoffman, 2006: 33).  A translation of Surah 25: 22-24 promises the martyrs “fair wives with 
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lovely wide eyes” as a reward for self-sacrifice, with various Islamic texts making reference to 72 
beautiful companions as a reward for martyrdom, that is, for showing the highest act of love to 
Allah. While some versions show that the men would be married to beautiful virgins with swelling, 
pear-shaped breasts, faithful female martyrs would get a reward of one man each who will be able 
to give the desired sexual satisfaction (Hoffman, 2006: 33). Other than delights such as milk and 
honey which the fundamentalists look forward to and the sensual pleasures of “full-breasted 
maidens” provided for in the holy book, Surah 78:34 promises the martyrs other pleasures such as 
alcohol, which the Shariah happens to forbid on earth. Those who have come face to face with 
suicide bombers, for example, a US Army corporal who witnessed the Beirut International Airport 
suicide bombing on 23 October 1983, have suggested that suicide bombers exhibit what Muslims 
refer to as bassamat al-farah (a smile of joy) as they engage in the act (Hoffman, 2006: 100). One 
may deduce that the smile is a preview of the anticipated permanent pleasures of Paradise, with 
the faithful individual having managed to forego the earthly transient ones, in conformity with the 
promises of the Qur’an.  
 
The belief in an afterlife, and a better permanent life for that matter, in Paradise has had the effect 
of persuading several believers of the Islamic faith to seek death by eliminating those they see as 
enemies of Islam. The fundamentalists would be happy to be counted among those who have 
proselytised and fought ‘evils’ such as immorality and idolatry and all forms of jahilliya and thus 
get rewarded for dying while executing Allah’s will. The challenge, however, is that this 
fundamentalist choice has an impact on the rights of others who choose not to subscribe to the 
Islamic faith and those of the Islamic faith who do not believe in the literal translation of the 
Qur’an. The desire by extremists to force others to believe in a religion which is not of their choice 
drives many people to suggest that Islam is a violent religion.  
 
If Islam has to be seen and confirmed to be a peaceful religion, moderate Muslims must be heard 
condemning Islamic fundamentalists unreservedly. They should shout in their numbers, and be 
heard doing so loudly and clearly, drowning the voices of the minority. All should realise and 
accept that different people have their own value systems, and no-one should be coerced into 
following another’s beliefs. All Muslims should appreciate the true spirit of the greater jihad, 
which should allow them to live in peace and harmony with those who choose not to follow their 
religion. Those who choose to turn themselves into bombs should pick their targets carefully and 
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ensure that they kill the identified enemy and themselves only and proceed to accept that the 
anticipation of the promised rewards in Paradise is a personal decision. The consideration of by-
standers as collateral damage is nonsensical and should be seen as such. The targeting of an enemy 
where the operation is clearly likely to result in the death of innocent people is unjust and only 
serves to give justification to the USA and its allies for resorting to force to resist the extremists.  
 
5.5 Concluding Remarks 
Islam is an old, established religion that commands multitudes of followers. The Islamic faith is 
arguably something more than a mere religion but an ideology and a way of life that governs the 
day-to-day conduct and actions of Muslims. The religion, just like any other, has specific mores 
and values which create boundaries between the faithful and outsiders. The dictates of the 
Shahadah, the belief in one God, which demands that conduct in society has to follow Allah’s will 
as prescribed in the Qur’an and hadiths, sets a scene for confrontation with non-Muslims, given 
the differences in their value systems.  As a result of the differences and Islam’s apparent 
inseparability of religion and politics, the faith has been subjected to constant attacks from the 
West. Islamic extremists have taken advantage of the attacks, fusing them with genuine and 
perceived grievances to launch violent attacks on the USA and its Western allies.  
 
This chapter showed how the extremists have managed to emphasise the differences between Islam 
on the one side and atheists and followers of other religions on the other side. Using examples of 
various extremist Muslim leaders and the clergy, it was demonstrated how these prominent leaders 
have utilised the distinct identity of Muslims to project a religion under siege. In that way, 
extremists have managed to exploit the propensity of people to react when they feel that there is a 
threat to themselves and their interests. Extremists have managed to exploit the numerous socio-
economic challenges facing Muslims in the Arab world to advance a violent agenda.  
 
Similarly, the militants have attempted to hijack the agenda of Islamic Revivalism which is aimed 
at freeing, or at least keeping, Muslims from the control of others, to give prominence to religious 
and related cultural differences between Muslims and the rest of the world. The genuine fear of 
domination by the West has placed the general Muslim community in a defensive posture. From a 
supposed-to-be defensive position, the extremists have launched offensive operations against the 
USA and its Western allies. Being aware of the influence of the Qur’an and the respect it commands 
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among Muslims, extremist leaders and clergy have cherry-picked ‘verses of the sword’ in the 
Qur’an, which are ostensibly meant for the defence of the faith, to justify their use of violence. 
Through the use of inflammatory rhetoric, among other strategies, radicals have managed to deploy 
Islam, a belief which happens to blend religion and politics into one, to put a wedge between Islam 
and others, thereby increasing suspicion between the parties. 
 
This chapter showed how the differences in the value systems between Muslims and the West have 
fuelled the violent conflict between the two sides, for example, in the use of the concepts of 
democracy and justice which mean totally different things to the two belief systems. The Muslims’ 
belief in the supremacy of religion and, hence Allah’s will, compels them to see Western liberal 
democracy as a challenge to Islam. They see liberal tenets such as freedom of conscience, which 
allow people to criticise religion, as evil. Instead they would want to see a ‘just’ system, that is, 
one which conforms to the provisions of the Qur’an and hadith, not one which promotes the right 
of consciousness as defined by scholars such as Rawls (2005). Fundamentalists therefore aspire to 
see the creation of a theocratic Muslim state where the ‘truth’ would prevail as all of humankind 
unreservedly worship the only one true God. Needless to say, this is a recipe for conflict between 
Muslims and non-Muslims. 
 
With such aspirations in mind, it was demonstrated in this chapter how the extremists have abused 
the otherwise noble jihad to advance their interests.  As moderate Muslims use the jihad of the 
tongue to proselytise, the extremists are quick to engage in the jihad of the sword to confront the 
West with the hope of forcing the enemy to accede to their demands. It was shown in this chapter 
that while the jihad is meant to be an internal struggle in a person to lead life in God’s way, the 
extremists have manipulated the concept to lure the followers of Islam to engage in dastardly acts 
of violence, all in the name of Islam, thus allowing the West to associate the jihad with a holy war. 
The supposedly peaceful concept has been hijacked by extremists to woo followers of Islam to 
fight others as the militants give a literal translation of some texts in the Qur’an to advance their 
violent agenda. They have managed to aggravate the violence through the manipulation of the texts 
using well-chosen sensational language to create conditions for confrontation. The declaration by 
various extremist leaders and Islamic clergy that Islam should never be allowed to be subordinated 
to the state, alongside their claim that Muslims have an unalienable right to engage in the jihad to 
right the wrongs, only serves to increase the tension between the different groups which are already 
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suspicious of each other. Using a wrong to right a wrong is, for that matter, immoral. The extremist 
disposition to fight anyone and anything that is non-Muslim only serves to escalate the conflict 
and hence world instability.     
             
This chapter showed further how deep-felt grievances, frustration and anger drive God-fearing 
people to strap themselves with explosives and turn themselves into bombs where they instantly 
kill others whilst they are clearly aware that they would also die in the process. The strong belief 
in an afterlife, the related eschatological goals, and a promise of Paradise where people will live 
happily are irresistible to fundamentalists. While suicide bombing does make strategic sense 
insofar as mitigating the superiority of the enemy is concerned, the fact that it results in the loss of 
innocent lives in almost all cases makes it an unjust means of warfare.  It was thus argued in this 
chapter that this type of violence, and indeed all other related forms of political violence 
perpetrated by those claiming to be acting in the name of Islam, only serve to give Islam a bad 
name and thus attract a countervailing force from the West.  
 
While Islam certainly does not equate to terrorism, the use of its name by the Islamic extremists 
to commit acts of violence helps to taint an otherwise peaceful religion. Islam, as has happened to 
other religions from time to time, is being appropriated by extremists in pursuit of various 
objectives – justifiable and unjustifiable – unfortunately, using illegal and immoral means. It was 
argued in this chapter that the current conflict between the Muslim extremists and the United States 
and its Western allies is a struggle for political space which is accentuated by differences in belief 
systems. Reconciling relations between two antagonistic groups is a major challenge given the 
militant stance of both parties.  An appreciation of each other’s interests and sensitivities and 
preparedness to compromise and sacrifice something on each side may go a long way in reducing 
the conflict between the two parties. Unfortunately, as the extremists are not prepared to 
compromise on their ideals, the USA has also adopted a similar, rigid, self-centred stance in its 
dealings with those it sees as constituting a threat to its global interests.   
 
 
 
 
 
 89 
 
CHAPTER SIX: THE USA FOREIGN POLICY AND THE INTERNATIONALISATION 
OF THE WAR ON TERRORISM 
6.1 Introduction 
Given a unipolar world where on one side there is one superpower, namely the USA, which 
naturally wants to and does exercise political and economic influence over the less powerful, and 
on the other side there is an aggrieved community with a long list of grievances against the 
superpower, the relations between the two sides are bound to be antagonistic. It was argued in the 
last three chapters that the aggrieved have found terrorism to be an effective means to force the 
enemy to accede to their demands and, in fulfilment of that objective, the terrorists have opted to 
use various forms of violence to attack Western targets, thereby luring the USA to react with force. 
It was further demonstrated in the last chapter that religious extremists are prepared to do anything 
in pursuit of their beliefs given the conviction that their actions are in fulfilment of God’s wishes. 
In response to the terrorist attacks, the USA has done everything it can to rally the world behind it 
as it applies a variety of strategies such as diplomacy and use of force in an attempt to combat 
terrorism. The USA is known to have applied diplomatic pressure on governments of countries 
such as Pakistan and Afghanistan to cooperate with it in combating terrorism well before the 9/11 
incident. It has undertaken covert operations in different parts of the world in an attempt to capture 
or kill terrorist suspects and confirmed terrorist leaders. Past overt operations include the 
deployment of its forces in search of Al-Shabbab terrorists in Somalia in 1993 and bombing 
campaigns such as the targeting the Al-Shifa medical plant in Sudan, which was a response to the 
bombings of its embassies in East Africa in 1998.  
Whilst in the past the USA has responded with limited military operations to punish specific 
terrorist attacks, the devastating terrorist assault on the homeland on 11 September, 2001 drove the 
superpower to declare a war on terrorism (WOT). The USA saw the WOT as the solution to the 
elimination of terrorism. This chapter makes a detailed analysis of post-9/11 developments vis-à-
vis the internationalisation of the war on terrorism and its link with the USA’s foreign policy. This 
chapter seeks to explore the consequences of the various strategies adopted by the USA in pursuit 
of its foreign policy objectives. The first section of this chapter seeks to evaluate claims by some 
scholars that the internationalisation of the WOT is a means of achieving various foreign policy 
objectives of the USA which happen to be imperial in nature. In that regard, the Project for the 
New American Century (PNAC), the USA’s National Security Strategy (NSS) of 2002, and the 
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Bush Doctrine will be analysed. This section will untangle various pronouncements by the USA 
leadership in an attempt to uncover the driving force behind the WOT. The second section will 
assess the efficacy of the USA diplomatic initiatives in trying to get the whole world to follow it 
as it leads from the front in the war against terrorism. Here the use of both persuasive and coercive 
diplomacy and their effect in influencing the desired objective of eliminating terrorism will be 
discussed. Different countries in various parts of the world will be sampled to demonstrate the 
driving self-interest of the regimes that collaborated with the USA in the WOT and the resultant 
consequences, especially on human rights in those respective countries. The third section  will look 
at the USA’s foreign policy in the Middle East with a focus on its relationship with countries such 
as Israel and Egypt, whose transgressions it deliberately ignores for the sole reason that they 
constitute allies in its internationalised WOT. The last part will evaluate USA’s offensive 
operations with a focus on Afghanistan, where the conduct of the USA and its NATO allies will be 
discussed. 
6.2 Link Between the War on Terror and the USA Foreign Policy 
McIntoch (2002: 41) argued that the WOT is driven by elite global policies which obviously do 
not take care of the interests of the developing world, thereby bringing irony to the refrain “Why 
do they hate us?”. He contended that the implication by the American politicians and leadership 
that the USA was being attacked by evil people needed scrutiny as it was unlikely to be true. He 
instead saw the attacks as a ‘backblast’ on a republic that had turned into an empire. Booth and 
Dunne (2002: 120) similarly argued for a need to disaggregate the so-called hatred of the USA as 
doing so would show that it is not the USA per se that is hated but rather its global policies. They 
contend that it was the ‘American way’ – the way the USA runs the world on its preferred way on 
a daily basis – and its ‘brutal foreign policy’ that is the source of international terrorism. They 
argued further that the hatred is a result of the actions of the different administrations, regime after 
regime, which showed contradictions in the USA “…self-image of standing firm for liberty, democracy 
and international law and peace, while conducting policies characterised by inconsistency on free trade, 
support of tyrants, economic imperialism, playing fast and loose with international law and, where 
necessary, being ready, willing and able to use violence.” (Booth and Dunne, 2002: 3).  
Various pronouncements in support of the New American Century, which advocated for American 
global dominance, the 2002 USA National Security Strategy, and the Bush Doctrine, all showed 
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characteristics of a predatory foreign policy (Booth and Dunne, 2002). Source Watch showed that 
the PNAC13, established in 1997 by neo-conservative academics and politicians, a good number of 
whom ended up in the George W. Bush administration, was unequivocal in its desire to promote 
American global dominance, which would allow the USA to influence international politics. 
Having been obsessed with Iraq long before 9/11, the men now occupying critical positions in the 
White House, Pentagon and the Defence Department, found a golden opportunity to advance their 
imperial objectives in the aftermath of 9/11. While their interest was on the Iraqi oil, the smoke 
screen has always been national security (Booth and Dunne, 2002: 4-6). Among other activities 
directed at promoting the interests of the USA at the expense of smaller powers, the group 
reportedly sponsored an Iraqi national, Ahmed Chalabi, to effect a regime change in Iraq, despite 
the individual being a known fugitive from justice with a 22-year sentence for fraud. For the 
American government and PNAC advocates, the end – having a pliant regime to ensure unhindered 
access to Iraqi oil – justified the means. They had to link the Saddam Hussein tyrannical regime 
with terrorism, as will be discussed in detail in the next section, despite the unavailability of 
evidence to that effect. Blum (2006: 267) quotes Arnold Toynbee arguing that, just as ancient Rome 
supported the rich at the expense of the poor, America, “the leader of the world anti-revolutionary 
movement in the defence of vested interests”, ensures that “its policies protect inequality, injustice 
and least happiness for the greatest number” in pursuit of its national security.  
The USA NSS of 200214 focused on security, free markets and democracy. While espousing 
multilateral cooperation, it underlined the fact that the USA will not hesitate to act alone in the 
exercise of its right to self-defence. The right to self-defence entails pre-emptive strikes on 
terrorists and states harbouring terrorists and, in that endeavour, the NSS emphasised that “the only 
path to peace and security is the path of action” (Blum, 2006: 5). In that regard the NSS spelled 
out the need for the USA not to be constrained by the dictates of international organisations such 
as the International Criminal Court (ICC) whose jurisdiction, it emphasised, did not cover USA 
citizens.  
                                                          
13 Donnelly, T. (2000) shows that the Project for the New American Century was established in 1997 as a non-profit 
organisation with an objective of promoting the leadership of the USA in world affairs. Details are available at 
http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/pdf/RebuildingAmericasDefenses.pdf. (Accessed on 21 October, 2018).  
 
14The USA National Security Strategy of 2002 is a policy document that was published by the USA State 
Department in 2002. It aims at coordinating the use of all means at the disposal of the USA to promote USA 
interests in the world. Details are available at https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf 
(Accessed on 21 October, 2018). 
 92 
 
The NSS has not been apologetic for the USA’s unilateral action in pursuit of the country’s 
strategic, economic and political interests. A critical evaluation of the contents of the NSS shows 
that it is about ensuring America’s hegemony in the globe. Mallaby (2002: 39) argued that the USA 
is bound to lead the world and take unilateral decisions by virtue of its power thereby, deliberately 
or inadvertently, playing an imperial role. He argued that this was a pragmatic approach, given the 
inherent risks such as the time factor and lack of consensus that are associated with consultations, 
the weakness of allies, and the veto power of rivals in the United Nations (UN) system. Paul 
Rodgers, in Booth and Dunne (2002: 217), joined other scholars such as Charles Krauthammer of 
the hegemonic stability theory who saw guaranteed peace and stability under a single hegemony. 
He described the American hegemony as a “benign imperium” meant to ensure global peace and 
security, and in that regard, it becomes not always necessary to consult other players (Booth and 
Dunne: 221). Elshtain (2003: 94) gave her total support to the above school of thought and argued 
further that “responding justly to injustice” is a tall order as the fluid situation, which characterises 
terrorism, always entails a risk of lives over and above the fact that the USA has a task of defeating 
the ‘apocalyptic nihilists’ (Elshtain, 2003: 209). Indeed, any mighty state will not find it easy not 
to resort to force and unilateralism when faced with what it perceives as provocation, but that kind 
of decision criterion is what separates liberal democracy from autocracy.   
Gusterson and Besteman (2010: 39) quoted the Economist noting that the USA does play a leading 
role in coming up with multilateral regulations and institutions but has the propensity for 
conducting policy outside the constraints imposed by the accords. While it is true that there are 
various challenges associated with multilateral approaches when faced with danger, the attempt by 
one power to decide single-handedly for the world what is right or wrong, is wrong.  The USA, as 
the only superpower, has arrogated itself the right to lead and must be seen to be doing exactly 
that, but in the right way – the right way being one that recognises state equality. As noted by 
Elshtain (2003: 93), it is the burden of the empire to lead and lead it may, but there are norms 
prescribed by the international community that the leader is expected to follow.  
Weiss, Crahan, and Goering (2004: 91) argued that any state with the capability is likely to be 
persuaded to use pre-emption when faced with a realistic, imminent threat. Indeed, that is a given, 
but the response should be subject to the provisions of the UN Charter. Doing otherwise is not only 
immoral but is also a contravention of International Law. Weiss et al (2004: 236) quoted the UN 
Secretary for Communications and Public Information, Shashi Tharoor, reminding the world that 
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the UN was created to ensure that all nations, big or small, overcome their vulnerabilities through 
international institutions where “use of force would be subjected to constraints of international 
law…(using) universally upheld rules and norms”. The USA has to accept the fact that no single 
power, despite its might, has the right to force the whole world to follow its ideals and model of 
democracy.  A foreign policy based on going it alone (the American way) does not help the war 
against terrorism and an attempt to foist democracy on other countries will not yield the desired 
results but may, as a result of resentment, contribute towards breeding more terrorism. To that 
effect, Yew (2007) argued that the world is very diverse and, as such, needs multilateral 
cooperation. He went on to advise that, “Different races, cultures, religions, languages, and 
histories require different paths to democracy” (Yew, 2007: 71). Similarly, Boren and Perkins 
(2002) advised the USA to adopt a foreign policy paradigm which must reflect, “… a vision of the 
kind of world we want to help build and live in … and a realistic understanding of the limits of 
our own power and that of other major powers, both friendly and rival” (Boren & Perkins, 2002: 
176). 
Arguably as a means of pushing for the New American Century and thus the American way, 
President George W. Bush and his team seemed oblivious of or at least chose to ignore the rights 
and freedoms that the UN Charter accords each individual and each sovereign nation-state.  
Fouskas and Gökay (2005: 3) suggested that since 2002 the USA has been pursuing the Bush 
Doctrine, which they described as “an imperial posture…which is based on militarist and imperial 
values with theocratic overtones”. They argued that the doctrine was hegemonic and goes a long 
way in spelling out the USA’s unilateralist foreign policy while it is not hesitant in effecting 
regime-change on those governments which fail to protect or abide by its interests. The imperial 
nature of the USA’s foreign policy is aptly described by Gareau  (2004), who related it to a hub-
and-spoke system where the USA was the imperial hub while the rest of the capitalist capitals 
made up the spokes. In that regard, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO -  a security 
alliance of North American and European countries - is used by the USA as an instrument to assert 
its authority on the world where it strives to ensure that the system has “more spokes to spin around 
its hub” (Gareau, 2004: 231). The WOT therein allows the USA to proceed with its neo-imperial 
agenda as the system facilitates the deployment of its troops elsewhere in the world where it has 
strategic interests. An analysis of President W. Bush’s presentation at West Point on the USA’s 
NSS in 2002 showed that the USA will not hesitate to use violence where its interests are at stake. 
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Caldwell (2011: 103) argued that the right to pre-emption, so emphasised by the Bush 
administration, is now synonymous with illegal preventive wars. Arguing that the USA seeks to 
impose its policies on the world, President W. Bush was quoted by Caldwell (2011: 106) as 
declaring that, “I will seize every opportunity (as President of the USA) to achieve big goals.” 
The utterances of the USA leadership show a propensity of the USA for going to war to get things 
done in the American way, in tandem with the New American Century. Iraq, which is subject of a 
detailed discussion in the next section, should be seen as one of those big goals. Going to war for 
the sake of introducing democracy to people not only transgresses International Law, but is 
outright immoral. Caldwell (2011: 27) quoted one senior advisor to President Bush boasting that 
the USA is now an empire and therefore has the right to act any way it likes, and that when it does 
so it creates its own reality. The arrogance of the officials of the various administrations was 
illustrated further by John Bolton, the then USA Ambassador-designate to the UN, who was quoted 
bragging in 1994 that the UN was just as good as non-existent, but that there was instead an 
international community that had to be led by “the only real power left in the world” (Blum, 2006: 
270). In this regard the international community should and would only be consulted when it suited 
the interests of the USA. As arrogant and undiplomatic as the statement from a senior government 
official was, and, more so, an official that was at that time designated for a diplomatic posting at 
the highest intergovernmental institution, Bolton’s assertions confirmed the real situation on the 
ground. But, as observed by Weiss, Crahan and Goering (2004: 83), such a stance was a clear 
testimony of contradictions in the foreign policy of the USA which, while advocating for equality 
among individuals and all nations of the world, was at the same time preaching and doing exactly 
the opposite. They argued that this was all a result of the USA’s foreign policy which was 
influenced by a belief in exceptionalism, the conviction that the USA is divinely blessed and 
therefore is above all other nations in terms of everything that matters.  
In as far as the officials of the USA are concerned, the concept of ‘universalibility’ is not applicable 
to the big power. Weiss, Crahan and Goering (2004: 81) defined the concept of universalibility as 
a maxim that states that an action should be only permissible if it can be adopted across the board. 
In this spirit, fairness demands that the USA cannot claim privilege as a result of what it is, which 
is exactly what the USA is doing as it dangles carrots while wielding a stick to get the international 
world to cooperate with it in its WOT. 
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6.3 International Cooperation in the Fight Against Terrorism 
The internationalisation of the war on terrorism included the roping in of various countries which 
were either persuaded or coerced to join the USA in its declared war. While NATO allies joined 
under the block’s security pact, countries such as Japan, Turkey and some African countries and 
traditional opponents such as China and Russia, arguably joined the war for various reasons which 
were related to self-interest while others were apparently coerced to get on board. Chomsky (2003: 
15) noted that Turkey was the first country to offer its support to the USA when the latter invaded 
Afghanistan. He argued that this was a quid pro quo for the USA’s support of Turkey in its war 
against Kurd rebels in that country. Ahmed (2013: 39) argued that Turkey’s declaration that what 
the al-Qaeda was to the West was what the Kurdistan Workers’ Party was to Turkey was received 
with delight by the USA as it sought to have obedient allies in the fight against terrorism.  This 
was despite evidence of Turkey having destroyed homes and killed thousands of dissenters, which 
Chomsky (2003: 18) described as “massive state terror… (in the magnitude of something) …way 
worse than what Slobodan Milosevic was accused of”.15  
The use of terror by some states against political opponents seems not to have been a major issue 
for the USA for as long as the country in question was with the USA in the war against terrorism. 
This realisation gave the Turkish regime an opportunity to trample on the rights of dissidents with 
impunity. Examples of the government’s crackdown on human rights, with the complicity of the 
USA – all in the name of the WOT – included the incarceration of Mayor Aydin Budak for seven 
and half years in prison for the crime of participating in a protest rally, the detention of 1,572 
minors between 2006 and 2007, with one Kurdish teenager getting 28 years in prison for “throwing 
a stone”, and the return to prison of sociologist Ismail Besicki, for the crime of publishing a book 
titled State Crime in the Near East, after having served 15 years in jail for yet another crime of 
recording the repression of the Kurds (Ahmed, 2013: 198). Instead of the USA demanding respect 
for human rights by Turkey, as it had done elsewhere, the administration praised the Turkish 
government for its “positive experiences” in crushing the rebels (Ahmed, 2013: 198). Whatever 
the USA government meant by ‘positive experiences’, the USA found it convenient to disregard 
Turkey’s human rights record for as long as Turkey supported the American war against terrorism.  
                                                          
15Slobadan Milosevic, President of Yugoslavia from 1997 to 2000, was indicted by the International Criminal 
Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in 1999 for genocide and various war crimes against humanity. 
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Ahmed (2013: 91) argued that China joined the bandwagon in the war against terrorism and, 
instead of using the usual terms such as hooliganism and accidents which it has frequently used in 
the past to avoid giving prominence to terrorist incidents, it started to talk openly about al-Qaeda 
and Islamic fundamentalists in its Xinjiang Province. China’s cooperation with the USA bore fruit 
in 2002 when the USA included the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), a hitherto unknown 
terrorist group said to be operating in the Xinjiang Province, in its list of terrorist organisations. 
Likely buoyed by such unexpected cooperation from a supposed-to-be ideological rival, China 
went on to accelerate its repression of dissent as it at one time arrested up to 100 ‘terrorists’ 
(Ahmed, 2013: 290). Thousands of Uyghurs, a Turkish ethnic group living in China and primarily 
practising Islam, were detained while a number were sentenced to long jail sentences, with as many 
as 40 being executed at one time after being accused of terrorism (Ahmed, 2013: 290). China’s 
war against terrorism included a clamp down on demonstrations. A women’s protest march against 
a ban on the headscarf in March 2008, which also demanded the end of torture and release of 
political detainees, was described by the government as being in support of the ‘three evil forces’, 
a term used by the Chinese government to refer to separatism, religious extremism and terrorism. 
The link of the demonstrations with Al-Qaeda was likely meant to give a justification for the use 
of force to quell the demonstrations. Had the Chinese government not declared its support for an 
international war against terrorism, it is very likely that the noted kind of repression would not 
have gone unnoticed. There is a high probability that the USA would have been the first to censure 
China for failing to live by its dictates of creating a harmonious society, that is, a moralistic society 
which is supposed to allow for the minorities to live side by side with the majority where all would 
enjoy peace and tranquillity.  
Possibly for similar selfish reasons, the Russian regime also went into bed with the USA as it 
sought the support of the latter in its suppression of the Chechnya rebels. Ahmed (2013: 91) 
revealed that Russian President Putin was one of the first Heads of State to express his support for 
the WOT directly, just four days after President Bush’s declaration of war. The Russian President 
went on to reiterate that the Chechen rebels were a constituency of the Islamic terrorist network. 
Unlike in 2000 when the USA Secretary of State Madeleine Albright accused the Russian 
government of abusing the Chechen civilian population, President Bush went on to describe 
President Putin as “straight forward and trustworthy” (Ahmed, 2013: 93). Immediately thereafter 
the USA placed a bounty on Dokka Umarov, the Chechen leader of Caucasus Emirate, as both 
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countries agreed that he was ‘Russia’s bin Laden’. 
The flattery afforded an old rival by the USA leadership and its tacit acknowledgement that 
Russia’s enemies were its enemies, in typical fashion of ‘my friend’s enemy is my enemy’, was 
obviously meant to cement the relations and cooperation between the two in the USA-declared 
WOT. The Russians, taking advantage of the newly found friendship, went on to bomb some 
residential apartments as the government claimed that they housed terrorists. 300 lives were lost 
while a number of survivors were arrested and subjected to torture (Ahmed, 2013: 93). Some 
analysts argue that the so-called terrorists were a creation of the Russian intelligence which was 
aimed at creating a solid ground for the launch of an offensive against the Chechens.  
The Russians did proceed with what is now referred to as the ‘Second Chechen War’ where, among 
other things, they used live ammunition to subdue demonstrators and heavy weaponry such as 
tanks to demolish homesteads and erase entire villages as they joined hands with the USA in the 
WOT. This was how ‘straight forward’ the Russian leadership had become to the Americans who 
now saw no evil and heard no evil as they sought to revenge the 9/11 attacks. The Russians had 
turned out to be a trustworthy ally which also had a duty of destroying its own Bin Ladens. At 
around the same time the USA sought to strengthen its ties with Israel as it affirmed Israel’s support 
of the WOT. With unconditional support from the USA, more Jewish settlers moved into 
Palestinian lands. Replicating the cycle of violence that characterises terrorism, Palestinian 
terrorists escalated their attacks as they dispatched suicide bombers and launched rockets randomly 
into Israel while Israel responded with retaliatory attacks which were, equally, non-discriminatory. 
Chomsky (2003: 196) revealed how the American support gave the Israeli Prime Minister Sharon 
more ammunition to clamp down on the Palestinians. President Sharon’s offensive operations 
included an attack on the Jenin refugee camp where, among a long list of atrocities, the Israeli 
security forces targeted wheel chair-bound Kemal Zughayer whom they shot dead before crushing 
him using tanks in 2002, all in the name of the WOT (Ahmed, 2013: 95-96). 
Chomsky (2003) posed a question on what, for example, would have been the effect if a country 
such as Syria had occupied Israel and launched an offensive against its population, rampaging its 
towns with tanks and bulldozers, levelling all buildings, and denying the population food and water 
and access to medical care. The researcher avers that the international, liberal community, ably led 
by the USA, would have taken drastic action, as it did against Slobodan Milosevic and Saddam 
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Hussein. The collective punishment unleashed by Israel against terrorists and civilians for a crime 
committed by a few extremists would not have been condoned. The use of terrorism to fight 
terrorism would likely have been escalated to the UN for condemnation. But by virtue of being the 
one and only superpower, the war against terrorism had to be fought on American terms where the 
USA had the ability to use its strength and influence to decide the rightness or wrongness of state 
action.  
Following the signing of an order by the USA Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld, that 
empowered the military to hunt for Al-Qaeda in 15 countries, the USA sought collaboration with 
Pakistan as it hunted for the terrorists in the tribal areas bordering that country with Afghanistan. 
Weiss, Crahan and Goering (2004: 87) noted that the need for cooperation with Pakistan 
overlooked the fact that President Musharaff  of Pakistan was an undemocratic leader who had 
gotten into power through a coup d’état. When quizzed on his relationship with a dictator who had 
no respect for human rights, President Bush retorted that what was critical was the fact that 
Musharaff was “tight with us on the war against terror” (Weiss, Crahan & Goering, 2004: 89). 
President Bush’s statement was clearly a confirmation that the WOT took precedence over 
everything else. thereby pushing governance issues to the periphery. There is also a feeling among 
some scholars that Musharaff himself may have had no choice but to cooperate with the USA, 
given the naked power politics of the latter, which is known to have been pursuing a quid pro quo 
to get the sanctions it imposed, following Pakistan’s nuclear test, lifted (Weiss, Crahan & Goering, 
2004: 89).  
President Obama, a leader who had been voted into power for his anti-war stance, went on to 
pursue his predecessor’s policies as, under him, the WOT also took precedence over human rights. 
The objective of defeating terrorists anchored and defined all activities of the state in the war. 
Ahmed (2013: 296) and other authors told of tribesmen lamenting the killing of innocent civilians 
on a daily basis by terrorists having been accused of cooperating with the Pakistan military and of 
being spies for the Americans, and also by the Pakistan army for conspiring with terrorists, while 
Americans attacked them indiscriminately using drones. These are the kind of circumstances 
where one is persuaded to understand why desperate human beings decide to take up arms and 
resort to terrorism to demand justice, a decision which unfortunately always leads to a cycle of 
violence. 
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The abuse of civilians by terrorists and the different state actors together with their agents deserves 
unreserved censure. The USA, the Pakistan ally and the terrorists all behaved alike in their failure 
to distinguish innocent civilians from combatants. For each of them, expedience ruled the day as 
they found it imprudent to subject the suspects to a trial to confirm their guilt or innocence. All the 
players seem to have borrowed Niccolo Machiavelli’s argument that the respect of moral qualities 
such as forbearance and probity, which are admirable in private life, might be disastrous in a war 
situation.16 This approach is, however, arguably self-serving as it suggests that one may have either 
human rights or security, meaning that the two are mutually exclusive, which is not true, as argued 
hitherto. The reaction by the USA and allies fails to take heed of Ignatieff’s (2004) advice that no 
reciprocation is required in granting rights. Ignatieff (2004: 29) argued that political liberalism 
expects these rights to be respected as they cannot be revoked, despite one’s conduct. 
Typically to conformity with realpolitik, the USA made ‘friends’ across the political divide as it 
sought to decimate terrorists wherever they could be found, as declared by President George Bush. 
The newly found allies included Uzbekistan, a relationship which was described by one USA 
Congressman as “a dance with the dictators” as the administration sought to use that country to 
launch attacks on Afghanistan (Weiss, Crahan & Goerin, 2004: 87). The poor African continent 
was not spared as the USA government lobbied and pressured some African countries – a number 
of which were known not to be democratic – to cooperate with it in the WOT while the countries 
in question used the opportunity to suppress their restless populations.  
Weiss, Crahan and Goering (2004: 87) argued that the USA ignored “the lack of democracy, 
systematic torture, persistent repression, and other violations of human rights” as it sought the 
cooperation of Hosni Mubarak to wage the war.17  Various suspects of Arab origin were ‘rendered’ 
from the USA to Egypt, an action which deliberately located them beyond the jurisdiction of the 
USA legal system. The USA also went for covert military operations in other African countries 
such as Somalia and Libya (Peter Bergen, 2012: 121).  In the Horn of Africa, the USA found an 
ally in Ethiopia as it backed the invasion of Somalia by Ethiopia in 2006 where the latter was 
accused of killing more than 8,000 Muslims as the USA poured in billions of dollars in military 
equipment (Ahmed, 2013: 267).  Ethiopia, in turn, played ball and passed an Anti-Terrorism 
                                                          
16Machiavelli, N. (1961) “The Prince”. New York: Penguin Inc. 
17The USA is accused of embracing President Mubarak to advance its interests, and once it felt that he had outlived 
his usefulness, its leadership put pressure on him in 2011 to step down amid protests in the country.  
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Proclamation which had the effect of curtailing opposition politics and freedom of the media, 
instead of curbing terrorism. Thanks to the anti-terrorism legislation, one blogger received an 18-
year jail sentence for “disseminating terrorist ideas” after calling for the government to end torture 
and respect human rights (Ahmed, 2013: 270).  
Weiss, Crahan and Goering (2004: 99) revealed an increase in the levels of cooperation between 
the USA and African leaders as the rulers jumped on the bandwagon and exploited the USA war 
against terrorism to safeguard their regimes. They gave examples of Ugandan leader, Yoweri 
Museveni, who shut down some newspapers in 2002 after accusing them of promoting terrorism. 
In the same year the Liberian President, Charles Taylor, labelled his political opponents as ‘illegal 
combatants’ and threatened to try them for terrorism in military courts. The American fangs also 
dug into the small African country of Malawi where Weiss, Crahan and Goering (2004: 101-102) 
reported that its intelligence agents at one time in 2003 arrested a school teacher and four other 
suspects of Somali origin. With the court ruling that they either be charged or released, a dejected 
prosecutor advised that the suspects were out of reach as only the Americans knew where they 
were (Weiss, Crahan & Goering, 2004: 101-102).  
The USA could not resist establishing ties with the small, undemocratic state of Gambia where the 
CIA arrested three British citizens in 2002 on suspicion of having links with terrorists. Ahmed 
(2013: 282) reported that one of the suspects was released after a month of interrogation, leaving 
two who were to be blind-folded, put in diapers, gagged and chained before being flown by the 
CIA to Kabul. Typical of the behaviour of intelligence agents elsewhere with a mission to 
accomplish, the CIA reportedly starved and beat their captives and kept them in leg shackles 
throughout their captivity. Just as had happened to many other suspects before, the two were flown 
to Guantanamo Bay in 2003, only to be released four years later without any charges preferred 
against them (Weiss, Crahan & Goering, 2004: 101-102).  
The high-handedness of the USA is clearly an attempt akin to the terrorists’ desire to ‘destroy them 
before they destroy us’. However, its disregard for international law and various human rights 
depicts the intolerance of USA leadership, as shown in its pronouncements, which encourages the 
elimination of anything that may stand on its way. The coercive, arm-twisting approach, besides 
being a flagrant violation of human rights, serves to create, or at least increase, the alienation of 
the USA and those who are not with it in the WOT, as demonstrated by the situation in the Middle 
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East.  
6.4 The War on Terror and the USA Foreign Policy in the Middle East 
The Middle East is generally an unstable region with a mixture of Islamic theocratic states and 
secular governments, with the latter not necessarily being democratic. The region is a source of 
recruitment for terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda and happens to be the source of origin of all 19 
of the terrorists who attacked the USA on 11 September, 2001. There is a tug of war for the control 
of the region between the USA on the one side, which uses client states such as Israel and a few 
Arab countries to exercise its influence, and Muslim extremists on the other side, who accuse the 
USA of interfering in Muslim affairs. Walt (2013: 41) summarised Osama bin Laden’s three main 
grievances as the USA’s interference in the Islamic world, its support of corrupt, illegitimate 
regimes in Muslim countries, and the USA’s unconditional support of Israel. 
In the category of interference in Muslim affairs, Osama bin Laden included the sanctions imposed 
by the USA on Iraq in the 1990s which are reported to have claimed thousands of lives (Walt, 
2013: 41-42). The economic sanctions were in fact imposed on Iraq by the UN through UNSC 
Resolution 661 following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Later on, another UNSC Resolution 
687 imposed yet more sanctions in an attempt to force Iraq to eliminate weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD), which it was accused of having. The Multilateral Interception Force 
constituted to ensure the enforcement of the sanctions was led by the USA. Ramos (2000) blamed 
the UNSC for a serious abuse of human rights in Iraq where estimated that 250,000 to 1,000,000 
children, over 50 percent were under the age of five, died as a consequence of sanctions. As a result 
of disease and malnutrition-induced deaths occasioned by the sanctions, the UN Humanitarian 
Coordinator in Baghdad, Denis Halliday, resigned after serving the UN for 34 years, stressing that 
he did not want to be associated with genocide. Pilger (2017: 17) quoted him arguing that, “We’re 
in the process of destroying an entire society… It is illegal, immoral.” Two years later, Halliday’s 
successor, Hans von Sponeck, also resigned from the post, citing similar reasons, followed by Jutta 
Burghdardt – the head of the World Food Programme in Iraq – two days after von Sponeck’s 
resignation (Pilger, 2017: 17).  
Article 2 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948) 
relates genocide to destroying, killing of, or causing mental or physical harm to, large groups of 
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people belonging to a particular nation of ethnicity.18 While Halliday’s claim of genocide might 
be seen as an exaggeration, given the unlikelihood of an intended destruction of the Iraq people by 
the UN or the USA and its allies, the sanctions against Iraq arguably resulted in serious abuse of 
human rights. Article 3 of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (UDHR) (1948) provides for the right to life, liberty and security. Ramos  (2000: 
24) revealed that during the sanctions era, the USA blocked entry of items such as baby food into 
Iraq through its veto power, (unbelievably) arguing that the food might be used by adults. Also 
prohibited were pencils which the USA administration claimed could be used for the production 
of weapons. Despite the evident serious abuse of human rights, USA President Bill Clinton 
similarly retorted in 1997 that the sanctions would not be lifted for as long as Saddam Hussein 
remained in power. It is therefore evident that Iraq’s compliance with the UN demands was, for 
the USA, not the issue but the need for having a pliant regime that would promote and protect the 
interests of the USA.  
As noted in the preceding sections, Ramos (2000) argued that the USA’s major interest in Iraq and 
other Middle East countries is oil. He suggested that while oil is an asset for Iraq, it is its major 
problem. He quoted the then Secretary of State Henry Kissinger explaining that, “Oil is too 
important a commodity to be left in the hands of the Arabs” (Ramos, 2000: 24). Evidently, the 
USA is prepared to do anything, despite the consequences, to ensure a guaranteed supply of oil. In 
this regard the right to life of Iraqi children ceases to be an inviolable right. The consequences of 
trying to get rid of the Saddam regime in some fashion where terrorism, WMD and democracy are 
enmeshed into one became immaterial as morals were thrown into the wind. The USA’s blocking 
of an assessment of the impact of the sanctions by the UNSC and its prevention of those 
responsible for humanitarian affairs from presenting their reports to the UNSC, as reported by 
Sponeck and Halliday (2001), pointed to the fact that the sanctions had nothing to do with 
terrorism, democracy or WMD but selfish interests, which the imperial power arguably continues 
to pursue through, among other means, the use of client states.  
The USA’s Arab allies which have been described by Osama bin Laden as corrupt and illegitimate 
include regimes in Saudi Arabia and Egypt.  There is a general consensus that corruption is 
                                                          
18 See the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948) at 
https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%2078/volume-78-i-1021-english.pdf (Accessed on 22 
February, 2017). 
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endemic among government officials in Saudi Arabia, but it does not look like that is a major 
concern for the USA, given Saudi Arabia’s strategic location in the Middle East as well as the 
abundance of oil resources in the country. Osama bin Laden’s real gripe with Saudi Arabia, as 
acknowledged by himself, is its association with the USA, which has allowed the USA to station 
its forces in that country, which Osama bin Laden refers to as the Land of the Two Holy places.  It 
is true that the government of Saudi Arabia is not a constitutional democracy, assuming that is 
what Osama bin Laden means by illegitimate, although that would be self-contradictory, given 
that his preferred Sharia law also does not give room for elections. Saudi Arabia has a number of 
oppressive laws which include discrimination against women and tight press controls, issues which 
would have caused consternation with the USA had Saudi Arabia been under the leadership of an 
unfriendly government or some other country elsewhere. Owing to the double standards of the 
USA, the issues are not critical to the superpower, given the strategic importance of Saudi Arabia 
in the pursuit of its foreign policy objectives which include strategic energy resources and bases 
for its troops. 
Chomsky (2003: 194) showed that a number of Muslim American corporate chief executive 
officers, who normally support various American policies, complained bitterly about the USA’s 
cooperation with corrupt and repressive Arab regimes which undermine development in the region. 
He quoted one Egyptian academic as arguing that the talk of democratic values and individual 
freedoms is obscene, given America’s support of almost all undemocratic regimes in the region. 
He referred to the USA’s stance as ‘moral hypocrisy’. This academic, who claimed that he had 
great respect for the USA as “a paragon of liberal values which were worth emulation by Arabs 
and Muslims” felt a great betrayal by the American government and now regards the USA as 
“narrow-minded, pathological, obstinate and simplistic” (Chomsky, 2003: 194).   
The grievances include the USA’s relations with Egypt, a country which is of strategic importance 
to the USA, as discussed in previous sections. A plus for Egypt insofar as the USA is concerned is 
its recognition of Israel, the first Arab country to officially do so, following the signing of a peace 
treaty between the two countries in 1979. The peace treaty meant the availability of an Arab ally 
in the region to work with the USA and Israel in advancing the interests of the two. Meehan (2002: 
69) noted that the authoritarian regime of Egypt has cooperated fully with the USA in the fight 
against terrorism. Weiss, Crahan and Goering (2004: 85) revealed that the USA found it prudent 
to use quiet diplomacy when Hosni Mubarak, a staunch USA ally, was creating problems for the 
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USA as a result of his repressive rule, as that would have the effect of detracting the two allies 
from their cooperation in the WOT. The USA administration appreciated that demanding the 
requisite democratic change from the Mubarak regime – which it was demanding through the use 
of force from countries such as Iraq – might undermine the tenure of the very ally it needed to 
advance its foreign policy interests in the region. It is likely for such reasons that Osama bin Laden 
regarded such Arab countries as traitors. The removal of a popularly elected Islamic government 
by the military in Egypt was also not an issue for the USA, given the new regime’s undertaking to 
fight terrorism with the cooperation of the USA and its Israeli ally.  
Osama bin Laden’s grievance against the USA for its unqualified support of Israel strikes a chord 
with a number of Arab and Muslim countries. The NSS of 2002 stressed the need for paying 
attention to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Outlining the NSS, President George W. Bush stated 
that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was important “because of the region’s importance to global 
priorities of the United States” (Fouskas et al, 2005: 130). In a testimony to the Senate Committee 
on Foreign Relations, Samantha Power, the USA Permanent Representative designate to the UN, 
suggested that there was no greater friend to the USA than the State of Israel as the two shared 
security interests and core values, and she went on to emphasise that “… America has a special 
relationship with Israel” (Fouskas et al, 2005: 130). Singing the same tune in 2002, the USA House 
of Representatives and the Senate made a proclamation that the two countries were “engaged in a 
common struggle against terrorism” (Fouskas et al, 2005: 130). 
The above comments from Samantha Power, the unanimity of the two houses of the USA’s 
legislators and the objectives of the Republican’s NSS, as pronounced by President W. Bush, all 
confirmed Osama bin Laden’s grievance that Israel was USA’s all-weather friend who could do 
anything it wanted to, anywhere and at any time, despite the consequences and without the USA 
raising an eyebrow.  The special relationship was the result of shared interests and values as 
confirmed by Samantha Power and is undoubtedly a function of the USA’s global interests. The 
interests include the commitment of the two countries to fight terrorism in line with the USA 
legislators’ proclamation.  The terrorists in question happen to be Palestinians whose land, the West 
Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem, was annexed by Israel following its victory in the 1967 War. 
Weiss, Crahan and Goering (2004: 99) noted that since then Israel has continued to deny the 
Palestinians basic civil and political rights. An attempt by Egypt and Syria in 1973 to regain the 
territories lost in 1967 was futile as the USA immediately came to the aid of Israel with critical 
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support in the form of weaponry and other logistics (Weiss, Crahan and Goering, 2004: 89).  
The USA’s unqualified support for Israel in its fight against the Arab ‘terrorists’ compels it to 
ignore the various human rights abuses perpetrated by its Israeli ally on the Palestinians as noted 
in previous sections. Gareau (2004: 187) noted that from September 2000 to March 2003 Israel 
killed more than 2,100 Palestinians as it continued to annex more Palestinian land. American 
morals do not allow it to condemn a friend, but rather to reward it by increasing military and 
economic aid to a staggering amount of $3 billion a year, the highest amount from the USA to any 
other recipient (Gareau, 2004: 187). Why then should the Arab militants not be given an excuse to 
hold the principal to account for such insensitivity to their plight? Jack Donnelly in Weiss, Crahan 
and Goering (2004: 102) argued that for the USA Israel’s transgression of human rights was not 
an issue as Israel has proceeded with assassinations and collective punishments of the Palestinians, 
acts which have become a standard operational procedure. He added that Israel’s policies, 
obviously with the support and abetment of the USA, constituted an orchestrated strategy meant 
to destroy the economy of the Palestinians, thereby weakening them.  
The weakening of the Palestinians and other Arab states was a well-calculated strategy meant to 
allow Israel to attain and retain a regional hegemonic status. Weiss, Crahan and Goering argued 
that this included the ‘cantonising’ of the Palestinians into small separate enclaves, thereby keeping 
them weaker. With the USA foreign policy not allowing the condemnation of the friend who had 
turned some Palestinians into terrorists, Israel continues to annex more settlements from the 
Palestinians and establishing an effective take-over of Palestinian lands in violation of a number 
of UNSC resolutions. Gareau (2004: 151) showed that the UNSC has passed more than 60 
resolutions condemning the inhuman treatment of Palestinians by Israel, which relegates them to 
second-class citizens, as the USA ally continues to violate the resolutions at will. Crotty (2005: 
64) argued that had Israel been some other country, it would certainly have attracted censure from 
the USA. This is however not the case as the USA’s realist politics, coupled with its desire to win 
its declared WOT at any cost, drives it not to care about the human rights of the Palestinians. In 
that regard, Blum (2006: 15) argued that the USA “… does not care a whit about human life, human 
rights, humanity…”. He adds that the principles of the USA’s foreign policy do not include doing 
the right thing and that it is “not an ideal, or a goal of policy in and of itself” (Blum, (2006: 15).  
The security and economic interests of the USA, which arguably influence each other, compel the 
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USA to possibly inadvertently disregard basic human rights which include the right to life. The 
USA’s perception of security threats, whose estimate covers its allies, obscures issues on 
democracy and human rights. Claims that its major goal in the Middle East is to weaken Arab 
regimes who are failing to toe the line, and thereby keeping Israel stronger, are arguably not 
unfounded, as success in that goal will allow it to have total control over the Middle East region 
thereby meeting its economic and security interests. Had the USA not had such ambitions, it is 
likely that it would have taken some steps long ago to deal with Israel which is seen perpetually 
practising state terrorism. The USA cannot do the right thing as the ‘empire’ requires substantial 
resources to support it and, hence, its belligerent foreign policy and its biased support for Israel 
and other client states in the region, who it views as reliable partners in the WOT. Contrary to the 
assertion by Blum (2006) that doing the right thing is not an ideal for the USA, the researcher 
argues that the USA authorities are aware that doing the right thing is desirable for the USA as a 
liberal democracy, but the challenge is that doing so poses a far-fetched goal given its imperial 
desires. The only alternative therefore is the use of its military might to bring to the fold those who 
are seen to be going against it. 
6.5 Offensive Operations 
The Al-Qaeda terrorist attacks on the USA, which left almost 3,000 people dead and economic 
damage of not less than $82 billion constituted a slap to the ego and pride of the USA. While the 
Al-Qaeda terrorist leader, Osama bin Laden, cited issues such as the USA support of Israel, the 
deployment of its troops in the Muslim country of Saudi Arabia, and imposition of sanctions on 
Iraq for its terrorist war against the USA, Crockatt (2003: 150) revealed that the attacks were 
considered by the USA government as extreme provocation, which called for nothing less than a 
vigorous, effective punitive response. Over and above the destruction being outside the framework 
of war, the fact that the attacks were directed on the mainland only served to fuel American anger. 
The killing of thousands of innocent people from various nationalities in the World Trade Centre 
was supposed to galvanise the liberal world against terrorists. Jenkins and Godges (2011: 196) 
asserted that September 11, 2001 divided the world into ‘pre-9/11’ and ‘post-9/11’ eras as 
“Americans in the post-9/11 era started seeing the world beyond their borders as a source of 
danger”. Americans were arguably justified in seeing the world as such. The hijacking of the four 
aeroplanes on 11 September, 2001 was executed by individuals from one ethnic group, that is, 
Arabs from the Middle East, a part of the world known to be a breeding ground for terrorism. The 
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operation was planned by Osama bin Laden, a Muslim extremist who was apparently trained and 
armed by the USA which happened to have similar interests with the Mujahideen (Muslim) 
militants as they fought the Russians in Afghanistan in a 10-year war that started towards the end 
of 1979. 
Having declared the WOT, President George Bush demanded the surrender of Osama bin Laden 
by the Taliban government of Afghanistan to the USA. Welch (2006: 8) argued that the demand 
was not negotiable as the president advised the Afghans that they would “share their fate” if they 
failed to deliver the terrorists responsible for 9/11. With the Taliban government having failed to 
meet the demands, the USA together with its North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) allies 
and other sympathetic states, went on to invade Afghanistan with the objective of overthrowing 
the Taliban government. Despite failing to get Bin Laden, the USA managed to deal a heavy blow 
to the terrorists, but at the expense of a number of dead civilians (Blum & Heymann, 2013: 47). 
The Afghans thus shared their fate as promised by the USA President and in accordance with the 
threat of Admiral Sir Michael Boyce, who advised them that the bombing would not end until the 
Afghan population cooperated in changing the country’s leadership.  
With the Taliban government and the Al-Qaeda terrorists sharing the same Islamic grounding and 
a similar anti-American stance, it was arguably clear to the Americans and their allies that the 
Taliban government would not surrender Osama bin Laden. Even if the Taliban government had 
wanted to, it is unlikely that it would have succeeded in doing so, given the strength of the terrorists 
over and above their ubiquity. It is also unlikely that the USA and coalition partners would have 
called off the invasion even if the Taliban government had cooperated, given the desire of the USA 
to avenge the devastating 9/11 terrorist attacks. The quest for revenge drove the USA to see the 
Taliban government and the Afghan population as one. It is clear that when President Bush 
declared a war against the terrorists – a ‘war’ not metaphorically, but in the literal sense – that he 
did not expect a quick win. Welch (2006) showed President Bush in one of his many addresses 
related to the war stating, “Americans should not expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign, unlike 
any other we have ever seen. Therefore, I ask you to live your lives, and  hug your children” 
(Welch, 2006: 12). 
President Bush’s pessimism was in order as the battles against the terrorists had just been too many, 
without a sign of the war coming to an end at any time soon. The uncompromising stance taken 
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by the USA authorities may be seen from an angle of a besieged state which also had an obligation 
of fulfilling its mandate of defending and protecting its citizens. The destruction of the Twin 
Towers, a symbol of the USA economic power, together with an unprecedented loss of lives was 
a devastating blow to USA national pride and, more so, in a country which is supposed to be 
respected and feared by friend and foe alike. With evidence that the terrorists were intent on using 
any means possible to destroy the USA and all it stood for, the authorities were compelled to hunt 
down the terrorists and ensure that they destroyed them before they inflict any more harm on the 
USA and Americans elsewhere in the world. 
The sense of anguish among the Americans, however, drove the authorities into a trap where, with 
a desire to mete out a punitive response, the USA lost all caution and behaved like the terrorists. 
The terrorists lured the USA to play into their game thereby forcing it to transgress various human 
rights and provisions of International Law. Khan (2013: 31), just like many other scholars, noted 
that although the UNSC Resolution 1373 did condemn the 9/11 attacks and terrorism in general, 
there was no follow up resolution authorising either the USA or NATO to attack Afghanistan. 
Contrary to the argument by John Locke (1975) that adherence to the rule of law does not allow 
for man to do what he lists, the USA chose to do what suited it at that point in time; it found it 
imperative to disregard international law in pursuit of its security interests. 
Some scholars and politicians, however, have argued that the invasion of Afghanistan by the USA 
and its allies was in pursuit of the just war principle, that is, to right a wrong through the elimination 
of the terrorists responsible for the 9/11 attacks. Despite the requirement of a UNSC authority for 
one country to launch an attack on another, and only for self-defence, the pursuit of a just goal 
does not imply the right to use any means to achieve it. Ahmed (2013: 285) gave an account of 
various atrocities committed by the USA armed forces in Afghanistan. The ‘I-don’t-care’ attitude 
of the American armed forces, coupled with their egotism, included episodes of troop-carrying 
vehicles running over children in the streets, actions which Ahmed (2013: 285) claimed were 
condemned even by its allies. While the USA arguably went into Afghanistan to right the wrongs, 
their actions were hardly different from those perpetrated by the very terrorists which they desired 
to eliminate. Assuming that the USA and its allies had a just cause to pursue the terrorists and 
remove the Taliban regime, their conduct in the war unquestionably went against the jus in bello 
principle of the need for discriminating civilians from combatants and the use of proportional 
force. 
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Chomsky (2011: 201) quoted the then Director of Human Rights Watch Africa in his address to 
the International Council on Human Rights in 2002 saying that he could hardly see the moral, legal 
or political difference between the USA and the jihad in as far as the intolerance of the two were 
concerned. Once on the ground, there was no evidence that the USA forces took any measures to 
protect the innocent from harm.  There was proof of intransigence and arrogance exhibited by the 
invasion force. The targeting of non-combatants and the disregard for their safety, even if the war 
is just, is not only wrong but is also illegal.  
Blum and Heymann (2013: 71) argued that there is always tension in the reconciliation of security 
interests and liberal democratic values. The WOT has put the USA in an invidious position as it 
has seen itself not only acting immorally, but frequently transgressing international law and human 
rights standards that it demands from others. Driven by the objective of forcing the Afghan 
government to surrender the terrorists responsible for the 9/11 attacks, the USA found nothing 
illegal with invading that country, just as its forces found nothing immoral with its conduct on the 
ground. Chomsky (2003: 207) argued that the USA found the principles it claims to stand for not 
being universally applicable when he compared the Afghan’s failure to surrender Osama bin Laden 
with the USA’s refusal to extradite Emmanuel Constant, a paramilitary leader who was handed a 
life sentence by a Haitian Court for the killing of thousands of innocent Haitians. With President 
Bush’s declaration that any country that harboured terrorists should be treated as terrorists, 
Chomsky questioned whether, for example, the Haitians had the same right in that scenario to 
bomb the USA, as morality requires that the standards it demands from others be applied to itself 
as well.  Given the self-centred way in which the USA has executed the WOT, one is persuaded to 
agree with Crockatt (2003: 159) that, “The war on terrorism was defined in American terms and 
largely on American terms.” 
The decision by the CIA to partner with some chosen terrorist groups, which it flew from 
Afghanistan to Bosnia for specific missions, or its collaboration with the Hezbollah, which it 
supplied with weaponry as revealed by Chomsky (2003: 207) is a clear definition of the WOT in 
and on USA terms. Here morals and righteousness were defined by what was expedient to the USA 
insofar as the objective of advancing its security interests were concerned.  Such exposés do not 
only show the self-centred definition of the WOT by the USA but go beyond the limit in mocking 
morality. These revelations have lent credence to assertions that the USA actions are generally in 
service of its foreign policy where the USA is using the WOT to maintain its control of world 
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affairs as it pursues its expansive needs.  
Ignatieff (2004: 79) argued that political liberalism, and indeed democracy, entail fighting the 
enemy with one’s hands tied behind the back. Liberalism provides for various civil and political 
rights which are indivisible, and in this regard, he stressed that “…national security is not a carte 
blanche for the abrogation of individual rights…” (Ignatieff, 2004: 80). To enhance national 
security while upholding individual rights, the USA is expected to control its emotions, thereby 
avoiding doing what it accuses the terrorists of doing. There is need for the USA and its allies to 
appreciate the symbiotic relationship between security and human rights. As argued by Weiss, 
Crahan and Goering (2004: 90), the WOT should not be taken as a zero-sum game. Viewing 
national security and human rights as mutually exclusive is arguably counter-productive. It is 
exactly what the terrorists are aiming for as they do whatever is possible to provoke government 
to overreact, as did the 19th century anarchists. The respect of the various tenets of political 
liberalism, though posing a practical challenge in an asymmetric war, would even give the USA 
and its allies a higher moral ground to engage the extremists. The USA’s reaction, unfortunately, 
did not only entail the use of a sledgehammer to kill a troublesome fly, but it also led it to undertake 
various immoral and illegal activities which only served to meet its own selfish interests. 
6.6 Concluding Remarks 
The USA’s foreign policy, just like that of any other country, is geared towards the promotion of 
its national interest. It was demonstrated in this chapter that an examination of various 
pronouncements by the country’s leadership and the actual actions of the USA point to a foreign 
policy that is imperial in nature. An analysis of the USA’s NSS, as articulated by President W. Bush 
in 2002, the Bush Doctrine and the PNAC revealed a foreign policy that will not hesitate to use 
compulsion, and in this case, the WOT, which it decided to internationalise, to protect its strategic 
interests.  Unilateralism – in this case the right of the USA to go it alone and use force to protect 
its interests, whether the world likes it or not – was a recurring theme in all three concepts. It was 
thus argued in this chapter that the WOT has been used by the USA to assert and retain its 
hegemonic superiority. 
The USA’s predatory foreign policy has unmasked its inability to respect the values of political 
liberalism. Its rapacious foreign policy has forced it to disregard international law and other basic 
values of political liberalism such as democracy, as the ‘empire’ focuses on winning the war 
 111 
 
against terrorism. In an endeavour to win the WOT, the principle of ‘universalibililty’ has become 
an anathema to the USA as it quickly labels unfriendly states as rogue when they are perceived to 
be transgressing basic liberal norms, while it turns a blind eye when its allies carry out similar 
actions.  
It is for the above stated double standards, the wilful disregard of International Law by the USA, 
and the clear injustice in the treatment of sovereign states that it was maintained in argument 
throughout this chapter that the WOT has been executed by the USA as a means of advancing its 
foreign policy objectives. Guided by an aggressive foreign policy that seeks to satisfy the USA’s 
imperial needs, the WOT, executed in its current form, is a threat to global peace and security. The 
USA’s foreign policy – in its current form – serves, to a great extent, to justify the terrorists’ violent 
attacks, at least from the terrorist perspective.  
There is no question that the provocative terrorist attacks on the USA on September 11, 2001 
caused much anger and agitation for the USA government and the American population at large. 
The desire for revenge called for nothing less than victory, which had to be achieved at whatever 
cost. It was demonstrated in this chapter that a major cost of the WOT has been the creation of 
worldwide disharmony, resentment, and a total disregard for individual rights and state 
sovereignty. While the USA has used force and coercive diplomacy elsewhere in the world to bring 
to order to various oppressive governments, it has chosen to go to bed with similar, if not more 
brutal dictators in its internationalised war against terrorism. It was shown in this chapter that  the 
USA chose to turn a blind eye to and at times even abet the excesses of its allies on countless 
occasions. Its Middle East all-weather friend, Israel, has literally gotten away with murder as it 
bulldozes Palestinian civilian homes and uses military tanks against the same, all in the name of 
the WOT. The USA has supped with several dictators in countries such as Egypt and Uzbekistan 
in the WOT. Illiberal China suddenly became a friend while it tortured those who dissented 
communist rule. The self-anointed paragon of justice and human rights has thereby defined the 
WOT in terms that allow it to pursue a hawkish foreign policy as it seeks to protect its strategic 
interests. In pursuit of related objectives, it sees the war against terrorism as a zero-sum game 
where national security and individual rights are mutually exclusive.  
The invasion of Afghanistan by the USA and its allies without the authorisation of the UNSC was 
a transgression of International Law. While the state has an obligation to protect its citizens, 
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political liberalism calls upon it to uphold the rule of law and fundamental human rights, including 
the basic right to life. Apart from the killing and maiming of many innocent civilians, who are 
considered by jus in bello to be immune from attacks, the WOT has compromised the very rights 
it seeks to protect. The targeting of civilians by whichever party is unjust, immoral and illegal.  
It was argued in this chapter that while the goal of hunting down the terrorists wherever they could 
be, may, arguably be right, the means used by the USA and its allies in the execution of the WOT 
has been wrong. The wanton disregard for the lives of civilians in Afghanistan shows that the USA 
has decided not to be bound by International Law and the human rights standards that it demands 
from others as it attempts to circumvent the constraints imposed by the ethics of political liberalism 
in the fight against terrorism. It is evident from the chronicled events that the use of brute force on 
civilians by the USA allies is inconsequential to the USA for as long as the state in question 
cooperates with it in the WOT.  
Did the USA have any choice other than behaving in the way it did in trying to eliminate the 
terrorists who were responsible for the devastating blow unleashed on it on September 11, 2001? 
It was argued that any government fighting an enemy, and more so a non-state actor which also 
happens to use illegal means to wage its war, is subjected to great pressure to retaliate. This is so 
given that a war against terrorism, by virtue of it being an unconventional type of warfare, places 
immense challenges on a liberal state as it is almost impossible to distinguish the innocent civilian 
from the terrorist. The USA found itself having to resort to illegal means to avert a loss of more 
lives whilst avenging the embarrassing attacks, thereby failing to live by the expectations of a 
liberal state. Its disrespect for individual rights and national sovereignty has associated the WOT 
with lawlessness, immorality and impunity and, it has been argued, it was all driven by hubris. 
Despite priding itself as a champion of peace and justice, the USA has failed to respect the founding 
values of the philosophy of political liberalism which indeed places challenging constraints on the 
actions of the state. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: THE ETHIC OF POLITICAL LIBERALISM 
7.1 Introduction 
Using various examples, all the previous chapters have demonstrated how terrorists have lured the 
USA to react to their attacks while at the same time giving pointers on how it has in the process 
transgressed individual rights and state sovereignty in its reaction. The last chapter showed 
specifically how the USA has used its aggressive foreign policy to pursue its interests while hiding 
behind the WOT. Therefore, having unravelled the typical nature of modern terrorism and the 
subsequent reaction of the USA in the preceding sections, this chapter seeks to take a detailed look 
at the philosophy of political liberalism, thereby unbundling its constituent parts. The 
disaggregated components of the philosophy will then be utilised to proffer a consolidated 
evaluation of how the USA has violated the various principles of the ethic as it attempts to counter 
the terrorist menace.  The first section of this chapter takes a detailed look at the philosophy of 
political liberalism with the aim of unpacking its constituent parts. The first part of the section 
delves into the concept of justice, one of the major pillars of the philosophy of political liberalism. 
It looks at both the deontological and utilitarian approach, together with its interplay with the 
doctrine of natural justice, as it evaluates the definition of justice. The second part of the section 
considers the role played by the principle of equality in the ethic of political liberalism, while the 
third part focuses on the rule of law as it seeks to contrast it with the ‘rule of men’. The last part 
of the section looks at toleration and considers its role in the philosophy of political liberalism as 
proposed by major scholars such as John Locke.   
 
The second section of the chapter evaluates the principle of individualism, one of the major pillars 
of the philosophy of liberalism, and seeks to uncover its link with democracy and, hence, the 
relationship of democracy with political liberalism. The third and final part of the chapter unravels 
the principle of liberty, the very principle from which the concept of liberalism gets its name. This 
section discusses the good of freedom together with the demands of the school of natural rights 
and related arguments relating to the precedence of the right and the good in the framework of 
justice. In its second part, this section considers some basic rights, that is, both negative and 
positive freedoms, and deliberates on the merits of seeing freedom as intrinsic or instrumental to 
some end. The last part of the section considers the role of the state in a liberal society. Borrowing 
from Robert Nozick (1974), this section evaluates the role of the state in protecting the individual 
and thereby ensuring that he is given maximum possible freedom to pursue his goals in a 
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democratic, liberal society.  
 
7.2 The Philosophy of Political Liberalism 
There are many variants of political liberalism but Chau (2009: 2) noted that central to the 
philosophy are the concepts of individualism and liberty with the former placing “the individual 
at the heart of the society”, thereby suggesting that the social order has to be modelled around the 
individual, while the latter seeks to give the individual as much freedom as possible to allow him 
to maximise his potential. The Columbia Encyclopaedia shows that the term ‘liberalism’ is derived 
from the Greek word ‘liber’, which means ‘free’. Gray (1995: xi) revealed that the epithet ‘liberal’, 
in relationship to political movements, appeared for the first time in the 19th century when the term 
was adopted by the Spanish Party of Liberals in 1812. Various scholars before then had however 
used the concept, with Adam Smith proposing a “liberal plan of equality, liberty and justice” 
whereas many others associated it with humanity (Gray, 1995: xi).  Liberalism is, in theory and 
practice, about the commitment to the concept of freedom and respect for another person, thereby 
requiring that one’s view of the good for another person should be applicable to oneself (Chau, 
2009: 3). Rosenblum (1989: 2) advised that liberalism is against interference with other people’s 
freedoms and that it is actually meant “to secure the political conditions that are necessary for the 
exercise of political freedom” and the related ability to make decisions without fear or favour. In 
concurrence, Sandel (1998: xii) noted that liberalism is about justice, fairness and individual rights. 
He advised that, “A liberal society seeks not to impose a single way of life but to leave its citizens 
as free as possible to choose their own values and ends” (Sandel, 1998: i).  Relating liberalism to 
freedom, Macpherson (1973: i) saw man19 seeking wider freedom to maximise utility.  Whether it 
is the maximisation of utility or the desire for justice and fairness, the ultimate goal sought is the 
free exercise of individual rights to maximise happiness. While the issue of individual rights will 
be dealt with in more detail under the umbrella of liberty in Section 7.4, it is worth noting that the 
realisation of this goal requires, among other things, the availability of some prerequisites which 
include justice, equality, rule of law, and toleration.  
7.2.1 Liberalism and Justice  
Sandel (1998: x-xi) suggested that there is a close link between justice and good. He argued that 
justice is derived from the shared values of a society which allow the collective values of the 
                                                          
19 The use of the word “man” in this chapter, as in all other chapters, is gender neutral.  
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community to define justice. In other words, justice is about a shared understanding of concepts 
of the good. This understanding makes justice a function of the moral value of the good. It is about 
the end the good is seen contributing to the society, thus making justice a moral consideration. 
Sandel (1998: xi) noted further that when being focused on the end the good is meant to promote, 
justice becomes teleological in nature; its focus is on the end result the good is meant to bring 
about, that is, the end of happiness. 
 
Sandel (1998) however argued that the link of justice to concepts of the good is challengeable as 
a sanction of some actions by some communities does not necessarily make it just. The counter 
argument would then be to consider justice from a deontological point of view which is based on 
the concept of right. This approach considers justice as a stand-alone entity prior to the good. This 
seems to be in line with the argument advanced by John Stewart Mill (1863: 465) which posits 
that justice is “… incomparably the most sacred and binding part of all morality.” Therefore, from 
a deontological point of view, justice becomes an end in itself requiring it not to depend on the 
resultant good, or any end meant to promise the good. It becomes a primary demand outweighing 
all other interests, thus requiring it to be met before all other moral and political interests (Sandel, 
1998: 2-4). Explaining the importance of justice in liberal theory, Sandel (1998: 177) argued that 
had wants and desires existed in adequate quantities, the question of justice would not be an issue, 
and went on to suggest that “… justice is the virtue that embodies deontology’s liberating vision 
to unfold”. The embodiment entails the construction of the principles of justice in a value-free 
manner while the vision unfolds as the principles guide individuals in the choice of ends.  
 
Even for scholars who prefer seeing justice from a utilitarianism approach, the view has a positive 
role of providing guidance to citizens to realise their objectives in a free manner. Scholars such as 
Rawls (2005), however, prefer looking at justice from the view of a conception of ‘natural rights’ 
as opposed to a utilitarian one. This approach, Macpherson (1973: 88) noted, entails, among other 
things, an equality of opportunity for every person despite one’s social standing. Gray (1995: 49) 
showed that the doctrine of natural rights, which was propounded by John Locke and further 
popularised by Robert Nozick, allows for individuals to make claims against each other, the society 
or government, that is, not necessarily as members of any grouping but as individuals. The natural 
rights, which are on account of the natural law, come prior to any social institution. This supposed-
to-be model of a just society translates in real terms into a liberal, democratic capitalist society in 
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line with the distributive justice theory which seeks to allocate goods (costs and rewards) in an 
equitable manner.  
7.2.2 Equality 
Rawls (1996: 14), renowned for his ‘Justice as Fairness’ thesis, argued that justice and fairness 
require all citizens to be regarded and treated as equal. In this regard, he advanced two principles 
of justice, with the first one arguing that each person is entitled to basic rights and liberties. The 
second principle states that every individual is entitled to an equality of opportunity and that 
whenever there happens to be an inequality, the disparity – in what has been referred to as the 
difference principle – should have the effect of uplifting the disadvantaged members of the society 
in a manner which he describes as giving “the greatest benefit to the least advantaged members of 
the society” (Rawls, 1996: 5). Freeman (2003: 69) concurred by suggesting that inequality should 
be accepted only where it makes the worse-off members of the society as well off as possible.  
 
Padlovic (2014) note that the basic liberal proposition is that all people are fundamentally equal, 
implying that every human being should be allowed to pursue his or her life plans without any 
impediments. For this to happen, Gaus (1996: 163) maintained that the liberal principle of equality 
demands that no individuals should be treated differently, thereby allowing all individuals an 
entitlement to basic rights and liberties, all of which should be guaranteed.  Chau (2009:4) argued 
that through the principle of egalitarianism, all citizens have a right to equal opportunity, whether 
political or economic, where the state is obliged not to place any impediments on the members’ 
freedom. Similarly, the principle of universalism requires all liberal provisions to be applicable to 
all individuals in an unselective manner where all would be accorded the same rights. Freeman 
(2003: 69) argued that the equal rights and liberties principle takes precedence over negative rights 
such as the right against racial-, sexual-, or religious- discrimination. This argument seems to make 
sense since once equality is achieved, other rights can easily fall into place.  
 
Similarly, Gaus (1996: 246) also opined that “… fundamental to the rule of law is the principle of 
equality”. This, he argued, obligates public officials to be always ready to justify their actions 
whenever there is a need.  Should the public official decide to treat one person differently from 
another, that person has the obligation of justifying the differential treatment. Reasons given for 
the differential treatment should be in the public domain; otherwise the difference is unjust (Gaus, 
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1996: 251).  
 
The foregoing is arguably in tandem with the provisions of a liberal democracy which requires 
credible law-making institutions to protect individual rights. It is on that note that Gaus (1996, 
246) argued that liberalism and democracy go hand-in-hand as democracy responds to the needs 
of citizens and thus prevents government from violating their rights. It is the liberal society, the 
freedom, which in turn requires equality of power for one to assert his rights, the democratic 
institutions such as an independent judiciary, and related provisions such as freedom of political 
activity that Rosenblum (1989: 37) concluded that “liberalism is monogamously, faithfully, and 
permanently married to democracy”. Various scholars note the compatibility of liberalism with 
democracy, with Bobbio (1990: 31) asserting that democracy is an extension of liberalism. The 
ideal of equality and the resultant distribution of political power among the majority of the citizens 
makes the two, among other things, go hand in hand. Democracy relates to ‘government by the 
people and government for the people’, and liberalism provides the platform for that (Bobbio, 
1990: 31). On the other hand, the principles of democracy which are centred on the people and 
individual liberty serve to promote the ethic of political liberalism and, indeed so, as articulated 
by Avnon and De-Shalit (1999: 13) that democracy enables individuals to act in different ways and 
to influence outcomes in diverse contexts. The foregoing implies that each can only be fully 
realised with the support of the other.  
 
While equality does not mean equity, Macpherson (1973: 7), took a leaf from John Stewart Mill 
and described equity as the “the distribution of the aggregate among the individuals of the society” 
and went on to suggest that equity should be linked to the distribution of rewards which should be 
in accordance to the effort expended. He saw both equality and equity as being about fairness and 
justice, and, in this regard, the reward has to be proportional to the contribution made. The outcome 
should go a long way in contributing to fairness as implemented within well-defined laws which 
are governed by the ethic of liberalism.  
 
7.2.3 The Rule of Law 
The rule of law may be summarised as the confinement of the exercise of power within well-
established legal parameters. Gaus (1996: 167) noted that the term rule of law contrasts with the 
‘rule of men’ wherein he gives an example of the latter being the singling out of political opponents 
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and coming up with laws specifically directed at controlling their political activities. He argued 
further that respect of one another is the moral right and duty of every citizen (Gaus, 1996: 196). 
To avoid arbitrary exercise of power by the authorities, there is a requirement for the rights and 
duties of law enforcement agents and citizens to be legalised. This will, among other things ensure 
that government ‘rules through laws and by laws’. The rule of law demands respect for the 
principle of equality. It calls for an independent judiciary where its officials are able to take the 
stance of impersonal umpires where they assume the responsibility of adjudicating conflicting 
demands fairly and thus giving fair treatment to all citizens irrespective of their ethnicity, political 
affiliation or otherwise. Failure to do so would confirm the assertion by Gaus (1996: 199) that, 
“Governments become arbitrary when their governments are based on the private or idiosyncratic 
concerns of officials.” Whenever that is the case, it translates to rule by men. This remark resonates 
well with the observation by Damico (1986: 99) who noted that liberalism calls upon the state to 
govern according to impersonal laws that recognise the diverse interests of the citizens as all 
citizens are allowed to exercise their rights in an unhindered manner. This liberal requirement 
clearly requires the state and its officials to respect the provisions of the law as well as the rights 
and beliefs of all individuals.  
 
7.2.4 Toleration 
Gaus (1996: 164) argued that, “Toleration is a minimal but fundamental requirement …” of 
liberalism and that it is about “allowing others to go about their way”. It is against coercion and is 
about distancing oneself from what one objects to or disapproves of. Toleration entails avoiding 
imposing one’s own norms, principles and values on other people, thereby curtailing their freedom. 
It gives room to someone to live his or her own life as he or she prefers while appreciating that life 
is characterised by a variety of cultures and belief systems. Doing otherwise is coercion (Gaus, 
1996: 164). This view was supported by Freeman (2003: 71) who added that liberalism is against 
coercion and therefore “… a just society should adopt an attitude of tolerance and the exception of 
pluralism…”.  Pluralism is about agreeing to disagree and allowing those one disagrees with to 
freely pursue their beliefs. Locke (1995: 17) articulated the need for toleration as a principle of 
political liberalism by stressing that there must be clear boundaries between the state and religion 
to allow for people, individually and collectively, to express themselves (an issue which will be 
discussed in detail in Section 7.4.2). Such an arrangement, as an anchor of the concept of political 
liberalism, allows for the individual to be his own master. 
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7.3 Individualism 
As noted above, most scholars agree that individualism is, alongside liberty, the central feature of 
liberalism. Maeland (2015: 1-4) suggested that this is the case because individuals are supposed to 
decide freely what gives value to their wellbeing. Adding to the number of prominent scholars 
such as John Stewart Mill who stress the importance of individualism, Maeland argued that the 
individual should be left alone to do what he desires as long for as he is not harming others. Rawls 
(1996) made use of the ‘original position’20 to show that peoples’ desire to be free and lead their 
individual lives is human nature. While they are all in a veil of ignorance where they do not know 
their differences or similarities, they, however, do know the value of certain primary good. The 
basic primary good such as rights, opportunities and wealth, which a rational man is considered to 
be interested in, centre on the individual. Nozick (1974: 33) argued that the ethic of liberalism is 
about the respect of the individual and emphasised that, “There are only individual people, 
different individual people, with their own individual lives.” As he noted that the individual has 
only one life, Nozick argued that no-one, whether government or another individual, should force 
him to do what he does not want to do. He argued further that there is no justification in sacrificing 
one individual for another and that the state has an obligation for protecting every individual and 
supporting him to realise his goals. 
 
Individualism calls for social order to be anchored on the individual. Locke (1975) argued, in a 
recurring theme, that the right of the individual to be autonomous is not negotiable because 
individuals are human. His argument was that only the individual, given his self-interest, knows 
what is best for him. This, once again, calls for the individual to be left alone to decide what to do 
to maximise utility. The individualist conception of society, as proposed by Locke, means that the 
individual’s interests and needs constitute the rights which have to be guaranteed. This is a clear 
position which suggests that the individual comes before the society. In support of Locke, Gray 
(1995: xii) referred to this position as ‘moral primacy of the individual’ which takes precedence 
over collective claims while Bobbio (1990: 9) contended similarly that, “Without individualism 
there can be no liberalism.” 
 
                                                          
20 Andre Van de Putte (1995) describes John Rawls’ conception of the original position as an imaginary place where 
people meet to define their relationships and the shape of the society. They are all innocent (in a veil of ignorance) 
where they know nothing about the goings-on around them.  
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The concept of individualism was perhaps aptly captured by Macpherson (1973) who linked it 
with Western democracy and the claim to maximise individual powers, which is discussed in more 
detail in forthcoming section). Unlike the school of thought which sees man seeking wider freedom 
to maximise utility, thereby suggesting man’s pre-occupation with the consumption of utilities, 
Macpherson gave an alternative of man requiring room to maximise his human powers, in that 
way developing his human capacity to be his own master. Instead of being a consumer of utilities, 
man becomes the driver of ensuring that he realises certain satisfactions (Macpherson, 1973: 6). 
While appreciating the characteristics of a liberal democratic society, Macpherson however noted 
that this theory may be challenged. Given that man would always want to develop his attributes to 
his advantage, the capitalist society allows, by its nature, the transfer of some powers of one 
individual to some other. This therefore reduces the freedom of the one from whom the power is 
being transferred, thus annulling the claim that the liberal democratic society provides individuals 
with freedom to develop and maximise their capacities. The deduction is that liberalism allows the 
realisation of some men’s powers to acquire the power of other men to attain selfish gratification 
(Macpherson, 1973: 13). But even if that were the case, liberals may still come up with a counter 
argument to the effect that there seems to be no other socio-economic order that is able maximise 
man’s powers to realise his potential and yet still leave him with the same kind of freedom. 
 
7.4 Liberty   
Various scholars argue that liberty is one of the critical principles of the ethic of political liberalism 
as it gives individuals freedom to develop and pursue their capabilities without any interference 
from the state. Damico (1986: 95) advised that the philosophy of liberty is centred on a free 
individual who has the capacity of enjoying equal liberty and political equality. The assumption is 
that all individuals are rational agents with the capacity to come up with principles that would be 
acceptable to all members of the society. These are principles that the members of the society 
would be happy to follow in their day to day conduct of business in a liberal environment in a bid 
to enjoy their freedom and maximise utility. Rawls (1996: 325) hence noted that the philosophy of 
liberalism provides independent principals for individuals to enjoy various rights and freedoms 
while the state is forbidden to interfere with them.  
 
7.4.1 The Good of Freedom 
While the orthodox liberal view promotes state intervention in an attempt to improve the 
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individual’s welfare, Chau (2009: 4) showed that modern liberalism adopts a laissez-faire (hands-
off) approach which requires both the state and the individual not to coerce other individuals to 
follow a certain course of action. In concurrence with the school of natural rights, Bobbio (1990: 
5) argued that all men are entitled to “certain fundamental rights, such as the rights to life, liberty, 
security and happiness”. The state has the responsibility of guaranteeing these rights while it and 
other individuals have an obligation of not interfering with the rights in question.  
 
Noting that liberalism is a philosophy that uses the language of rights to justify the moral autonomy 
of individuals, Damico (1986: 16) acknowledged that the philosophy takes the rights as inviolable. 
The theory basically entails the respect of each other’s moral agency despite their station. This 
means that every individual is entitled to the rights despite the fact that it is not known how he will 
exercise that right. The absence of a prior political good takes away room for the state to choose 
who to give or not to give the right, since the right comes prior to the good. This argument is in 
accordance with Rawls’ (2001) conception of justice where he emphasised the importance of the 
acknowledgement of the right being prior to the good. His point is that the principles of justice that 
define the rights are independent of the concepts of the good given that justice and, hence the right, 
is a primary order claim. Similarly, Gray (1995: 50) saw human beings as rational agents and as 
ends in themselves. In this regard there is a need to give the human being maximum freedom, an 
overriding principle of the philosophy of liberalism.  
 
Sandel (1998: 196) took note of the argument of the priority of the right but opined that it is not 
always possible to set aside some intrinsic claims such as those based on religious doctrine for the 
sake of political agreement. Individuals and communities will generally consider fundamental 
political issues that impinge on moral ideals. The priority of the right over the good is therefore 
not always sustainable as some actions such as, for example, late abortion, that is, the killing of an 
unborn baby, are seen as manifestly immoral. With the action seen as defeating the desire to respect 
the woman’s right while others view it as outright murder, Sandel (1998: 198) argued that moral 
questions therefore cannot be ignored or bracketed to facilitate political agreement as suggested 
by Rawls. Sandel (1998: 200) hence argued that it is immoral to downplay contentious activities 
such as late abortion or slavery where critical moral issues are at stake. The argument hence implies 
that there will always be value judgments on the good, thereby subjecting the right to an array of 
moral considerations.  
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7.4.2 Basic Rights 
There are, however, some basic liberties such as freedom of speech, freedom of conscience, and 
freedom of association to which the ethic of political liberalism subscribes. These constitute 
negative rights, that is, rights which the state should not interfere with in a liberal society. 
Macpherson (1973: 97) defined negative liberty as the absence of coercion, with ‘coercion’ 
referring to the deliberate interference with other people’s activities thus depriving them of their 
freedom. The coerced individual is unable to do what he or she desires to do as a result of the 
actions of another. The deprivation may come as a result of human agencies, which include other 
people, or institutions and laws which may be prevailing at that time. The ethic of liberalism 
therefore demands that the individual be accorded his or her freedom, which Macpherson (1973: 
97) defined as “the absence of coercive interference by the state or society or other individuals”.  
 
The liberal freedoms are, however, arguably not without limit. Chau (2009: 3) argued that since 
individuals know what is best for them, they should be left alone to maximise utility. But they 
should be free to act in accordance with their wishes only in as far as their actions do not harm 
others. While agreeing that freedom is a valuable good which is for to the satisfaction of various 
interests and desires, Damico (1986: 72) asserted that there is no way individual freedom can be 
unlimited as freedoms are bound to conflict with one another, an issue which calls for the 
evaluation of the various freedoms to allow one freedom to take precedence over another. Damico 
(1986: 74), however, took note of one school of thought which views freedom as an intrinsic, that 
is, not an instrumental good (to achieve an end). He argued that making freedom instrumental to 
the good may leave it at the mercy of other factors such as cultural contingencies. It should, as 
such, be given its real value as an intrinsic good meaning that its value should not depend on other 
variables. This would then make freedom a higher-order good, an issue which seems to suggest 
that it should not be limited in any way. The elevation of freedom to a higher-order good assumes 
that individuals are rational actors with capacity to know what is best for them. There seems to be 
some agreement that while there is need for allowing for maximum possible individual freedom, 
there is a need to limit its application to curb possible abuse. Bobbio (1990: 60) suggested, as 
argued by John Stewart Mill, that the state should allow individuals maximum freedom and should 
thus exercise its power against the individual only if the action is meant to prevent harm to other 
individuals. For example, freedom of speech would lose its protection if it leads to others to act 
unlawfully (Gaus, 1996: 167). So would freedom of conscience. 
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There is however a problem with the idea that individual liberty should be constrained if there are 
indications that it would result in harm to others. The challenge is with the concept and 
interpretation of the harm. The subjective nature of what constitutes harm entails some wide moral 
judgments as individuals are bound to take sides in its evaluation. Despite these disagreements, 
the philosophy of liberalism insists on the need for individuals to exercise their rights freely, that 
is, without interference from other individuals or the state. Using the example of freedom of 
religion, Locke (1955) went at length to argue that there must be clear boundaries between religion 
and the state. He even suggested that even God, himself does not allow men to compel others to 
follow his religion (Locke, 1995: 18).  He argued that doing so would constitute hypocrisy and 
contempt of God, thereby underlining that religion should be “free and voluntary” where man 
would be free to enter and leave as he desired (Locke, 1995: 20). He further on argued that no 
person should suffer prejudice as a result of his conscience. Unlike the thinking of some scholars 
such as Hobbes (1998) who regarded religious cohesion as a pillar of stability, the philosophy of 
liberalism, as proposed by Locke, sees diversity as the bedrock of freedom and, hence, a strength. 
Religion and government are, for that matter, meant to serve different interests, that is, internal and 
external needs, respectively. It is for that reason that Locke (1995: 24) suggested that the two are 
“perfectly distinct and infinitely different”. While not downplaying the right to freedom of 
conscience, Sandel (1998: xii) argued that the right to religious liberty might not really be for the 
respect of religion per se, but respect for the individual to determine his destiny and conscience, 
whatever it might be, as a free and independent self. In this case, the right takes precedent over the 
good as freedom of conscience in this regard does not necessarily go into the content of the belief, 
let alone the moral importance of religion.  It is for such reasons that liberal philosophy urges the 
state to leave issues of choice to the individual.  
 
7.4.3 The Minimal State 
Individual liberty requires the state to take a neutral position it its relationship with the citizens. 
Maeland (2015: 8) described state neutrality as the ability of the liberal state to refrain from doing 
anything which is related to favouring any doctrine over the other, but to play its role of protecting 
the citizens. This is in line with the concept of the minimal state as advanced by Nozick (1974: 26) 
– a state which limits its roles to the protection of the citizen and everyone’s rights as it adopts the 
role of a ‘night watchman’. Chau (2009: 2) argued that the concept is centred on the principles of 
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liberty and individualism, with both principles seeking to emphasise the fact that the government 
should leave citizens to pursue their interests without interference.  Bobbio (1990: 83) noted that 
unlike anarchism which advocates for the elimination of the state, liberals see the state as a 
necessary evil which should, however, remain at an absolute minimum. Bobbio also acknowledged 
that liberal philosophy does not allow for the state to interfere in the private lives of individuals, 
despite its exclusive right to the use force, but can only do so with the intention of protecting the 
individual. He agreed with other scholars that the state may interfere where the individual’s 
actions, in pursuit of his interests, have a negative effect on the interests of others (Bobbio, 1990: 
60).  
 
Beiner (1992: 27), however, argued that the concept of state neutralism is nothing, but a mirage as 
social life is always skewed towards a particular way of life. His argument was that there is no 
state in the world, whether liberal or otherwise, which can ever be neutral vis-à-vis its interests. 
He further took note of the current political discourse which was centred on the language of some 
inviolate human rights, whose contravention were seen as undemocratic. Beiner agreed with other 
scholars that rights should not be seen as absolute and goes to suggest that some rights such as the 
right not to be tortured may have to be forfeited, depending on the circumstances (Beiner, 1992: 
81-90). Thus for Beiner , there are no absolute or inviolable rights. That said, it is worth noting 
that the concept of liberalism provides for limits in both the powers of the state and its functions. 
A rights-based socio-political order provides for constitutional democracy with independent state 
institutions such as the judiciary, which also has the important role of preventing abuse of power 
by the state. The liberal order gives superiority to a government of law over a government of men 
where the rights-based state demands that public power of whatever sort be subjected to the 
country’s laws (Bobbio, 1990: 11-13). The laws which should be readily available in a liberal 
democracy, among other things, to protect individuals from state abuse, must constitute a guarantee 
for liberty. The liberal laws, as a rule, provide for negative liberty; they provide a sphere of action 
with no constraints for the individual to do as he desires provided he is not interfering with the 
rights of others. They prevent those who hold the power from coercing others to do what they do 
not want to do. 
 
Adding his voice, Lehto (2015: 12) argued that liberty goes beyond the minimal state as the state 
has to ensure the provision of negative rights, the freedom from coercion from both public and 
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private entities. Lehto (2015: 15-20) saw liberalism as being about “limits against coercion, where 
equal liberty is guaranteed, under a limited government”. He viewed liberty as being about 
negative freedom as opposed to ‘freedom to’ and thus takes the former as being more important to 
the ethic of political liberalism as it entails the consideration of what the individual or group of 
individuals are able to do without interference from anybody. This, he argued, does not entail 
anarchy but maximum possible freedom under the guidance of the rule of the law. The liberal 
philosophy hence compels the state to restrain itself in the execution of its mandate. Lehto (2015) 
agree with many others noted hitherto that freedom cannot be absolute, hence the availability of a 
limited government to manage the laws in a fair manner as it ensures that the laws are applicable 
to everyone. In appreciation of the role of a limited government, Lehto (2015) noted the ability of 
the concept to allow for maximum freedom, which should, however, be within the confines of the 
law, as he agreed with John Locke that there can be no freedom without law. He saw the 
guaranteeing of negative freedom as having the effect of maximising peaceful actions and the 
reduction of coercive actions to a minimum while the natural law tradition, which does not require 
state legislation, would ensure that no-one harms another “in his life, liberty, health and 
possessions” (Lehto, 2015: 21).  
 
The various scholars therefore agree that liberty, as suggested by Mill (1859), entails the absence 
of coercion. Likewise, Gray (1996: 97) agreed with other scholars that the liberty of an individual 
should not be restricted unless his actions are seen as having the capacity to injure the interests of 
others. Mill (1859: 104) asserted that coercion, whether physical or emotional, is unethical. Mill 
went on to argue that even the ruler has no right to infringe on an individual’s rights or political 
liberties. If he does, the subject has a right to rebel against him (Mill, 1859: 9). Similarly, Locke 
(1995) took all men as equal and independent and suggested that there is a close association 
between natural rights and the social contract and, hence, added that political power is legitimate 
only if endorsed by the subjects.  The right to individual opinion should be respected even if it is 
one against the majority as there is no guarantee that the opinion being supressed is false. Even if 
it is false, Mill argued, stifling it would be evil. On a similar note, Mill argued that tyranny of the 
majority is also evil and went on to submit that the best assessment of fairness would be to evaluate 
the rules made by the majority from a minority stand point and see if they would be acceptable to 
the minority (Mill, 1859: 118-119).  
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Many scholars appreciate the temptation of the state to adopt a paternalistic approach in dealing 
with its citizens and hence the concept of a minimal state. It is in cognisance of this temptation 
that Locke (1995) insisted that the state must focus on safeguarding liberty and property of 
individuals while Immanuel Kant (2010) argued that the state has the obligation of appreciating 
that the subjects have the capacity to distinguish what is good and bad for them. The ethic of 
political liberalism also provides for positive liberty such as the right to employment and the right 
to security. Macpherson (1973) noted that positive liberty centres on the wish of man to be his own 
master, that is, his unhindered ability to direct himself to realise own goals. Liberty in this case 
constitutes the absence of impediments to the realisation of the individual’s goals. Gray (1995: 57) 
showed that revisionary liberals go to the extent of arguing for the welfare state, thereby making 
it a component of the positive concept of freedom. This, liberals argue, should ensure the 
availability of resources to expand the individual’s freedom and ensure self-actualisation.  
 
The issue of resources also strays into the domain of property rights. There is a general consensus 
among liberals that a belief in individual liberty subsumes an endorsement of private property 
rights and the free market (Gray, 1995: 61). Gray agrees with other liberals that property and a free 
market are the embodiment of individual liberty as these constitute non-coercive means of 
coordinating production.  Liberal theory views the individual’s ability to control his own body and 
labour and taking own decisions vis-à-vis the acquisition of property as contributing to the self-
actualisation of the individual. The right to property is seen as serving in the availability of a series 
of other freedoms such as “contractual liberty, liberty of occupation, association…”, freedoms 
which would be compromised if this right is not availed or is taken away (Gray, 1995: 62). The 
liberals’ argument, therefore, is that private property ownership allows one to be a free man and 
an autonomous agent. Gray argued that a man who does not enjoy proprietary rights over his 
capabilities and his labour is not free and went on to quote Michael Oakeshott who contended that 
man is separated from slavery by “a freedom to choose and to move among autonomous, 
independent organisations, firms, purchases of labour…” as market freedom is about individual 
freedom (Gray, 1995: 65). Needless to say, Marxists would not agree with this concept as they 
view the institution of private property as a constraint to liberty. Freeman (2003: 62) in fact showed 
that the term liberalism has been used lately by left-wing politicians pejoratively to castigate their 
right-wing opponents for their obsession with the market economy at the expense of social justice.   
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7.5 Concluding Remarks 
The philosophy of political liberalism is centred on respect of the individual. It regards the 
individual as a rational agent with the capacity to evaluate what is good and bad for him or her. It 
is about the respect of individual rights such as freedom of speech and conscience, non-
discrimination, equal opportunity, and justice and fairness. Whether justice is considered from a 
deontological or utilitarian point of view, the ethic demands that all individuals should be treated 
in an equal and equitable manner. It calls for the individual to be given the maximum possible 
liberty to realise his potential.  The ethic sees all persons as equal and thus as being entitled to 
basic rights and liberty. The focus on liberty places an emphasis on individual rights such as the 
right to life and equal opportunity. Under the principle of equality, the ethic of political liberalism 
demands that no two persons should be treated differently. The principle of equality is one of the 
major principles that links liberalism with democracy, as both provide for freedom to act as 
individuals or in common purpose. The principle is fundamental to the rule of law. 
 
The rule of law, a cornerstone of political liberalism, provides for the exercise of power within 
defined, well-established parameters. It endeavours to ensure that authorities act within the limits 
of justice as they recognise and acknowledge the individual’s human rights in regard to their 
choices. The rule of law in a liberal society is blind to race, ethnicity, sex and any other 
demographic delineations of human beings, thus dispensing with the arbitrary exercise of power. 
It acknowledges the diversity of human beings and views pluralism and the various concepts of 
good as a strength. Liberalism thus takes note of the fact that without individualism there is no 
liberalism as individualism, together with liberty, constitutes a key feature in the philosophy of 
political liberalism. The individual concept of society allows the individual to lead a free life and 
do what he or she desires for as long as his or her actions do not infringe on the rights of others, 
thereby providing a link between liberalism and democracy – the two philosophies which act as a 
guarantor of liberty.  
 
The principle of liberty recognises the individual as a rational agent capable of deciding what he 
or she wants. The laissez-faire approach dictates that no-one, whether state or other individuals, 
has a right to interference with individual liberty. The principle of justice provides for the freedom 
of all people; the maximisation of freedom defines the ethic of political liberalism. It allows 
individuals to enjoy basic rights such as the right to speech and the right to conscience, which 
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separates the state from religion. It ensures that the government is empowered to protect individual 
rights while measures are put in place to stop it from tempering with individual liberty. It empowers 
the government to play its role of ensuring the freedom of the individual and thereby allowing him 
to realise his potential.  
 
The responsibility of the government to protect its citizens while giving them maximum possible 
freedom calls for a minimal state. The limited government reduces room for coercion by 
acknowledging people as individuals with their own goals. It thus gives respect to the individual 
to determine his destiny as a free, independent self, to the extent that he is not infringing on the 
liberty of others. The concept of the state with limited powers and functions differentiates the 
liberal state from an absolute state. The philosophy of political liberalism is, in summary, about 
the enhancement and protection of the freedom of the individual. It is not synonymous with 
anarchy, but it entails a limited government, which should be empowered to protect the individual 
while barring it from threatening his liberty. The liberal government has the responsibility of 
promoting the freedom of the individual in a bid to allow him to realise his goals. The philosophy 
of liberalism argues that any interference by a government in individual affairs which is not aimed 
at upholding the no harm principle constitutes a harm to the individual.  It does acknowledge that 
the state has the privilege of using force, but only if the force is employed to prevent harm to others 
and for the protection of its citizens. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA COUNTER-TERRORISM 
MEASURES AS A THREAT TO THE ETHIC OF POLITICAL LIBERALISM 
 
8.1 Introduction 
The last chapter unpacked the various constituent parts of the philosophy of political liberalism 
and went on to detail the demands of the ethic, which is founded on the pillars of individualism 
and liberty. This chapter also acknowledged the role of the state in a liberal society where it (the 
state) is required to play a positive role in safeguarding the individual while ensuring that it does 
not interfere with his liberty. With the principles of political liberalism having been clearly defined, 
this chapter evaluates the response of the USA to the terrorist threat as illustrated by the various 
actions it has undertaken to counter the threat in the homeland and elsewhere in the world. While 
acknowledging that terrorism is a real threat to global peace and security, this chapter adopts the 
position that most of the actions and measures adopted by the USA constituted an affront to the 
ethic of political liberalism.  
 
The first section looks at how the USA sought to enhance domestic security following the 9/11 
terrorist attacks. This section will evaluate the effect of the state’s use of the various elements of 
power to prevent further terrorist attacks. The first sub-section will look at how the USA used 
various legal instruments for the ethnic profiling and detention of individual immigrants. This 
section will show how the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) denied suspects and prisoners 
their individual rights and liberty and how most of these were discriminated against by virtue of 
being of Middle Eastern origin. Discussion of the treatment of prisoners of war (POW) will dwell 
on the rule of law and thus consider the USA’s arguments on the applicability of international 
conventions such as the Geneva Convention on the Treatment of Prisoners of War. The second 
sub-section will focus on the wide-ranging powers of the USA PATRIOT Act where its effect on 
liberal values such as liberty and the various freedoms related to the principle will be evaluated. 
The third sub-section will focus on counter-terrorism financing (CTF). It will look at the 
relationship of CTF to the USA PATRIOT Act and the extent to which the USA has used it to bully 
small powers who, by right, are supposed to enjoy the provisions of the principle of equality.  
 
The second section will assess the USA’s use of proactive measures to counter terrorism as a 
response to the 9/11 attacks. The first sub-section will look at the effect of the use of surveillance 
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on the ethic of liberalism. For this purpose, reference will be made to the provisions of the USA 
PATRIOT Act, the use of the National Security Agency (NSA), and related measures which include 
the 2003 Terrorism Information Awareness Project. It will be considered how the law has been 
used to deny Arabs and Muslims equal rights in the USA after those sections of the population 
have been labelled potential terrorists. This part will also look at the effects of airport screening 
using full-body scanners. Some cases relating to the abuse of individuals in the targeted groups 
will be highlighted.  
 
The third section of the chapter looks at the war model as a response to the terrorist attacks. The 
point of departure in this discussion is that although the USA’s reaction was logical given the extent 
of deaths and destruction inflicted by the terrorists in the 9/11 attacks, the reaction, which was, by 
and large emotional, served to trash the values of political liberalism. This section will review 
Elshtain’s (2003) arguments for a war response together with opposing views from scholars such 
as Law (2009), which show how such responses play into the terrorists’ strategies while 
disregarding basic tenets of political liberalism. The last part of this section will develop the war 
model by looking at the USA’s invasion of Iraq where Iraq lost the right to equality in the family 
of nations. The last section of the chapter will look at the USA’s use of torture to obtain 
information, ostensibly to prevent further terrorist attacks. Here issues relating to the rendition of 
suspects to the USA’ s Guantanamo base in Cuba will be evaluated the effect of the actions in 
question on liberal values such as justice and the rule of law will be considered. 
 
8.2 Homeland Security 
Nardulli (2003: 16) noted that immediately after the 9/11 attacks, the Bush administration 
established the Department of Homeland Security, which amalgamated the operations of various 
intelligence agencies such as the FBI and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to ensure timeous 
and proactive response to terrorist threats. Guided by the 2003 National Security Strategy for 
Combating Terrorism, the administration established the Department of Homeland Security which 
was aimed at thwarting terrorist attacks in the USA. A National Strategy for Homeland Security 
was available at hand to identify potential attacks and intercept terrorists ‘out there’ before they 
could mount the attacks (Giraldo & Trinkunas, 2007: 248).  
 
Combined, these strategies, which entail pre-emption and ‘defence in depth’, encapsulated a 
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holistic defence of the USA’s interests – including that of its citizens and allies – as well as creating 
an environment elsewhere in the world that would be unattractive for the growth of terrorism. The 
strategies called for the use of all the elements of the US power to fight and defeat the terrorists 
and their supporters (Giraldo & Trinkunas, 2007: 248.). This understanding saw the administration 
engaging in various activities which led to the profiling of some ethnic groups and the attendant 
trampling of individual rights and liberties, thanks to the USA PATROTIC Act and various 
provisions of the Counter Terrorism Financing (CTF) measures. 
 
8.2.1 Ethnic Profiling and Detentions 
Armed with various legal instruments, the security agencies got a free hand to round up suspected 
illegal immigrants in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. Unlike in the past where the Immigration 
Department would play a key role in such circumstances, the FBI took over the operations (Gareau, 
2004: 201). Permanently in handcuffs and leg irons when they moved out of the holding cells, 
many observers noted that the prisoners were always considered guilty until proven innocent. 
Buckley and Fawn (2003: 310) noted that the ethnic profiling invigorated issues relating to 
nationality and racial segregation as all men who originated from the Middle East were considered 
potential terrorists. The liberal principle of equality, which demands all individuals to be treated 
the same, became an unnecessary luxury as suspects lost their freedom. Buckley and Fawn further 
revealed that at one time there were more than 1,200 suspects, mostly from the Middle East, in 
secret detention cells (Buckley and Fawn, 2003: 312). With the whereabouts of the detainees 
unknown, the Buckley and Fawn quoted a British journalist, Jon Snow, describing the prevailing 
justice system as “licenced political repression” (Buckley and Fawn, 2003: 312). 
 
It is rather disturbing to note that the USA has in the past cited such occurrences as reasons for 
putting countries such as Zimbabwe, Myanmar and Cuba under economic sanctions. Oblivious of 
the irony, it is a case of the pot calling the kettle black, a revelation which does not seem to perturb 
the USA. Instead of seeking justice, evidence shows that the USA was after revenge. In an attempt 
to defend the USA’s actions, Elshtain (2003: 24) explained that revenge is about the limitless 
infliction of harm on the subject while justice entails equity, which entails “putting things right 
when injustice has been committed”.  As will be shown in the forthcoming sections, the USA went 
beyond putting things right as it inflicted severe harm on those suspected of being against it as 
demonstrated, among other things, by its treatment of prisoners and detainees. Indeed justice has 
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a close relationship with equity as both call for fairness. There is no way the arbitrary arrests of 
individuals fitting the characteristics of a certain ethnic group and detaining them in secret prisons 
can be used as a measure of fairness.   
 
Gareau (200: 131) noted that most of the prisoners were eventually deported without any charge 
of terrorism preferred on them. The customary accountability expected from public officials 
became a non-issue as even Attorney General (AG) Ashcroft was quoted bragging that there was 
no need for any apology for such incidents. The need to counter the terrorists thus became a free-
for-all in the public institutions of the supposed-to-be leading, liberal United States of America. 
The actions of the USA’s authorities aptly fitted what was described as the ‘rule of men’ in the last 
chapter. This was a typical scenario where the rule of law disappeared together with liberty as if to 
vindicate Locke’s (1995) argument that where there is no rule of law there is no freedom.   
 
El-Ayouty (2004: 39) also presented disturbing statistics of about 5,000 men, aged between 18 and 
33, whose only ‘crime’ was that they fitted the Middle Eastern profile. As with the rest, the 
authorities refused to divulge their whereabouts and they kept them away from their lawyers. In 
the case of those taken from Afghanistan, the USA authorities argued that they did not qualify to 
be treated under the Geneva Convention on the Treatment of Prisoners of War as they, for example, 
did not possess military identities. The POWs who were taken for detention at Guantanamo Bay 
were seen in various photographs kneeling in front of their captives while in shackles with their 
mouths and eyes covered (El-Ayouty, 2004: 80). These revelations led to large-scale condemnation 
of the USA, not only from obvious institutions such as Amnesty International, but also from USA’s 
European Union (EU) allies. Javier Solana, the head of EU Foreign Policy went on to argue that 
the conduct of the USA was tantamount to changing the Western value systems, and that such 
behaviour had the effect of giving terrorists easy victory (El-Ayouty, 2004: 80). These are the kind 
of revelations that lead to scholars such as Crenlisten (2009: 7) to conclude that the threat to 
democratic values is not only from the terrorist activities, but also the response to terrorism, and 
indeed thereby justifying the argument that, “The US war on terror poses a greater threat than 
terrorism it is trying to combat.” One would be excused for suggesting that the USA would find it 
difficult to rebut the foregoing claim as it has seen it fit to maintain torture camps in the likes of 
Guantanamo Bay where suspects are denied basic individual rights, and, worse still, the right to 
legal counsel. 
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There is an argument from some scholars that the nature of terrorism often drives state actors to 
remove limitations imposed on the state by domestic and international law, as noted by Coady and 
O’Keefe (2002: 107). The school of thought further argues that because terrorists are not bound 
by the laws in question, they should therefore not expect protection from the same laws. In that 
regard, the state should have no limits in ensuring national security. Coady and O’Keefe (2002) 
however argued that that reasoning causes the USA to be portrayed as “a nihilism similar to that 
of the terrorists”. The researcher argues that the USA is not being portrayed as being similar to the 
terrorists, but that is actually so given the evidence that has been presented in this chapter and in 
the previous chapters and, worse so, given the ill-treatment of suspects who have not even been 
convicted. The USA’s recklessness and lack of concern for the safety and rights of civilians makes 
its WOT unjust. The USA authorities are arguably behaving the same as, if not worse than, the 
terrorists they are condemning. Coady and O’Keefe (2002) went to the extent of arguing that the 
19th century anarchists were even more considerate than the USA by showing a concern for human 
life as they would abandon the attack when the target happened to be in the midst of civilians, a 
point demonstrated elsewhere in this thesis. Unfortunately, this was not the case when the 
Americans threw bombs over Afghanistan and Iraqi cities in clear disregard for human life, 
ostensibly as a means of combatting terrorism. The liberal argument that all people are 
fundamentally equal and that every individual has a right to life did not apply to the Afghans and 
Iraqis.  The objective of securing American lives had to be achieved at whatever cost. 
 
Propaganda victory would indeed come easily for the terrorists as the USA found nothing wrong 
with allies such as Jordan getting a free hand to imprison journalists and other citizens for 
criticising the monarchy when they declared their support for the USA in the WOT. Reading from 
the same script as the USA, the Jordan authorities argued that these were temporary measures 
meant to fight terrorism (Buckley and Fawn, 2003). The question that arises is how temporary is 
temporary given that the declared war is not against a state, but a tactic which might remain in 
existence forever. It is from such observations that Kenneth Roth, a human rights executive, argued 
that the WOT is serving to promote “opportunistic attacks on civil liberties” (Buckley and Fawn, 
2003: 314). And as argued by Solana (El-Ayouty, 2004: 80, above), such actions indeed serve to 
increase Al-Qaeda’s support base and give free opportunity to the extremists to advance their 
cause.  
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Ball and Webster (2003), revealed that ethnic profiling allowed the USA authorities to monitor 
financial transactions and travel itinerary for specific Arab individuals. The FBI conducted 
thorough searches of more than 200 campuses which had Arab students where the operatives 
collected personal information on student records. Thousands of suspects were detained (Ball & 
Webster, 2003: 20). Coming in the aftermath of 9/11 where some of the attackers had undertaken 
flight training at USA colleges, this might be understood from a security and intelligence-gathering 
point of view, but the point that the action constituted an intrusion on personal life is indisputable. 
Richardson (2006: 193) argued that the ethnic profiling and the declaration of the WOT as a whole 
was a big mistake in that it focused on a particular ethnic group whose members were detained 
arbitrarily for months while denying them access to legal counsel. While condemning the terrorists, 
the Bush administration was doing exactly what they were accusing the terrorists of doing; they 
too found it appropriate to divide the world into good and evil where those deemed to be belonging 
to the latter had to face its wrath. Its Manichean view of the world allowed it to see its values as 
being superior to those of the Arabs, who it regarded as potential terrorists, as did terrorist leader 
Osama bin Laden, who had a black-and-white view of the world. The WOT hence relegated the 
liberal principle of equality to a myth.   
 
While it can be agreed, the USA, as a global leader and sole superpower, was under pressure to act 
decisively amidst the devastating embarrassment, as argued by El-Ayouty (2004: 48), the state 
nevertheless has the role of providing basic security and ensuring government legitimacy. That 
responsibility does not, however, give the state authority to take away the rights and freedoms of 
an ethnic group from which the terrorists came. Ball and Webster (2003: 107) stressed that all 
human beings “have universal rights of freedom from persecution and… religious toleration …”. 
Indeed the term ‘all human beings’, needless to say, includes the Arabs. It is a fact that the Arabs 
were being targeted and persecuted for their ethnic association with the terrorists, a very 
unfortunate occurrence driven by a liberal leading state. Instead of adopting the role of a minimal 
state intervention, where it would protect all individuals despite their ethnicity, and help them to 
pursue their interests and realise their goals, the USA government did the opposite.  Crenlisten 
(2009: 93) noted that the arrests, when it does not matter whether they resulted in convictions or 
not, are typical actions of autocratic governments. Just like the autocrats, the USA government 
found it prudent to use state instruments as a political tool to persecute the ethnic group that ‘bore’ 
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the terrorists. For the USA authorities, all Arabs and Muslims were potential terrorists. Members 
of that ethnic group lost their individual characteristics, the autonomy and moral primacy which 
goes with individualism.  The profile of a terrorist became, as noted by Crelinsten (2009: 93), any 
Middle Eastern alien in the USA and all others who happened to be Muslims, thanks to the USA 
PATRIOT Act, a post-9/11legislation that gave the authorities free rein to deal with immigrants.  
 
8.2.2 The USA PATRIOT Act 
The USA PATRIOT Act (which stands for Providing the Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept 
and Obstruct Terrorism) came into being on 26 October, 2001 and gave wide-ranging powers to 
security agents to combat terrorism. Crelinsten (2009: 162), showed that the act gave the FBI 
unfettered access to individual personal information such as library records, health records, emails, 
and the like, without having to seek a court order. Using the same piece of legislation, the 
authorities also have the freedom to tap telephones and monitor individuals’ communications – 
even communications between lawyers and their clients – as well as to deport immigrants 
suspected of fundraising for terrorists without a court injunction. El-Ayouty (2004: 27) showed 
that the act also allows for the detention of immigrants for a period of up to seven days, and 
thereafter for an indefinite period after the AG has filed charges against the detainee. This would 
be the case for as long as the AG is of the opinion that the person poses a threat to the security of 
the USA.  
 
Apart from the argument by Jackson and Sinclair (2012: 186) that security-biased measures are 
rarely effective in countering terrorism, the researcher avers that this is one piece of legislation, as 
will be shown in forthcoming sections, that is at its best discriminatory and, at its worst, treats 
immigrants as non-human beings with no rights whatsoever. Given the likes of AG Ashcroft 
referred to previously, who found no need to apologise for the ill-treatment of prisoners, 
immigrants in the USA are at the mercy of biased state authorities. The USA has, through the 
enactment of this Act, taken itself back to the dark ages where the powerless had no rights. The 
PATRIOT Act unquestionably goes against the liberal values of equality while giving precedence 
to security interests over civil liberties, of which the USA ironically boasts of being the champion. 
The provision for the arbitrary exercise of power by the authorities, together with the laws which 
are evidently passed to control certain groups of people, only help to confirm the thesis that the 
WOT is a threat to the ethic of political liberalism.  
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8.2.3 Counter-Terrorism Financing 
The wide-ranging provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act also gave powers to the authorities to 
monitor and intercept the financing of terrorist activities. This was arguably a critical element in 
the efforts of combating terrorism. Giraldo and Trinkunas (2007: 9) noted that terrorist 
organisations need funds to sustain their operations, for example, for buying weapons and moving 
their operatives from one place to another, and even to win the population and recruits to their side. 
Likewise, Crelinsten (2009) indicated the need to target terrorist funding as terrorists need money 
to maintain their organisations and mount operations. He estimated that the 9/11 terrorist operation 
cost around half a million United States dollars while the Bali bombing was estimated at $70,000, 
funds which the terrorists had to find from elsewhere and move from one point to another. It is 
here that the USA PATRIOT Act came in to facilitate the tracking of funds. For similar reasons, 
the Act gave the US Treasury power to direct any bank in the USA and elsewhere in the world to 
reveal banking information when required by the USA authorities. In case of failure to comply, the 
USA reserved the right to stop the party in question from accessing the US international banking 
system (Crelinsten, 2009: 171). This often leads to what has been referred to as ‘financial warfare’ 
where the affected party, once black-listed by the USA authorities, cannot transact internationally 
after the USA has blocked its financial assets. As a power that is more powerful than others in the 
family of nations, the USA has thus been able to dictate the dos and don’ts in the international 
financial system.  
 
As a result of the nature of the international financial system, Giraldo and Trinkunas (2007: 261) 
argued that the success of Counter-Terrorism Financing (CTF) required measures outside national 
jurisdiction, that is, a collective effort, and hence a hegemonic approach where the hegemony 
imposes the rules of the game. This is exactly what the USA has done as it dictates which country 
may or may not do what in the international financial system while attempting to make use of the 
UN system to endorse its wishes. Leading the CTF process, the USA sponsored UN Resolution 
1373, which made it mandatory for all UN member states to suppress terrorism and its financing. 
This led the UN to request member states to contribute to a UN technical assistance fund for the 
Counter-Terrorism Framework which realised a total amount of only $2.2 million, 10 percent of 
which was contributed by the USA while Australia contributed more than 50 percent (Giraldo & 
Trinkunas, 2007: 267). The measly contribution by the USA was arguably a result of its preference 
for bilateral relations, which it could manipulate easily using its economic and political muscle. 
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This depicts one of those examples which show the USA’s distaste for multilateral approaches to 
solve global challenges as exhibited by a host of its actions in the pre- and post-9/11 period. Giraldo 
and Trinkunas (2007) argued that the USA regarded multilateral institutions as “a waste of time”.  
For the USA the desired equality of nation-states is an unnecessary encumbrance which can be an 
obstacle on the realisation of its interests. 
 
The USA has been able to use the ‘sticks’ in Resolution 1373 to designate and impose sanctions 
on those countries seen not to be cooperating towards the objectives of the CTF. Using its own 
domestic legislation, the PATROT Act in particular, it has sought to counter terrorism through the 
use of its Department of Treasury to designate and impose sanctions on countries that are seen not 
abiding by its domestic laws. It has also managed to freeze the assets of countries, organisations 
and individuals suspected of colluding with terrorists through the use of the Office of Foreign 
Assets Control (OFAC), which the Department of Treasury utilises to enforce sanctions against 
entities deemed to be a threat to the USA’s interests (Giraldo & Trinkunas, 2007: 277). Arbitrary 
as a number of its decisions have been, some entities have been removed from the list after the 
discovery or ‘errors’, while others have been removed following complaints from its allies. The 
designation seems to be so subjective that one of the State Department officials is quoted as 
equating it to “a political process driven by the need for public action and the availability of a 
hammer” (Giraldo & Trinkunas, 2007: 277). Responding to the emotions of the public and whims 
of the hawks in government, the officials want to be seen to be hard on terrorists and their 
supporters and, in the process, it seems that every problem has necessitated the use of the readily 
available hammer to fix it.   Giraldo and Trinkunas (2007: 278) went on to suggest that the 
designation is not a helpful strategy as the terrorists would, where there is a need, just move their 
assets to non-designated entities.   
 
Instead of focusing on bilateral relations, the CTF requires different countries to share confidential 
records of entities and individuals of international transactions whenever desirable. Through the 
CTF, the USA is able to compel the supposed-to-be equal members of the international community 
to follow its dictates in the WOT. Giraldo and Trinkunas (2007: 249) argued that a focus on anti-
terrorism financing is a key element for combating terrorism as the destabilisation and disruption 
of their means of finance takes the initiative away from them, given that they are forced to focus 
on devising new means to finance their operations. There is no question, however, that this requires 
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multilateral cooperation coupled with proactive measures that would take away the initiative from 
the terrorists.    
 
8.3 Proactive Counter-Terrorism Measures 
There is a wide range of proactive counter-terrorism measures. Crelinsten (2009: 89) showed that 
proactive counter-terrorism measures are about preventing terrorist attacks. As such, they include 
both coercive and non-coercive security measures. Crelinsten noted further that the USA has 
always believed in pre-emptive actions to thwart terrorist plans before they come to fruition. Boaz 
Ganor, quoted in Jackson and Sinclair (2012: 138), noted similarly that proactive measures are 
meant to decrease terrorist capabilities and disrupt their operations. The measures in question 
would often include ‘retaliatory offensive operations’ (Jackson and Sinclair, 2012: 138). These are 
seen as necessary methods, given the high casualty rates and destruction associated with modern 
terrorism. Other than offensive operations, the USA’s proactive security measures included 
surveillance operations and the strengthening of airport security in the aftermath of the 9/11 
terrorist attacks.    
 
8.3.1 Surveillance 
Ball and Webster (2003: 90) defined surveillance as “watching the enemy – within and without, 
potential and real – about defence and its threatened accompaniment, war”.  Following the 9/11 
attacks, President George W. Bush authorised various eavesdropping programmes by the American 
National Security Agency (NSA). As alluded to above, this allowed the monitoring of telephone 
conversations and emails without having to go through the standard process of applying for a 
warrant (Crenlinsten, 2009: 99). To prevent further terrorist attacks, the USA developed the 
Terrorism Information Awareness Project in 2003, which focused on electronic trails (Ball & 
Webster, 2003: 3). The focus on electronic trails called for ‘data mining’, a process which aimed 
at picking some trends in the daily activities of individuals. Data mining entails the scrutiny of 
various activities such as the purchase of airline tickets, bank statements, immigration details, 
emails and telephone calls to check on suspected patterns. It involves the collection and analysis 
of large volumes of communications traffic in search for particular words or phrases which could 
reveal, in the case of terrorism, enemy plans (Ball & Webster, 2003: 3).  
 
For the USA, the post 9/11 period called for the broadening of the definition of enemy to include 
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“the enemy within” (Ball & Webster, 2003: 105). Various scholars argue that the term in essence 
referred to Muslim citizens, a reference which led to the targeting of individuals and communities 
by virtue of their belonging to certain ethnic groups and religious beliefs. With increased 
surveillance aimed at identifying terrorists before they could strike, focusing on these communities 
meant that individuals therein were regarded as potential terrorists. The state thus found itself 
invading individual space as it involved itself with religious issues. Freedom of conscience became 
associated with terrorism as the administration imposed its values of the good on the others. Using 
the old intelligence adage that, ‘If you have nothing to hide you have nothing to fear’, the 
authorities found nothing amiss with the targeting of communities and individuals as they argued 
that all law-abiding citizens had nothing to be afraid of. Summing up the ‘September 12 
thinking’21, Crenlisten (2009: 119) showed that the pro-WOT camp argued that there was need to 
sacrifice some rights and freedoms in order to enhance the security of the nation and, in that regard, 
only the guilty were to be afraid. The argument was that liberal rights such as judicial processes 
and rights of POWs and detainees were an unnecessary luxury given the need to ensure the security 
of the nation. Crenlisten (2009: 119) quoted the Justice Department supervisor, Kathleen 
Blomquist, emphasising that, “The United States cannot afford to retreat to a pre-September 10 
mindset that treats terrorism solely as a domestic law enforcement problem.”  
 
It is trite to note that surveillance operations had been the order of the day all over the world since 
well before 9/11. The contention therefore is not about the use of covert means to gather 
information, but about the targeting of particular ethnic groups and the abuse of the information 
obtained in the process. The targeted do have something to fear, even if innocent, if the information 
obtained from surveillance gets used to arrest them arbitrarily and they get locked up for extended 
periods without any courts to appeal to. The computer age which makes it easy, through data 
mining, to monitor an individual’s daily lifestyle and discover patterns on his privacy, provides a 
means for facilitating racial discrimination.  
 
Ball and Webster (2003), however, argued that there are legitimate reasons for the monitoring of 
individuals and sharing of the data even in liberal democratic systems of government if the 
                                                          
21 The ‘September 12 thinking’ is a term used by various authors to refer to the hard stance adopted by USA 
authorities in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks as opposed to the ‘September 10’ thinking 
that denotes the soft stance, which approached terrorism from a criminal point of view, before the attacks.  
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government has to maintain law and order and combat fraud. As such, they opine, there is a need 
to suspend civil liberties such as personal privacy during times of war. But the problem, as 
advanced hitherto, is that nobody knows when and if ever the ‘war’ will come to an end. Using the 
Slippery Slope Hypothesis, Etzioni (2005: 11), cautioned against accepting this line of thought as 
it may eventually lead to a complete loss of rights and liberties. Etzioni described the hypothesis 
as a situation where government starts by trimming a few rights, citing, for example, national 
security, an issue which the population is bound to understand. Gradually, a few more rights are 
curtailed, for example, through spying on citizens. More rights get lost with the passage of time 
until the entire institutional structure that forms the pillar of democracy collapses and rolls in an 
unstoppable motion down the slope. This looks like the scenario where, given the unavailability 
of any strong countervailing force to stand on the way of the rolling boulder, individuals are 
considered guilty on sight and get taken to secret detention centres where some are eventually 
released after some years without any charge, let alone an apology, while others are tried by 
military tribunals where they are denied the right of representation by legal counsel, all in the name 
of national security. The suspension of civil liberties, despite the duration, has an effect of 
infringing on the rights of the individuals in one way or another.   
 
8.3.2 Airport Security 
Immediately following the 9/11 attacks, in an attempt to complement the PATRIOT Act, the USA 
introduced new screening technology in its airports. Ball and Webster (2003: 17) advise that the 
new technology includes iris scanners and close circuit television (CCTV) cameras. Apart from 
the routine scanning of all travellers, the equipment is used to screen suspicious characters. The 
need to tighten security and thereby giving greater powers to security officers has led to 
inconveniences to the travelling public and a plethora of unfair practices as discussed below. 
Advocates for the scanners argue that full-body scanning machines are a form of ‘front-line 
defence’ against terrorism and argue further that by opting to travel, the individual gives up some 
rights. Because the machines are designed to allow the operator to see the individual completely 
naked and pick up any illegal objects ranging from items such as marijuana to bomb-making 
materials, critics have suggested that the machines, by virtue of the fact that they have to be 
operated by people, constitute an invasion into individual privacy. 
 
Eaton (2015: 7) noted that the downside of the machines is that they are not as fast as they were 
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expected to be upon their introduction, meaning that travellers have to spend more time with the 
boarding process. Furthermore, he argued that the process entails literally taking off your clothes 
for the screener, who may be of any sex for that matter. Should an individual refuse to go through 
the process, he notes that chances of being thrown into prison for being uncooperative are high. 
Despite the machines allowing for the blurring of private parts “so that the operator doesn’t see 
how you do your panty topiary”, the author argued that the search still constitutes an invasion of 
privacy; it remains a form of illegal stripping of a person (Eaton, 2015: 7). This has an effect on 
different cultures such as some sects of Muslims whose female members are not even allowed to 
mix with men in public places. The fact that this religious group has been placed on the high risk 
category means that Muslims have to be subjected to a more thorough invasion of their privacy, 
thereby taking away their liberty. Revelations by Schwartz (2009) that the technology has capacity 
to show body contours poses a further challenge on how to balance security needs and the privacy 
of the individual. While efforts have been made to consider respect for passengers by, for example, 
ensuring that the operator does not see the person being screened, security needs in the WOT have 
been allowed to take precedence over individual rights. Ball and Webster (2009:16) summarised 
this development on the WOT appropriately as a “new era of political control that overrides 
previous legal restrictions on monitoring citizens”. Citizens’ rights have been curtailed as the state 
has become obsessed with national security, leading to a proliferation of acts which have an effect 
of infringing on their rights. The WOT has therefore deprived the citizens of their freedom to 
pursue their interests and maximise their happiness as those who hold power are bent on coercing 
them to do what they do not want to do, which is typical of an autocratic state. 
 
Nardulli (2003: 31-35) recorded a number of cases showing unfair treatment of individuals who 
fit the Arab or Muslim profile in the USA. On various occasions, the individuals in question have 
been abused merely for their clothing or for having a long beard, which happens to be associated 
with Muslims. He gave the example of 22-year old Samar Kaubab who was strip-searched in 
Chigago’s O’Hare International Airport after having been identified through her hijab as a Muslim. 
A soldier with the aid of three security officers reportedly subjected her to a thorough, invasive 
search, which she linked to her “dress, ethnicity and religion”, as the metal dictators had not given 
any indication of anything worth the intrusive search. Nardulli noted that from September 11 up 
to the end of 2001, there have been more than 600 reported cases of such profiling of Arab-
Americans in the USA (Nardulli, 2003: 33). Caught up in the predicament was a USA 
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Congressman, Darrell Issa, who was prevented from boarding a flight to Paris as his Lebanese 
parentage put him on the wrong side of humankind. In apparent competition for glory, an aircraft 
captain also netted one Muslim USA secret service employee who was taken off the aircraft after 
going through all boarding formalities. Despite producing his identity documents and pleading 
with the arresting officers to confirm his identity particulars, his pleas fell on deaf ears for the 
simple reason that he belonged to the ‘wrong’ ethnic group or faith. The man could not even be 
allowed to retrieve his jacket from the plane as the captain stated categorically that he did not want 
to see him in the aeroplane (Nardulli, 2003: 34). With the conviction that Muslims and Arabs had 
infiltrated the USA and were bound to inflict more harm, such occurrences became the order of 
the day in the post-9/11 era. One of the many incidents involved a 20-year old Pakistan student 
who was pounced on by a Federal Border Patrol unit. Found with an expired visa, he was removed 
from the bus and locked up in a jail in Mississippi where he was reportedly beaten up until two 
ribs got fractured and an ear drum ruptured while his tormentors referred to him as Bin Laden 
(Nardulli, 2003: 37).   
 
The rule of law, as provided for in the ethic of liberalism, does allow authorities to undertake their 
work without fear or favour. Indeed, it expects the authorities to arrest individuals like the Pakistan 
student who are caught breaking the law. The liberal, democratic order, however, forbids the 
authorities from taking the law into their hands. The rule of law does not allow the authorities to 
be the judge and jury at the same time, let alone to harm the individual despite the threat, whether 
real or imagined.  
 
8.4 Warring Terrorism 
When President George W. Bush declared a WOT, it is clear that he did not use the term ‘war’ to 
refer to a metaphoric war. For the Bush administration and the general population, the extent of 
the attacks called for nothing less than a military response. Noting Osama bin Laden’s call for 
Muslims to fight and kill Americans wherever they could be and given the devastating attacks, 
President Bush was quick to reassure the Americans and the world at large of the preparedness of 
the US military to defend the country and bring the terrorists to account for their atrocities 
(Richardson, 2006). President Bush’s policy approval rate of 90 percent after the declaration of the 
WOT, as shown by Law (2009: 334), bears testimony to the fact that almost every American 
wanted decisive action against the Al-Qaeda terrorists there and then.   
 143 
 
 
For the Bush administration and the American population, the WOT constituted self-defence. El-
Ayouty (2004) showed a US Congress Joint Resolution authorising the president to, “ use all 
necessary and appropriate force against all those nations, organisations, or persons who 
determined, planned, authorised, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on 
September 11, 2001...” (El-Ayouty, 2004: 100). The Congress hence gave a free hand to the 
president to hunt down the terrorists, together with any state or subnational group that was deemed 
to have cooperated with the Al-Qaeda terrorists. For all intents and purposes, Congress allowed 
the president to determine who the enemy was. President Bush went on to promise that, “Whether 
we bring our enemies to justice or bring justice to our enemies, justice will be done (El-Ayouty, 
2004: 102). This statement, evidently coming from an emotional commander-in-chief of the 
defence forces, entailed the commencement of military hostilities under the pretext of self-defence. 
El-Ayouty argued that as the president warned the world that all countries were either with the 
USA or against it, he lost direction as he focused attention on the whole world rather than focusing 
on the attackers and their supporters. The president thus viewed anyone who did not share the 
political doctrine of the Americans their as an enemy.  
 
Elshtain (2003: 83), however, did not agree with this observation as she argued that ‘warring’ the 
terrorists was a clear act of self-defence given that the response was “legally authorised” by the 
UNSC, which for the first time in its history, “declared that the attacks connoted an assault on all 
members of the UN…”. She went on to claim that since the attacks launched by the USA were 
authorised by Congress though the USA Public Law 107-40, this made the actions legal. This is of 
course not true as it does not follow that whatever laws are approved by the legislature of one state 
are legal in International Law. Suggesting that the condemnation of terrorism by the UN was an 
approval of the invasion of Afghanistan is also not correct as there was no such resolution from 
the UNSC.  Elshtain further asserted that given that it is impossible to reason with fanatics, the 
only language the terrorists understand is interdiction as done by the USA in the name of self-
defence. The illegality of the USA’s invasion of other countries without a clear UNSC resolution 
is dealt with in detail elsewhere in this thesis, suffice to add that the availability of a domestic law 
authorising the use of force against countries deemed to be a threat to USA’s interests does not 
make that action legal in International Law. Countries can indeed decide to go to war against 
others, but history shows that some of those decisions have been found to have been against 
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international norms.  
 
8.4.1 The War Model 
Using the same language as noted above, which justifies USA’s belligerent stance against the 
terrorists and all those who are not its side, Elshtain (2003: 150) reiterated that the just war tradition 
does not only give the state the right to self-defence, but it also gives it the right to help citizens of 
other countries whenever they are in need. Such an endeavour may therefore entail the use of force 
as an instrument for justice. The fact that the USA is the only superpower – which thrusts upon it 
the responsibility to police the world – coupled with the realisation that international organisations 
have never been helpful in stopping violence, she argued, calls upon the USA to use its power, 
whether political, economic, diplomatic or military to ensure order in the world. She argued that 
this, therefore, justified the USA’s use of war to bring about peace in the world.  
 
At the risk of saying the obvious, critics see things from a different point of view. Law (2009) 
suggests that President Bush deliberately misused the term ‘war’ to solicit for national support in 
his attempt to deal a deadly blow to Osama bin Laden and his Islamic extremist followers. This 
saw him deliberately use the term ‘crusade’ to whip up emotions of the American people. Buckley 
and Fawn (2003: 315) further argue that whether Bush used the term ‘crusade’ deliberately or not, 
its use inevitably brought more strains between Muslims and Christians. Capitalising on Bush’s 
choice of words, Bin Laden quickly called for all Muslims to resist (Christian) ‘infidel’ forces of 
the “Chief Crusader Bush under the banner of the cross” (Ibid.). As Muslims, moderate and 
extremist alike, saw themselves under attack from the West, the development created more global 
instability while the USA saw war being the only viable means to bring about justice.  
 
Querying the USA’s intentions, critics pose various questions on how the USA expects to win the 
‘war’. Ankerson (2008) has enquired about the kind of war the USA is waging against the terrorists 
given the fact that a war is normally declared by one state on another, it is fought between 
recognised combatants, and that it has a beginning and an end. At the end of the war there is often 
a formal surrender accompanied by signing of documents, and the question is who the USA expects 
to do this with. Ankerson summed up his point by arguing that the USA’s stance only helps to give 
recognition, legitimacy and dignity to terrorism (Ankerson, 2008): 18). The researcher adds that 
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there is no question that the USA’s actions and pronouncements by its leadership are meant to 
justify the WOT and that, as may be the case, the war model poses many negative consequences, 
intended and unintended, on the ethic of political liberalism. Citing issues similar to Ankerson’s, 
Crenlisten (2009: 73) argued that given the fact that wars are generally fought between states, 
approaching counter-terrorism from a war point of view portrays terrorists as an equal rival. The 
pronouncement by the Bush administration in the aftermath of 9/11 that the USA was at war with 
the terrorists plays into the hands of the latter who have, themselves, declared a war on the USA. 
While this might be a morale booster to the restless American population who would want to see 
justice being meted on the terrorists, the USA’s repressive response, once again, gives the terrorists 
the much-sought ammunition as it is exactly what all terrorists in the world crave.  
 
Law (2009: 335) also gave a reminder of the fact that the ‘war’ requires the USA to respect rules 
of war as codified in the Geneva Convention. This includes the humane treatment of captives and 
POWs. Should the captives be regarded as criminals, then they have to be taken to criminal courts 
where the justice system would take its course. Evidently, the USA is non-committal on the 
prisoners’ status as it argues that it has to try them through military tribunals as illegal combatants, 
while at the same time it cannot accord them POW status, despite some of them having been 
captured in battle. As noted in Chapter 6, the USA does not seem to be concerned with all of these 
observations, but only its own interests and, hence, the arbitrary use of its military power to solve 
any challenge.  
 
The USA’s propensity to see every problem as requiring a military solution led it to launch a war 
on Afghanistan, travails which have been discussed in detail in Chapter 6. Jackson and Sinclair 
(2012: 144), suggested that with the invasion of Afghanistan, the USA had envisioned an outcome 
where Afghanistan would be an example of a peaceful pro-Western state where the USA would 
base its military in the geo-strategic area. The USA and its Western allies would then be able use 
the bases for exploitation of energy resources in Central Asia. The response to the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks therefore went well beyond the need to counter the terrorists and bring justice to them. 
Arguably, the incident gave the USA an opportune moment to advance its imperial agenda which 
has long been on the cards (Jackson and Sinclair, 2012: 144).  The more than 2,700 Afghan 
civilians killed, as noted by Jackson and Sinclair (2012: 188), were not an issue of concern in the 
advancement of the USA’s strategic interests in Operation Enduring Freedom. The principle of 
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right to life seems not to have mattered in any way to liberal America. Should the freedom which 
the Americans claim they gave the Afghans have come at that cost? Richardson (2006: 194), 
putting the number of Afghan civilians killed by August 2002 at between 3,125 and 3,620, argued 
that just as Osama bin Laden was never concerned with civilian lives, neither was the USA for 
which only American lives mattered. The same can be said of Iraq where the USA’s Operation Iraq 
Freedom was estimated by Jackson and Sinclair (2012: 188) as having cost more than 600,000 
Iraqi lives following President Bush’s State of the Nation Address in January 2002 claiming that, 
“Iraq continues to flaunt its hostility toward America and to support terror.”  
 
8.4.2 The Invasion of Iraq by the USA and Allies  
In this State of the Union Address on 29 January, 2002, President Bush declared Iraq, Iran and 
North Korea as the axis of evil and claimed that the three countries were a threat to global peace 
and security and, as such, the countries in question were not going to be allowed to proceed with 
their agenda. Meehan (2005: 71) suggested that the primary target of the USA, among the three, 
was Iran, a regime that would not be easy to overrun. In pursuit of the New American Century, the 
neo-conservatives therefore coined the term “The road to Iran runs through Baghdad” with the 
hope that once they had effected regime change in Baghdad, the USA would make an attempt on 
Iran (Meehan, 2005: 71). Proposed by the USA, Britain and Spain, the UNSC Resolution 1441 
(2002) held Iraq in breach of previous resolutions which directed it to disarm and offered it yet 
another opportunity to comply.  With Iraq having failed to meet the terms, Weiss, Crahan and 
Goering (2004: 89) noted that the USA tried frantically to get a new resolution authorising use of 
force to compel Iraq to comply but failed. On 20 March, 2003 the USA, in alliance with the United 
Kingdom (UK) and other allies such as Australia and Poland, invaded Iraq. Blum (2006: 98) 
described the attack as a 40-day and night bombardment where the invaders spent more than 177 
pounds of explosives which had the effect of incinerating the victims on the spot, over and above 
the deliberate destruction of infrastructure. Contrary to President Bush’s claim that the invasion 
was meant to end Saddam Hussein’s support for terrorism, disarm him of WMD, and free the 
people of Iraq, pronouncements by the Operations Commander, Brigadier General Looney, 
showed otherwise. Blum (2006) revealed the Operations Commander stressing that the Iraqis must 
know that, “We own their country…we dictate the way they live and talk. And that’s what what’s 
great about America right now. It’s a good thing, especially when there’s a lot of oil out there we 
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need” (Blum, 2006: 92). 
 
The above pronouncement should be viewed as a clear declaration by an informed General on the 
real motive of the USA’s invasion of Iraq, which had nothing to do with terrorism. The operations 
commander inadvertently revealed that the invasion had nothing to do with the reasons given by 
President Bush but concerned oil that is required to feed American corporations, as noted by Blum 
(2006: 73).  The small Iraq pitted against the mighty USA can indeed be ‘owned’ by the Americans 
where the latter would be able to dictate the dos and don’ts to the Iraqis or any other weaker state 
where the USA’s interests are at stake, an issue which points to the argument that, for the USA, the 
principle of nation-state equality does not exist. Crotty (2005: 63) noted that the 9/11 attacks 
brought about a new concept of national security that entailed early interception of threats before 
they could harm the American citizens. The pursuit of various strategic interests such as oil and 
the need for a pliant regime in Iraq had to ride on a link between the Saddam Hussein regime and 
terrorism to avoid the invasion being seen as imperial. Just as the USA had armed the Mujahideen 
and used its CIA to train Islamic militants to wage a war against the Russians, morality was lost 
when the Americans decided to ‘forget’ that it was they who armed the Iraqis to protect their 
interests in the Middle East against threats from Ayatollah Khomeini’s Islamic regime of Iran. The 
purported response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks was all evidently done in pursuit of selfish economic 
and political interests, thereby making the WOT an unjust venture.  
 
The economic interests of the USA were also clearly spelt out in its National Security Doctrine of 
1992, which gave prominence to the security of energy reserves, in particular oil (Crotty, 2005: 
65). Crotty argued that with the Bush administration having failed to find a link between the 
Saddam Hussein regime and 9/11, it undertook concerted efforts to prepare the public for a possible 
regime-change mission by using terms such as ‘axis of evil’ and ‘an undemocratic thorn in the 
flesh’ as it gloated on the vast amounts of oil reserves in the country. With the same objective, the 
administration sought to link the so-called WMD with terrorism as “terrorism became a catch-all 
for Iraq” (Crotty, 2005: 36). Almost some 30 years before 9/11, Meuller (1973: 69) went on to 
suggest that such strategies are so well planned by the American elite to the extent that early 
socialisation ensures that foreign affairs, mass media and public opinion leaders always rally 
behind the president in such situations.  
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Fouskas and Gökay (2005: 102) lent support to this claim through an illustration of the American 
National Geographic survey in 2003 which showed 85 percent of Americans in the 18 to 24 age 
group in support of the USA leadership despite their having no idea of the location of Iraq. 
Dimitrova and Strömbäck (2008: 31) also showed that while a number of countries were against 
the invasion of Iraq, polls conducted by the Washington Post revealed that 81 percent of the adult 
population in the USA supported the war against Iraq, together with the media which, they argued, 
has always tended to support the political elite in its reporting. Such revelations led to the authors 
to suggest that, “The United States is using the attacks of 9/11 to carry out its foreign policy agenda 
on a truly aggressive level” (Dimitrova & Strömbäck (2008: 30). While the assertion that the USA, 
in conspiracy with the Israeli intelligence, attacked itself on 11 September, 2001 should be taken 
as just one conspiracy theory, the researcher feels strongly that even if the 9/11incident had not 
taken place, the USA would still have attacked Iraq at one time or another, not for any reason to 
do with the 9/11 attacks, but to ensure a guaranteed supply of oil resources from the Middle East.   
The natural resources found in the small, weak countries therefore become a curse for the countries 
in question as the superpower uses the WOT to camouflage its objectives while taking away an 
individual state’s right to equality in the process.  
 
As shown by President Bush’s ‘stuttering’ from one position to another on the reasons for the 
USA’s invasion of Iraq, Crotty (2005: 41) noted that there was at the end some reference to the 
need to ensure democracy in Iraq. Ironically, the morals of the USA authorities did not allow them 
to see the need for democracy when they were supporting the undemocratic Saddam Hussein in 
the Iran-Iraq War which endured for six years from 1982 to 1988. Weiss, Crahan and Goering 
(2004: 89) noted that this was at a time when Iraq as ally-turned-enemy was freely using chemical 
weapons against the Iranians and the local Kurdish population. Over and above that level of 
immorality, one wonders why one country would opt to use coercion to introduce democracy in 
another country instead of attempting persuasive means such as education, economic 
empowerment and financial support to show the superiority of its model of governance. One would 
further enquire about the morality of the USA and the kind of democracy it wanted to introduce in 
Iraq when its troops gunned down 13 Iraq civilians who were demonstrating against foreign 
military presence in the country on 29 April, 2003, as reported by Faber (2007:13). The same 
forces that belonged to a country that brags of being an epitome of democracy, showed no shame 
or remorse when they opened fire on Iraqis demonstrating the following day against the killing of 
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the 13 civilians (Faber, 2007:13). The behaviour of agents of the supposed-to-be liberal West 
persuades one to support the observation by Faber (2007: 18) that, “Iraqis believe that the United 
States is less interested in a democratic Iraq than in having permanent American military bases to 
control the region’s oil.” Democracy, which goes hand-in-hand with liberalism, should not, for that 
matter, be foisted on any people, but rather be promoted gradually as individuals appreciate the 
value of the various freedoms and liberty that goes with it.  
 
Weiss, Crahan and Goering (2004: 93) went further to argue that even if the deaths had been 
accidental, which in fact they were not, there would have been no justification whatsoever for the 
American immorality, given that the USA was not fighting a war in self-defence but one of choice. 
One would add that there are even high chances that the shameless powers could have intended to 
destabilise Iraq and the region as a whole deliberately to justify their continued stay in the Gulf, 
thereby guaranteeing their access to the region’s energy resources, an unjustifiable immoral act. A 
suggestion that the West has used the WOT to try to extend its influence and thereby encourage a 
free market economy for the exploitation by capital in the Middle East does not look like a far-
fetched idea for the researcher. Such a motive would entail the instalment of friendly regimes in 
strategic countries such as Iraq. Indeed, private ownership of property and a free market economy 
are the hallmarks of liberalism, but that does not justify using force and taking away individuals’ 
lives to realise it.  
 
The United Kingdom House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee report of 2003 noted that a 
number of UNSC members did acknowledge the potential threat posed by Iraq, although they were 
not convinced that it posed an immediate threat to peace and security. They were, however, 
convinced that military action against Iraq would, instead, pose a grave threat to peace and security, 
hence the Committee’s conclusion that, “It would have been highly desirable to obtain a further 
Security Council resolution before taking military action on Iraq” (Weiss, Crahan & Goering, 
2004: 27). In this regard, the independent House of Commons Committee findings showed that 
the invasion of Iraq by the USA and UK, together with their allied forces, was unlawful as there 
was no authority from the UNSC for the countries in question to attack Iraq. The invasion was, 
hence, a clear travesty of the rule of law in preference to the ‘rule by men’. The allies did not even 
have the ground to invoke other UN provisions such as Article 51 which allows for individual or 
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collective self-defence as there was no attack or any imminent attack from Iraq.22 The willy-nilly 
transgression of international law by the USA, once again, brought its lack of morality to the fore 
while it kept pointing fingers at so-called rogue states. Lightenberg, in Weiss et al (2004: 76), asked 
how the USA was able to find the morality of blaming Iraq for possessing WMD when it, itself, 
was the biggest holder of WMD. A rogue state is, among other things, one that contravenes 
International Law at will and, if this is the case, the USA is typically a rogue state. Even if Iraq 
were, for that matter, a rogue state in the eyes of the USA, it is not the responsibility of an 
individual member state to discipline a rogue state, but that of the UNSC, as nation-state equality 
calls for a neutral arbiter, in this case the UN, to preside over inter-state disputes.   
 
Various authors have questioned the USA’s morals as it ignores human life in pursuit of its 
objective of having everything done the American way while its agents seem to be oblivious to the 
expected, unacceptable conduct in relation to warfare. Blum (2006: 58) has given harrowing 
examples of the humiliation of detainees such as that of a female American soldier giving a 
thumbs-up sign as a male prisoner is forced to masturbate while photos and video films of him are 
taken; the continual sodomising of detainees with broom sticks; posing with corpses after torturing 
victims to death; harnessing a 70-year old Iraqi woman and riding her like a donkey; forcing people 
to walk on fours and bark like a dog, and forcing those who believe in Islam to take pork and 
alcohol while denouncing Islam. For the Americans, these actions constituted a justified response 
to the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Had the incidents been few and far in between, one would have 
suggested that they could be a result of a few miscreants within the military ranks. The frequency 
and gravity of the incidents point to the likelihood that the occurrences either had the tacit approval 
of the command element of the deployed troops or the soldiers were taking orders from above as 
promised by the USA Operations Commander, Brigadier General Looney, that the Americans 
would dictate the way the Iraqis lived and talked. The above revelations suggest that the Americans 
did not care about the consequences of their invasion of Iraq as well as their abominable actions 
against the Iraqi population. They, instead, give strong support to the conclusion that the USA’s 
invasion of Iraq had nothing to do with countering terrorism but had everything to do with selfish 
objectives which included the want to secure energy resources while weakening Arab states as a 
                                                          
22Article 51 of the UN Charter allows for individual or collective self-defence in the case of an attack, pending the 
intervention of the UNSC, where the member taking measures will immediately report to the UNSC, which is the 
final authority. See http://www.un.org/aboutuncharter/ for details. (Accessed on 21 February, 2017).  
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means of protecting her allies in the Middle East, and this could be done through any means 
regardless of the effect of the means in question on state sovereignty and individual rights. 
Arguably, whatever means the USA found handy at the time, be it the killing and humiliation of 
the Iraqis, or torture, justified the end.  
 
8.5 Countering Terrorism Through the Use of Torture 
The need for quick decision-making and hence timeous, accurate information has always been an 
indispensable requirement of warfare. Lionel Giles (2002: 37) showed that ancient military 
theorists such as the Prussian General Carl von Clausewitz, pointed out the difficulties associated 
with making decisions in conflict situations long ago, which are always characterised by 
uncertainty and ambiguity.  Sun Tzu, a renowned Chinese military strategist, went on even to 
suggest that there might be a need not to obey commands from the sovereign in war but to act as 
the situation demands given the ‘fog of war’ (Howard & Paret, 1989: 12).  Faced with the need to 
win the war against terrorism in a situation where it is extremely difficult to ascertain who is and 
who is not a terrorist, and where accurate information is scarce, the USA and its allies resorted to 
the use of torture in an attempt to get timeous information in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks. 
One favourable means of eliciting information from terrorists in the WOT has been the ‘rendition’ 
of terrorist suspects from one country to another and mainly to Guantanamo Bay, a USA base in 
Cuba, which has been used as a torture centre by USA intelligence operatives. Ahmed (2013: 274) 
describe/d Guantanamo Bay as “one of the most widely discussed, sinister, and controversial 
aspects of the war on terror”. The USA, in collaboration with a number of its allies, reportedly 
flew hundreds of suspects to the base where they were subjected to torturer and other various 
degrading, illegal actions.  
 
One of the controversial allies of the USA in this war was Pakistan. Bergen (2012: 66) claimed 
that Pakistan at one time handed over 369 terrorist suspects to the USA in exchange of millions of 
dollars (Bergen, 2012: 66). President Musharaf’s remorseless bragging that he had handed over 
many terrorist suspects to Guantanamo Bay in response to accusations of double standards by the 
Americans may be a confirmation of Bergen’s claim. In collaboration with the government of 
Bosnia, Weiss, Crahan and Goering (2004: 93) showed how the USA intelligence services 
disregarded the rule of law by whisking six Algerians to its Guantanamo base, despite them having 
been freed by the courts. Conceding that there was no evidence incriminating them, the Americans 
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released their captives after torture. The captives revealed that the torture included exposure to 
freezing temperatures and deprivation of sleep and food (Ahmed, 2013: 180).  
 
In search of information, the USA intelligence agents collaborated with its counterparts elsewhere 
in the world where the cooperation included agencies from hostile undemocratic countries. In the 
process, individuals were transferred from one country to another without due regard to their 
rights. Welch (2006: 14) gave an example of one Canadian citizen, Maher Arar, who was arrested 
in the USA in 2002 and immediately transferred to Syria in handcuffs and leg irons, only to be 
released after a yearlong period of torture with no charges. The incident was not an exception but 
has been a general practice of the USA intelligence services in the WOT as shown in previous 
sections. A number of arrested suspects have reported being abducted and locked in cells in 
Guantanamo Bay and elsewhere in the world to where they have been transferred. In numerous 
occasions, the suspects have been released and dumped elsewhere after extensive abuse, whenever 
no evidence has been found against them. Torture methods such as forcing the accused to lie on 
bed frames charged with electrical currents or being hung from hooks, has not been uncommon in 
the USA’s counter-terrorism operations (Welch, 2006: 14-16). 
 
The use of rendition and secret torture prisons all over the world by the USA smacks of double 
standards and immorality as the USA finds nothing inappropriate with it breaking International 
Law while it imposes sanctions on the various countries it views as working against liberal and 
democratic principles of governance. The very fact that the torture and other related abuses of 
individuals are undertaken in secrecy is a clear indication that there is something untoward in the 
activities. The USA has an obligation as a leading liberal state to ensure that it respects negative 
liberties such as the right not to be tortured. The USA authorities and other analysts claim that the 
use of secretive, coercive approaches such as torture, is unavoidable in the chaos of war if the state 
has to prevent further terrorist attacks. Responding to one journalist on why the USA used torture, 
Welch (2006: 173) quoted Senator Trent Lott asking rhetorically, “How are you going to get people 
to give information that will lead to the saving of lives (if you do not use torture)”. The implication 
is that torture is inevitable in the war against terrorism if the security forces have to avoid 
unnecessary loss of lives. These government authorities see coercive measures as an indispensable 
requirement to obtain information which would lead to the defeat of terrorists. They use the 
‘ticking bomb’ scenario to justify coercive interrogation to obtain critical information to save lives.  
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A ticking bomb refers to a scenario where a suspect with critical information has been identified 
and the authorities are convinced that there is need to extract information from him urgently to 
save lives, hence the justification to use torture. There are a number of scholars who contend that 
a ticking bomb scenario does, at times, justify the use of torture.  Blum and Heymann (2013: 21) 
referred to this as ‘defence of necessity’. They, however, argued that the action should be 
transparent and allow for judicial intervention. They argued that the suspension of habeas corpus 
– a legal instrument requiring the arresting authority to bring before the courts the arrested 
individual for determination – should be justified by a demonstration that adhering to the law as 
opposed to breaking it would have resulted in a higher cost. The argument here is that torture, 
whenever used, should not be a standard practice, but rather used under extreme circumstances to 
save lives, and must always be subject to judicial review. This approach was supported by Ignatieff 
(2004: 83-85) who referred to the approach as a ‘lesser evil’. Ignatieff argued that ‘perfectionism’, 
that is, an attempt to stick to liberal universal moral standards, is not attainable in a real world but 
nonetheless puts a rider that an approach that is characterised by secrecy and illegality is 
unacceptable. He emphasised that lesser evil does not mean that the act is not wrong, but only 
constitutes some evil that may be acceptable in a liberal state that is entangled in a situation such 
as that of a war against terrorism where solutions to challenges with potential disaster have to be 
found within a short space of time. It is some kind of a compromise where the state has to act 
illegally to get a solution that would provide a greater good to the majority, just as the state coerces 
those who earn an income to pay tax in exchange for the provision of public goods, which allow 
the individuals to exercise their freedom (Ignatieff, 2004: 83-85). 
 
In an apparent acknowledgement of the fog of war, Ignatieff (2004: 79-81) argued further that 
there is a thin dividing line between good and bad in counter-terrorism activities. Counter-terrorism 
involves various violent activities such as targeted killings (assassination) and pre-emption, the 
choice of which is often influenced by the need for the leader to make quick decisions in war. He 
argued that lesser evil may mean taking unpalatable decisions such as killing some to save more, 
which he referred to as ethical realism. The use of related, otherwise publicly condemned 
approaches such as deception may be justified in a war situation, but only if used to deceive the 
enemy and not the public. In that case, it should be a temporary measure, with a clear strategic 
objective (Ignatieff, 2004: 79-81).  Also in line with the thinking of similar scholars and many 
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politicians whose countries have been subjected to terrorist attacks, the then USA Secretary of 
State, Donald Rumsfeld, once suggested that captured terrorists do not have any rights under the 
Geneva Convection by virtue of their being unlawful combatants, while the USA Vice President 
Richard “Dick” Cheney was quoted by Blum and Heymann (2013: 124) as arguing that, “Torture 
should be regarded as within the rules for fighting terrorism ....” 
 
These are sentiments arguably expressed by leaders who find torture an indispensable instrument 
in the war against terrorism, given the population’s expectations of them to deliver peace and 
security.  It is likely a result of a tug of war between the demand for security and the need to respect 
liberal rights that the USA has been found to have opted to sacrifice the latter as it claims a right 
to respond to the terrorist attacks. As shown above, the USA has been involved in endless 
degrading incidents in its response to the 9/11 attacks. The accusations include the use of 
horrendous torture methods such as the squeezing of male genitals, and on many occasions by 
female interrogators, leading to prisoners urinating and defecating on themselves as revealed by 
Welch (2006: 19).  In some occasions the suspects have been advised to urinate on themselves 
after requesting to relieve themselves, while youths as young as 12 years have found themselves 
in detention. Such treatment of human beings, even if they were proven terrorists, is barbaric and 
immoral and, it is argued, belongs to the dark ages. It is likely a result of this kind of treatment of 
other human beings that a number of scholars do not agree that the use of torture can, under any 
circumstances, be justified. The argument is that torture, despite whatever justification, constitutes 
an assault on human rights. Whittaker (2004: 141) argued that “nobody should be able to pick and 
choose their obligations under international law” thereby implying that a wrong should be seen as 
such despite the outcome, typically in line with the deontological ethical approach. The suggestion 
is that torture should be seen outright as unethical despite the argument of necessity.  
 
It is arguably these moralistic, humane principles which should guide conduct in civilised, liberal 
societies that lead to an unqualified condemnation of torture. While senior USA leaders such as 
Donald Rumsfeld and Dick Cheney clearly support the use of torture to extract information from 
suspects as discussed above. Welch (2006: 167) quoted President George Bush conceding that 
torture is never acceptable and even going to the extent of claiming that the USA does not 
cooperate with those who use torture, contrary to the evidence adduced above,  and saying that 
torture should never be acceptable in a modern, liberal society. In that case, there is merit in 
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proposing that the USA has to be indicted and put on its defence for abducting individuals and 
flying them from one country to another where they have been subjected to torture by its 
intelligence operatives and its allies.  
 
8.6 Concluding Remarks 
There is no question that the 9/11 terrorist attacks constituted an event which led to anger. It is 
unlikely that there is any state with the power to bring the terrorists to justice that would not do so 
given the unparalleled loss of lives and devastation that resulted from the attacks. This is more so 
for a state that prides itself in being the only superpower in the world – a state that is accustomed 
to having things done its own way. The anger, however, led to a want for revenge, which is exactly 
what the USA did as it directed its wrath on everybody who it considered as not being ‘with it’ on 
its WOT. Given the want to inflict harm on the terrorists and their supporters, the US officials 
found themselves having to dispense with the customary accountability which, before 9/11, 
characterised the conduct of public officials of the democratic, liberal state. It was shown in the 
discussion that the want for revenge and the resultant punitive, retaliatory action, as contradicted 
with the want for justice, led to officials getting away with crimes they would normally have been 
tried for as they inflicted harm on anybody who they profiled as originating or having parentage 
from the Middle East. A number of examples were given to show how Arabs and Muslims were 
unfairly targeted and their individual rights and freedoms violated in this endeavour. 
 
Accepted, the USA was faced with an ethical dilemma that meant that its failure to deal with the 
terrorists decisively would threaten the very liberal freedoms enjoyed by American citizens and 
the free world at large while doing so meant the curtailment of some individual rights and 
freedoms. It was argued in this chapter that the USA failed to strike the right balance between 
ensuring the security of its citizens and respecting various rights as enshrined in the ethic of 
political liberalism. Just as the terrorists are a threat to the ethic of political liberalism, it was 
demonstrated how the USA equally constituted a threat to the same principles through its careless 
vengeance.  It was also shown in this chapter by way of various examples how individuals bearing 
Middle Eastern names were abused in various USA airports and elsewhere as they became enemies 
of the state on sight. It was further shown how the USA officials became accountable to nobody 
as the ‘rule of men’ became superior to the rule of law. It was also demonstrated how the USA, 
using legislation that would normally fit autocratic governments, saw liberal provisions such as 
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judicial processes and the rights of detainees as constituting an unnecessary encumbrance on its 
WOT. The ‘September 12 thinking’ called for the curtailment of all freedoms and a dispensation 
with the rule of law as suspects were tortured at will by the USA and its allies in Guantanamo Bay 
and elsewhere after the suspects were illegally ‘renditioned’ from one country to another.  
 
Using various examples, it was also shown in this chapter how the USA’s reckless lack of concern 
for the safety and rights of civilians made the WOT unjust. Arguing that the captives did not qualify 
to be treated under the Geneva Convention on the Treatment of Prisoners of War (POWs), the 
supposed-to-be liberal state subjected them to wanton abuse at the hands of its security officers. 
They thus found an excuse to substitute the criminal justice system for military tribunals where all 
detainees were regarded as ‘guilty until proven innocent’ while, at the same time, denying them 
their liberal rights of legal representation. The Bush administration was thus found, in its response 
to terrorism, to be doing exactly what it was accusing terrorists, their supporters, and other 
autocratic states of doing. Typical of despots the world over, the USA government found it prudent 
to use state institutions and associated pieces of legislation as tools for persecuting those seen not 
to be with it in the WOT.  
 
This chapter showed how various pieces of legislation crafted and passed after the 9/11, in 
particular the USA PATRIOT Act, were used by the state to grant unrestricted access to individual 
personal records to facilitate the tracking of private citizens. The use of the legislation showed at 
the end that, under USA’s anti-terrorism laws, individuals, in particular those of foreign descent, 
have no rights in the USA. The USA’s distaste for multilateral approaches allowed it to do what it 
desired as appropriate in its bid to counter terrorism as it used its domestic legislation and 
institutions such as OFAC to freeze assets of countries, organisations and individuals deemed to 
be on the enemy side while it used its military might to attack countries such as Afghanistan and 
Iraq. It was shown how its hubris propelled it to dispense with the rule of law as international 
organisations such as the UN were found to be an unnecessary obstacle in its war against terrorism, 
which, as demonstrated, became a war for the attainment of its strategic objectives, as was clearly 
the case with Iraq. 
 
This chapter also argued that the USA’s invasion of Iraq had nothing to do with countering 
terrorism but had everything to do with selfish objectives which included the want to secure energy 
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resources while weakening unfriendly Arab states in the region.  The invasion showed, once again, 
that weaker countries automatically lose their right to state equality once the USA deems them not 
to be on its side in the WOT. With the USA’s National Security Doctrine of 1992 clearly showing 
a focus on oil, it was averred that the invasion of Iraq by the USA had nothing to do with the 
pronounced reasons, which shifted with time from WMD to terrorism. The inhumane destruction 
of life and infrastructure in its incessant bombardment of Iraq cities confirmed that the USA will 
go all the way to ensuring that everything has to be done the American way. It is in that respect 
that the USA found nothing immoral with its disregard of both the UN and provisions of 
International Law as it launched a unilateral attack on Iraq with the support of its allies.  
 
All in all, the USA’s counter-terrorism measures in the post-9/11 era can best be summarised as, 
by and large, illegal, unethical and a threat to the ethic of political liberalism. Its unrestrained 
detention of suspects in secret detention centres without trial, their capture and transfer to 
Guantanamo Bay and elsewhere in the world where they were ill-treated, the wanton use of torture 
to obtain information from suspects, its failure to respect human life, and its disregard for 
international law and norms are typical actions of a rogue state. Instead of reacting emotionally to 
terrorist threats, the USA and allies need to consider undertaking a sober assessment of the threat, 
thereby developing strategic options that have the effect of mitigating the challenge in both the 
short- and long-term horizons, while allowing individuals to enjoy their rights in a liberal, 
democratic environment under the protection of a minimal state which is able to protect and 
support each individual to realise his potential despite his ethnicity or social standing. 
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CHAPTER NINE: GENERAL CONCLUSION 
9.1 Overview of the Study 
Chapter 9 seeks to synthesise the findings of all the chapters to answer the question ‘In what ways 
is the internationalisation of the war on terrorism a threat to the ethic of political liberalism?’. In 
this endeavour, the chapter will consolidate the findings of the study and hence address issues that 
relate to the factors that are seen as contributing to the WOT and related responses from the USA 
and is allies, which constitute an affront to the ethic of political liberalism. The assembled findings 
will be utilised in the next chapter to proffer recommendations for the study. With the introductory 
chapter having given the background on the WOT and challenges that ensue in relation to the 
respect of values of political liberalism and the maintenance of global peace and security following 
the declaration of the war by the USA, the first section of this chapter will summarise findings of 
Chapter 2 which was concerned with the definition of terrorism. The section notes that while there 
is currently no consensus on the definition of terrorism, there are various aspects of this illegal 
form of warfare that characterise it.   The characteristics in question, which include the use of fear 
and intimidation in a desire to attain some political objectives, have provided a framework for the 
various discussions on the use of violence by the terrorists and the reaction of the USA in all the 
subsequent sections of the study.  
 
The second section focuses on the threat posed by extremists as epitomised by modern terrorism, 
which has managed to deploy religion in a disingenuous way in its pursuit of political violence.  
Chapter 3 demonstrated the desire of modern terrorism to inflict mass casualties while making use 
of the media to attract publicity. This chapter showed how modern terrorists use violence and fear 
in an attempt to force the world to accede to their demands as they try to compel others to see 
things from their point of view. The failure of the other side to comply with the terrorists’ wishes 
has inevitably led to a clash between the terrorists on the one side and the USA and allies on the 
other, with the resultant effect of undermining liberal values and global peace and security. Having 
explored the characteristics of modern terrorism and the clear desire of modern terrorists to cause 
maximum possible destruction, Chapter 4 sought to find out why the terrorists seem to be obsessed 
with cold-blooded murder and the related destruction of property, which has led to fellow human 
beings to suggest that terrorists are not normal people. The chapter therefore sought to find out 
what could be the motivation and major drivers behind the ‘senseless’ terrorist activities. The 
overall conclusion was that terrorists are, on the general, normal people who are driven by a 
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combination of factors to commit various acts of unmitigated violence. They set themselves clear 
goals and do a detailed cost benefit analysis of the various possible options. As they are conscious 
of the immoral effect of their actions, they work hard to shift the blame to their victims.  
 
With a clearer indication of what drives the modern terrorist, Chapter 5 then sought to go further 
and uncover the link between Islam and terrorism. This was in recognition of the fact that most of 
the terrorist attacks are currently attributed to extremists who claim to be acting in the name of 
Islam as they advance their destructive agenda. The chapter went on to explore the resultant 
combination between Islam, the religion, and Islamism, which combines ideology with religion, 
to form a potent force for resistance and aggression against the West.  The chapter took a detailed 
look at the various provisions of the Qur’an and the deployment of the religion by extremists, and 
hence its effect on liberal values as the subject of terrorist attack. In this spirit, it explored the 
concept of the jihad and found that the extremists deliberately abuse the otherwise noble concept 
to advance their interests.  The chapter concluded that Islam is not just a religion but an ideology. 
It is a way of life that dictates the do’s and don’ts of Muslims, where their belief of one correct 
way, puts them on a collision course with the USA and its Western allies who, unfortunately, have 
been trapped by the extremists to react in a way that has the effect of undermining liberal values 
and global peace and security.  
 
Given the various aggression exhibited by the extremists on the one side and the USA and allies’ 
purported response, Chapter 6 sought to uncover the link between the USA’s foreign policy and its 
internationalised WOT with the objective of uncovering reasons for, and propriety of, the USA’ 
actions in the international arena. The chapter made use of the neo-conservatives’ PNAC, the NSS 
of 2002, and the Bush Doctrine to evaluate the link between the USA’s foreign policy and the 
WOT. Evidence adduced in the discussions pointed to the fact that the WOT has been employed 
by the USA as a means of achieving its strategic interests elsewhere in the world. In this regard, it 
showed that the USA will not hesitate to coerce weaker nations and, where desirable, use force to 
maintain its hegemonic status, thereby allowing it to protect its strategic interests under the cover 
of the WOT. This stance seemed to give an excuse to the extremists to employ to their dastardly 
tactics to mete out punishment on the West thereby luring the USA and its allies to disregard 
various values of the ethic of political liberalism as they focused on defeating the terrorists. While 
various chapters, in particular Chapter 6, having shown how the USA has wantonly disregarded 
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individual rights and state sovereignty and other aspects of International Law in the name of 
national security, Chapter 7 made a detailed examination at the principles of the ethic. It discussed 
the demands of liberty and individualism as cornerstones of the philosophy, together with other 
related principles such as the rule of law, justice and the good of freedom, all of which require the 
state to ensure the protection of the individual while giving him all the support needed to realise 
his potential. The demands of the ethic were then used to appraise the legality and morality of the 
USA’s counter-terrorism measures.   
 
Chapter 8 acknowledged that the 9/11 attacks perpetrated by Al-Qaeda terrorists against the USA 
constituted an extreme provocation which led to the USA to react with anger and a wish for 
revenge. The desire to mete out instant justice saw the USA dividing the world into two camps, 
namely, those who were seen to be with it in the WOT, and those who were against it. The USA 
then quickly came up with various pieces of legislation which were aimed at dealing with the 
terrorist threat. This chapter showed how, using the USA PATRIOT Act, officials were seen 
transgressing various individual rights and freedoms. It showed how Arabs and Muslims lost their 
individual rights as a result of their ethnicity, which associated them with terrorism. This chapter 
revealed further how the laws governing the treatment of prisoners and detainees were usurped by 
the USA PATRIOT Act which led to the noted category of citizens being denied their basic 
individual rights in the USA as demonstrated by some detainees who got locked in secret cells in 
the country with no recourse to the justice system while many suspects were sent to the infamous 
Guantanamo Bay where they were subjected to torture.   
 
9.2 Conceptual Definition of Terrorism 
It has not been possible to date, to come up with an agreed upon definition of terrorism given the 
careless and subjective use of the term by various parties to refer to those with whom one does not 
agree. Chapter 1 noted that terrorism has been used since time immemorial as a means of warfare 
to intimidate and subdue one’s enemies. Chapter 1 therefore attempted to locate terrorism in and 
compare it with other forms of warfare. It was noted that terrorism, as a form of warfare is, by and 
large, the opposite side of conventional warfare, which is founded on the just war theory. The jus 
ad bellum principle of a just war calls for the cause of going to war to be just. In a democracy, the 
onus of the justification is placed on the political leadership of the state, which is answerable to 
the people who vote it into power. Liberal democracy also calls for the state to be a responsible 
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citizen of the international community, which in turn, expects it to ensure that its conduct conforms 
to international norms. While there is, in principle, no excuse for a liberal democratic state not to 
follow the rules, the argument here was that expecting the same from the terrorists is asking for 
the impossible as terrorist organisations are answerable to none other than themselves.  
 
Conventional warfare is required to abide by the jus in bello principle, which demands just conduct 
in war. Jus in bello calls for the discrimination of civilians from combatants and thereby gives 
immunity to non-combatants; this is exactly the opposite of terrorism which characteristically 
targets soft civilian targets. In the attempt to compare and contrast terrorism with nuclear warfare, 
it was argued in Chapter 2 that, for all intents and purposes, there is hardly any difference between 
the two forms of warfare as both target civilians. It was however noted that a number of scholars 
have resisted classifying nuclear warfare as terrorism despite its indiscriminate effect as they argue 
that the inclusion of state actors in terrorism would further complicate the quest for seeking for an 
agreed upon definition. The researcher’s argument in this regard was that confining the definition 
of terrorism to non-state actors would unfairly leave out state actors whose history shows their 
clear intention of inducing panic and fear in the civilian population, just as terrorists do. The 
argument was however not pursued further as the current study was limited to the conduct of the 
USA and its allies, as state actors, in their attempt to combat political violence perpetrated by 
substate actors.  
 
Chapter 2 went on to evaluate the characteristics of irregular warfare (IW) where it was shown that 
terrorism typically constitutes a good example of IW where asymmetric means and other indirect 
approaches are used to neutralise the power of a comparatively stronger enemy. Just like regular 
forces, terrorists adopt IW with the objective of winning the hearts and minds of the civilian 
population to their side. It was argued in Chapter 2 that while the actions of the conventional forces 
are constrained by law in an attempt to win over the population to its side, terrorists have a free 
hand as they are not bound by any laws. Having attempted to locate terrorism in other forms of 
warfare, which are guided by given sets of principles, it was concluded that terrorism should be 
understood as a means of warfare which depends on the use of unregulated violence, fear and 
intimidation to achieve political objectives. It is a strategy or tactic which the perpetrators of 
political violence use to try to change the status quo. Terrorism uses civilians as expendables in its 
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attempt to convey its grievances and desires to the government, which is the ultimate target for 
terrorist communication. For the terrorists, the end justifies the means.  
 
9.3 Terrorism in the Modern Era 
Given an understanding of what constitutes terrorism, Chapter 3 was aimed at unravelling modern 
terrorism and thereby considering how it fits into the definition which is used to guide discussions 
in this thesis. Using various examples, it was shown that modern terrorism uses extreme violence 
to cause fear, unlike older terrorism which was mainly obsessed with dramatising terrorist acts for 
propaganda purposes. Chapter 3 also showed that modern terrorism is associated with 
fundamentalists who claim to be acting in the name of religion to cause extreme violence. Whilst 
there is a strong argument by some scholars that religious terrorism is an end in itself, it was argued 
that there is plenty of evidence to show that extremists often use violence to pursue political 
objectives. The researcher’s argument was that religion, in a number of occasions, only serves as 
a source of inspiration for the terrorists; their unflinching belief in their faith allows them to do 
anything which they believe the faith condones, to pursue that elusive objective, which may, for 
example, be the removal of the USA military from Muslim-majority countries. The extremists’ 
fundamentalism drives them to have no tolerance for anything viewed as not conforming to their 
belief systems as they see the world from a single lens. They, in the process, lose all moral 
constraints as they search for their version of justice. It is this lack of tolerance, that is, their desire 
to have everything done in their way, that puts them on a collision course with the West, which 
happens to have a totally different value system.  
 
The inevitable confrontation between terrorists on the one side and the USA and its Western allies 
on the other leads to more blood on the floor as the superior West wants to prove the point that it 
will not tolerate acts of mischief from non-state actors and their sponsors, while terrorists want to 
show their mettle to the whole world and lure the state to over-react, thereby getting discredited as 
a result of its heavy handedness. The attacks and counter attacks between the two sides lead to an 
endless cycle of violence where innocent civilians and the rule of law are the casualties. It was 
also argued in Chapter 3 that despite modern terrorism being seen as purposeless extremism, 
terrorists have, from time to time, expressed their grievances, most of which are directed at the 
USA. These complaints include the USA’s support of autocratic Muslim governments such as the 
House of Saudi in Saudi Arabia and its bias towards the Jewish state of Israel, which happens to 
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be the arch-enemy of Arabs and Muslims. It was also shown that other activities such as attempts 
by the USA and its allies to export Western democracy to Muslim countries, which may be 
genuinely well-intended, from a Western point of view, are seen as evil, not only by the extremists 
but also by moderate Muslims as they have the effect of interfering with their faith. It was therefore 
argued that such acts lead to hostility towards the USA, and religious fundamentalism thus comes 
in handy to drive the aggrieved to join terrorism. Unfortunately, in their bid to attract attention, 
terrorists resort to the use of any means, such as the hijacking of aircraft, as a weapon. With the 
foregoing observations, it was argued in Chapter 3 that all terrorist acts make terrorism an illegal 
form of warfare. Terrorism’s disregard for the laws of warfare makes it morally wrong. The 
immorality and illegality of the issues in question give the USA and its Western allies an excuse 
to take the terrorists head on, a development which, unfortunately has led to a disregard of the rule 
of law and the associated abuse of individual rights.  
 
9.4 The Modus Operandi of Modern Terrorism 
Following a detailed appreciation of the nature of terrorism which shows a penchant for inflicting 
maximum harm on fellow human beings and a demonstrable lack of the instinctive desire by 
individual terrorists to survive, Chapter 4 went on to try to evaluate the drive and motivation behind 
the ‘senseless’ actions of terrorists.  The chapter acknowledged that the level of violence and 
destruction that is associated with modern terrorism leads to some analysts to suggest that terrorists 
are not normal people. It was, however, noted that various discussions in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, 
pointed to the fact that terrorists do engage in deliberate planning where they choose their targets 
carefully for propaganda purposes. The two conflicting positions then brought to the fore the need 
for a further enquiry on what actually drives the terrorists not to hesitate to kill and destroy property 
with abandon.  The activities of the terrorists were hence evaluated in their individual capacity and 
as members of an organisation.  An informed understanding of the motivation and drivers could 
then be used to proffer meaningful strategies for countering the menace.  
 
Influenced by the type of violence that is perpetrated by the terrorists and a clear lack of concern 
with their lives, Chapter 4 utilised Lewis Richardson (2006) three-level analysis that is focused on 
the individual, society and the international environment to try to single out factors that may 
constitute generic grievances which would, in turn, motivate terrorism. The chapter made use of 
submissions from various individual terrorists – leaders and operatives - in a bid to elicit the actual 
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drivers behind the inhuman terrorist actions.  The chapter also reviewed the operations of three 
prominent individual terrorists, namely, Timothy McVeigh, Theodore Kaczynski and Osama bin 
Laden also in an attempt to find out the motivation behind their strange actions. Two terrorists 
were added to the list, namely Mahmoud Abouhalimia, an operative, and Dr. Abdul Aziz Rantis, a 
prominent terrorist leader. The chapter went further and utilised Martha Crenshaw’s (2011) 
instrumental and organisation process theories to evaluate the behaviour of the terrorist in a group 
(organisation) setting.    
 
In almost all the cases, the terrorists showed to be normal individuals who set themselves clear 
goals and did a cost-benefit analysis of various options before they launched their attacks. There 
was evidently no common motivation behind their actions other than a combination of personal 
experiences and the desire to avenge the suffering of fellow kinsfolk which seems to have 
influenced the individuals to resort to violence as revealed by the terrorists themselves. Exhibiting 
normalcy and, in most cases, high levels of intelligence, the terrorists transfer the blame of their 
atrocious deeds to their targets in an attempt to deal with their guilty conscience. It was shown that 
this process, referred to as ‘moral disengagement’, involves dehumanising the opponent and 
absolving themselves of any blame, thereby allowing them to commit the levels of murder and 
destruction which the average human being sees as senseless.  
 
The chapter also reviewed and acknowledged the role of terrorist organisations in ensuring the 
motivation of the operatives to undertake the noted brutal attacks. Given the need for survival, the 
chapter showed how a terrorist organisation works towards ensuring that the individual terrorist’s 
goals merge with those of the organisation in an attempt to guarantee unquestionable loyalty to the 
organisation. The exit barriers which the organisation imposes on the individual terrorist as he 
launches those dastard attacks on innocent individuals ensures that he is beholden to the 
organisation which now assures his security. At the end, the individual and the organisation become 
one as the operative carries more cruel attacks without question, typical of fundamentalists. The 
role of the terrorist leader is critical in this endeavour to ensure unity, commitment to the 
organisation’s cause, and total loyalty.  
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9.5 Islam and Terrorism 
Building from an understanding of the extremists’ obsession for a desire to avenge their 
humiliation and a host of other grievances, Chapter 5 sought to undertake an in-depth exploration 
of the meaning of the presumed bifurcated world, a perception which has the effect of removing 
all restraints from terrorist attacks. The chapter, unapologetically, focused on Islam, the religion 
that modern terrorists claim is the foundation for their unmitigated murder and destruction. It 
therefore explored the link between the abhorred levels of violence and the provisions of the 
Islamic religion.  This entailed a detailed examination of politics as a constituent part of the Islamic 
faith, the appropriation of some verses cherry-picked from the Qur’an, and the concept of the jihad, 
as well as its link with martyrdom. The chapter discussed all these elements under the umbrella of 
political Islam.  
 
It was noted in the chapter that there is no doubt that Islam is a powerful religion that commands 
great followership. The power of Islam allows it to direct its followers to abide by the dos and 
don’ts of the faith without question as it closes out those who do not subscribe to the faith. The 
Qur’an and hadiths do not simply provide guidance to the followers but instructions on the conduct 
of Muslims. This faith views all human beings, including fellow Muslims, who are seen as not 
adhering to the demand of Allah, as evil. Unlike the Western value systems, in particular the ethic 
of political liberalism, which separates religion from the state, it was shown in Chapter 5 that, for 
Islam, religious faith and politics are inseparable. It was thus argued that this difference is a cause 
for conflict as the West is bound to see the resultant lack of freedom to follow one’s conscience as 
retrogressive while Islamists see the wide array of freedoms and the related secularism as going 
against the will of Allah.  
 
It was argued further that while the West has condemned Islam for its inflexibility, Muslims, and 
Islamists in particular, have rallied behind the Qur’an, fused the Western value systems with their 
grievances and launched violent attacks against the West which they see as bent on destroying 
Islam. In all the cases, extremists have managed to prove their point by showing a bifurcated world 
with Islam on one side and the secularists and all other religions on the other. Using a few examples 
of some Muslim charismatic leaders, it was demonstrated how these leaders have been able to 
manipulate and deploy Islam to serve a predetermined agenda, though in a number of cases citing 
genuine grievances. It was also demonstrated in the chapter how extremists have sought to turn 
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the otherwise justified agenda on Islamic Revivalism, which aims at keeping Islam pure and 
thereby allow it to take its rightful place among other major religions, against the West.  
 
It was however opined that there seems to be a genuine fear within some Muslim groups of a 
Western agenda which is aimed at destroying Islam. It was suggested that the concern could be 
partly responsible for putting Islam on the defensive. The extremists are however quick to exploit 
such fears and recruit fellow members to pre-empt the attacks as they quote some verses in the 
Qur’an which justify and oblige Muslims to fight and defend their religion. It was argued that it is 
here that they are able to convince the followers to see the war as a cosmic struggle for their 
spiritual liberation as they undertake brutish attacks on their opponents, reminiscent of ancient 
societies. The West finds it difficult to enter into negotiations with extremists, given its conviction 
that the latter is fighting for an unjust cause. It was shown how extremists abuse the concept of the 
jihad to pursue their nefarious objectives.  It was argued that the extremists have done everything 
possible to pervade the otherwise peaceful religious concepts as they reject all who espouse a 
different dogma. It was further argued that such intolerance by extremists serve to justify the West’s 
association of the jihad with a holy war, given the terrorists’ attempt to force others to see the 
world from their point of view.  It was stressed that the extremists’ disposition to fight those who 
see things differently is not only immoral but constitutes a threat to global peace and security just 
as does the uncalculated reaction of the USA and its Western allies.  
 
Without in any way condoning terrorist extremism, Chapter 5 showed how grievances act as a 
recruiting tool for suicide terrorism, especially when they merge with deep-seated values. It was 
argued that there is very little that can be done with an individual who, when faced with a grievance 
or even a perceived one, sees an opportunity in blowing himself as a ticket to Paradise. The fact 
that the suicide also takes away lives of the innocent is not an issue to the attacker whose only 
concern is his ascension to Paradise. This discussion concluded by stressing that such acts only 
serve to tarnish the name and image of Islam and that these unjust actions put the other side on a 
similar war path as it attempts to defend its value systems while blaming its opponents for being 
war mongers. These accusations and counter-accusations call for an unbiased evaluation of the 
major drivers of terrorism and a consideration of strategies and policies that would have the 
capacity of addressing the root causes and hence curb its proliferation as opposed to the careless 
use of force, which has not only led to global instability, but also to a formidable threat to the 
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values of political liberalism.  
 
9.6 The USA Foreign Policy and the Internationalisation of the War on Terrorism 
With Chapter 5 having clearly demonstrated that the extremists, using religion, will stop at nothing 
to inflict maximum possible harm on their opponents, Chapter 5 went on to consider the actions 
and reaction of the USA through the lenses of its foreign policy as it relates to  the WOT. The main 
objective of the chapter was to evaluate the thesis that the USA is using the WOT as a tool to 
advance its foreign policy objectives. The investigation found that all the activities clothed in the 
WOT garb are aimed at promoting the national interest of the USA. An analysis of the USA’s NSS 
revealed a comprehensive document that does not limit itself to traditional security issues but 
covers a broad category of aspects, which are all centred on its desire to assert its global 
dominance.  Following an analysis of the salient provisions of the NSS document, it was the 
researcher’s submission that the USA has adopted a hegemonic foreign policy with a clear strategic 
intent of promoting and protecting its economic and political interests, but at the expense of the 
interests of other nation-states. Its desire to have the whole world on its side in the WOT has driven 
it to attack those who are not cooperating with it while it befriends various undemocratic regimes 
which have opted or have been compelled to join the alliance on the WOT. Countries such as China 
and Russia got an opportunity, through their support of the USA’s internationalised WOT, to 
continue with their suppression of political dissent in their home countries as the USA turned a 
blind eye. It was also shown that the USA’s actions, which are camouflaged in the WOT, show its 
clear desire to gain control of the Middle East for similar reasons. 
 
9.7 The Ethic of Political Liberalism 
This chapter which was aimed at exploring the constituent elements of the ethic of political 
liberalism, with the objective of using the same to evaluate the USA”s counter-terrorism methods, 
showed that liberalism is centred on the principles of liberty and individualism. Ii was shown in 
Chapter 7 that the philosophy of political liberalism is about the enhancement of rights and 
freedoms of the individual. The ethic thence calls for a limited government, which, while 
promoting individual rights, is able to protect the individual and allow him to realise his goals, a 
requirement that bars the state from threatening his liberty. The philosophy of political liberalism 
makes an assumption that the individual is a rational agent and is thus able to decide what is good 
and bad for him. As such no-one – whether the state or other individuals – has a right to interfere 
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with the liberty of the individual if justice and fairness has to prevail. It was shown that justice 
demands that all individuals should be treated in an equal and equitable manner. Similarly, it was 
shown that the principle of equality demands that no two persons should be treated differently 
because of their ethnicity or social standing.  
 
Chapter 7 also showed that one of the fundamental principles of the ethic of political liberalism is 
the rule of law, which calls upon the authorities to act within the limits of justice. A liberal, 
democratic society acknowledges the diversity of human beings and hence views pluralism as a 
strength which has to be protected by the rule of law. This philosophy demands that the individual 
has to be left alone to go about his daily desires freely for as long as his actions do not infringe on 
the rights of others. It does acknowledge the role of the state in maintaining law and order and 
hence the exclusive right to the use of force, but only on condition that its use is directed at 
protecting the individual and preventing harm from being inflicted on other citizens.  
 
9.8 USA Counter-Terrorism Measures as a Threat to the Ethic of Political Liberalism 
Chapter 8 acknowledged that the 9/11 terrorist attacks constituted a slap to the superpower and 
went on to show that the USA’s counter-terrorism measures were driven by a desire to seek revenge 
as opposed to justice.  The wish to retaliate drove the USA to transgress various values of the ethic 
of political liberalism. The want to inflict pain equally on terrorists and their supporters allowed 
for a free-for-all in the ranks of the USA’s public officials as they got away with crimes they would 
normally have been required to account for in a democratic, liberal state. Muslims and Arabs 
became the target as the officials profiled and detained individuals associated with those groups 
for whatever length of time they saw fit. There was no law to protect those categorised as potential 
terrorists as the USA had come up with innovative pieces of legislation such as the USA PATRIOT 
Act, which legally provided for such ‘transgressions’. 
 
While there was a need to deal with the terrorists decisively, the chapter argued that the USA failed 
to strike the right balance between national security and respect for various liberal rights. This 
chapter showed evidence that the USA’s actions, in its attempt to counter terrorism, constituted a 
threat to the same principles it sought to protect as shown by, among other things, its capture and 
torture of prisoners in Guantanamo Bay where the suspects were denied rights to legal 
representation while on trial under military tribunal. In all cases, the detainees were regarded as 
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guilty until proven innocent. This chapter noted that the USA counter-terrorism measures were not 
different from actions of autocratic states which always find state institutions an indispensable tool 
for the persecution of hapless citizens.  The chapter further showed that the USA’s distaste for 
multilateral approaches qualified it to be categorised a rogue state. Its use of domestic laws in the 
international arena allowed state institutions such as OFAC to freeze assets of various individuals 
and entities elsewhere in the world whenever it deemed them to be uncooperative in the WOT. 
This chapter also argued that USA’s invasion of Iraq had nothing to do with terrorism but was 
driven by the desire to secure its strategic interests.  
 
This chapter found that the USA’s counter-terrorism measures were, on the main, illegal and 
unethical and, hence, constituted a threat to the ethic of political liberalism. It was therefore 
concluded that the USA’s disregard for international law which requires it to respect state 
sovereignty,  its capture and detention of suspects in secret prisons, the torture and humiliation of 
the same at the hands of its security forces, its disregard for multilateral institutions of which it is 
a member, and its failure to respect the right to life – a fundamental right that must be guarded 
jealously – all point to a rogue state that poses a threat to the ethic of political liberalism and global 
peace and security as it fights its WOT. 
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CHAPTER TEN: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ETHICAL STRATEGIES AND 
POLICIES FOR COMBATING TERRORISM 
10.1 Introductory Remarks 
All the previous chapters in this thesis acknowledged that terrorism is an illegal form of warfare, 
which uses violence to create fear to meet some political-related objectives. The discussions 
showed that despite the violence being directed at the civilian population, the real target audience 
is the government. While old terrorism was, by and large, selective in its choice of the targets, the 
study showed that modern terrorism, especially the type that is driven by religious faith, shows a 
penchant for unmitigated destruction of life and property. The thesis also concluded that it is not 
possible to generalise the cause of terrorism as the drivers evidently differ from one terrorist group 
to the other as well as from one region to another. It is, however, apparent that different motives 
may blend together to constitute major grievances, which may drive individuals into terrorism. 
When the grievances combine with core values of a given community, they have the effect of 
causing what the average person sees as ‘senseless’ destruction.   
 
This study observed that extremists are obsessed with a wish to transform the world and thus end 
up attempting to compel other cultures and civilisations to see the world from their point of view, 
an objective which attracts resistance and a counter-response from the affected powers. With the 
terrorist leaders evidently appropriating Islam for selfish politico-religious reasons and the 
followers having been convinced that their violence is in fulfilment of Allah’s wishes, the 
indications were that terrorism is set to continue unabated. It was evident in the analyses of the 
objectives and modus operandi of the extremists and the response measures taken by the USA that 
both the USA and Islam represent strong value systems which are aimed at prevailing over each 
other. While the extremist leaders are bent on deploying Islam to whip up the emotions of the 
Muslim and Arabs populations, the USA and its Western allies are determined to exterminate 
terrorists at whatever cost.   
 
It was noted that this determination to annihilate the enemy reached its pick in the aftermath of the 
terrorists’ 9/11 attacks in the USA, which left an embarrassing trail of destruction.  The humiliation 
inevitably led to a quest for revenge and, hence, the launch of the WOT, which the study 
demonstrated has an agenda with ulterior motives over and above the publicly stated objective of 
eliminating terrorism. Various sections showed the USA’s use of the WOT to pursue its selfish 
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strategic interests in various parts of the world. Evidence was adduced pointing to the USA’s 
hubris, an I-don’t-care attitude which called for everything to be done the American way. This 
stance thus became the defining feature of the WOT. It was observed that as the USA 
internationalised the WOT, it and its allies were seen trampling on individual rights and freedoms, 
using torture to extract information from suspects, ignoring traditional international practices 
which they are signatories to and various provisions of international law such as state sovereignty, 
and a host of other illegal and immoral actions. Instead of contributing to the eradication of 
terrorism, the study concluded that these practices, which are anchored on the use of force, play 
into the hands of the terrorists and have the effect of exacerbating the conflict.  
 
Based on the foregoing outcome of the study, this chapter proffers five recommendations which, 
it is hoped, will contribute significantly in combating terrorism in a manner that accords respect to 
the basic tenets of the ethic of political liberalism, for consideration by policy makers and other 
interest groups. The recommendations take into account the host of counter-productive response 
measures discussed above and adopts a position that the objective of totally eradicating this 
asymmetric approach to warfare which has been employed by state actors and subnational groups 
since time immemorial is not attainable. The recommendations centre on the need to have clear 
goals for combating terrorism, an attempt to resist the use of coercive approaches where they are 
not necessary, a concerted effort to respect other people’s value systems, the need to uphold moral 
and ethical standards in combating terrorism, and the need for the balancing of security interests 
and liberal values in the fight against terrorism.  
  
10.2 Set Clear Goals that are Grounded on the Rule of Law 
Any mission that has to deliver results must be based on clear, attainable goals. Declaring a war 
on terrorism – a war in its literal sense – is not an achievable goal as it is not clear how the USA 
intends to defeat a tactic.  Instead of ‘warring’ this means of asymmetric warfare and accentuating 
the conflict, the USA should come out with a set of broad, but realistic, goals which, while 
contributing positively to combating terrorism, are not in conflict with the provisions of 
International Law and the rights of the individual. The goals should relate to the desired end state 
which should centre on the need to eliminate terrorist opportune targets while reducing the 
attractiveness of terrorism. Going from one country to another changing regimes which the USA 
does not agree with is a myopic, illegal approach which does not help the effort of combating 
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terrorism, but only serves to annul the right to state equality and sovereignty.  
 
The strategists should, drawing from the goals, systematically come up with a comprehensive 
counter-terrorism plan of action which should avoid a focus on tactical gains and short-term 
objectives, and should be engrossed with the desired future state, as identified by the goals. Such 
a strategic approach will avoid risks associated with foolish bravado which has led to unnecessary 
loss of lives in the WOT and a host of unethical conduct that is related to reprisals. The planners 
have to go all the way and come up with measurable objectives and milestones which are not 
influenced by emotions, egotism, anger or vengeance, but by the desire to achieve justice and 
fairness. The objectives for countering terrorism should state, in no unequivocal terms what has to 
be done and how it should be done to avoid operatives resorting to immoral, illegal activities such 
as the noted cases of women soldiers forcing male suspects to masturbate or forcing Muslim 
suspects to eat pork and take alcohol. With clear goals and objectives, the conduct of operatives 
should be guided by morality and the rule of law. 
 
10.3 Avoid Having the Use Force as a Default Response to the Terrorist Threat 
The second recommendation relates to the need for the USA to resist the temptation to default to 
the use of force whenever it feels that its interests are under threat from terrorism. The USA has 
the leverage to blend the different elements of its national power, not only to fight terrorism, but 
also to address various grievances and conditions which promote the growth of terrorism. While 
acknowledging the deterrent effect of military power, the USA should resist the temptation to use 
force indiscriminately. Uncalculated use of kinetic power simply plays into the hands of terrorists 
who are known, since the days of the anarchists, to lure the government to overreact. The 
indiscriminate use of military power leads to an unnecessary loss of innocent lives among other 
things, an issue to which a liberal state is required to pay attention. An effective and just counter 
terrorism strategy entails the selective use of military power to strike at appropriate targets and 
limiting the freedom of the terrorists while ensuring maximum protection of individual members 
of the civilian population. Military power should be employed judiciously, in combination with 
soft power approaches in an effort to address political and socio-economic grievances which are 
often exploited by extremists to advance their violent agenda.  
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The USA should be tolerant of other cultures, appreciate the diversity of the world, respect other 
peoples’ freedom of conscience, and adopt a give-and-take approach, thereby stopping giving the 
extremists an excuse to attack it. While its foreign policy should, like that of any other state, be 
centred on the advancement and protection of its interests, it should move from short-term self-
defeating policies that serve to create more enemies for it. It has to seriously consider dumping its 
dictator allies elsewhere in the world, thereby pulling the rug under the feet of the extremists. It 
should focus on the Middle East, a hotbed of terrorism, with an open mind and stop burying its 
head in the sand, acknowledging that the Palestinian question is at the heart of almost every Arab 
and Muslim, moderates and extremists alike. By the same token, it should stop its biased, 
unconditional support of Israel, an ally which has continued to defy international law and used the 
WOT to brutalise Palestinian civilians, if it has to avoid giving free ammunition to the terrorists to 
attack it.  It should, instead, use its power to seek for a fair settlement between its Israeli ally on 
the one side and Arabs and Muslims on the other side, thereby directing effort at reducing the 
incidence of violence on civilians and attempting to pave the way for peace and stability in the 
region. Such an approach would go a long way to reducing the attractiveness of terrorism, which 
should in turn, allow the state to focus on protecting individual citizens and helping them to realise 
their potential.  
 
10.4 Respect for Different Value Systems 
The USA should appreciate that while it is a big power, and the only superpower in the world, it is 
not invincible. The USA leadership should stop asking the question ‘why do they hate us’ for they 
know that Americans are hated by some out of jealousy while many resent them for their 
haughtiness, which drives the USA to want to see everything done according to its dictates.  Just 
as it is its right not to give in to extremist wishes to impose their values on America, it equally 
should avoid doing the same to others.  The USA should embrace the principle of state equality 
and thus avoid giving an excuse to the aggrieved to resort to the weapon of the weak to attack it. 
It should realise that the ‘one true way’ which the extremists want to guide the conduct of 
humankind is just as immoral as its (USA’s) desire to drive others to follow the ‘American way’.  
 
Notwithstanding the need to respect universal values such as the sanctity of human life, the USA 
should note that any attempt to impose its value systems on others would only help to invite 
asymmetric attacks on it by those who do not have the power to confront it head on. The USA 
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public officials have to be schooled to understand that Muslims and followers of any other faiths, 
have equal rights with Christians and atheists. They should be made to appreciate that the 
democracy and political liberalism, which they subscribe to, gives freedom of conscience to all 
humankind. The USA government should consider expanding its school curricula to include 
related courses which would assist citizens to avoid having a bigoted view of the world and thus 
make Americans acceptable to others across the globe. The same should be apply to induction 
courses for all public officials.  
 
10.5 Moral Integrity 
Having given itself the right to lead the world, probably rightfully so by virtue of being the only 
superpower, the USA must have moral uprightness to show consistency between its demands and 
its actions. Accepting that it is fair that it leads the effort to counter terrorism by virtue of its 
superpower status, it should show respect for international institutions which are, among other 
things, designed to protect small and big powers alike.  As it has argued for the need to bring errant 
regimes which have defied the rulings of the UNSC into the fold, it should avoid engaging in 
similar illegal actions such as attacking other states without the express authority of the same body, 
and, at the same time, avoid cavorting with autocratic states by virtue of them supporting the WOT.  
Where there is a justified need to go to war, as there would be from time to time, the USA and its 
allies should adhere to the principles of a just war and ensure that its forces desist from trampling 
on various individual rights.  
 
As supposed-to-be law abiding citizens of the international community, the USA and its Western 
allies should make sure that they engage in warfare only after exhausting all possible peaceful 
alternatives, thereby avoiding the use of war to satisfy selfish hidden agendas. Morality and just 
war principles demand that they should go to war only where there is no doubt that the intention 
to do so is a just one, such as in correcting a wrong, but not for mere vengeance. The USA and its 
allies should seriously and genuinely consider the need for the discrimination of civilians from 
combatants, not only as a requirement of a just war, but as a means of avoiding giving the terrorists 
a cheap opportunity to justify their attacks on Western targets as they claim the right to defend 
themselves. Moral integrity requires the USA to lead by example and avoid double standards. 
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10.6 Balance Security Interests and Liberal Values 
The final recommendation is about the need for the USA to avoid being driven by emotions in its 
desire to assure national security. The USA should realise that national security is not a zero-sum 
game. The need for the maintenance of security and respect for liberal values are not mutually 
exclusive but should be seen to be mutually supportive. It is, in fact, in the interests of the USA 
and its allies to ensure that their effort in combating terrorism is guided by the values of political 
liberalism, if for only one reason that the concept is modelled on a Western political ideology. The 
West should show by deed that it genuinely believes in political liberalism by adhering to its tenets 
as it combats terrorism. It should avoid policy inconsistencies and focus on long-term sustainable 
policies and desist from seeing every security challenge as requiring a military solution. A focus 
on comprehensive security and the need to respect the concepts of individual liberty and state 
sovereignty, while adopting a firm stance against terrorism and concurrently addressing conditions 
that fester its growth, should go a long way in reducing the threat.  
 
The USA should not pay lip service to the philosophy of political liberalism but should genuinely 
believe in the ethic where its belief would be tested by its deeds. It should be tolerant of other 
cultures and value systems, and indeed Islam, which is not just a religion but a way of life for 
Muslims. The USA should appreciate that the ethic of political liberalism does not stand on its way 
in fighting terrorism but should rather note that the respect of individual rights and freedoms will 
go a long way in advancing its cause. A respect for individual rights requires for the USA, among 
other important steps it should consider taking, to stop the capture and transfer of terrorist suspects 
to Guantanamo Bay and other torture centres in the world as such actions are illegal, wrong and 
immoral. It should, in fact, consider closing Guantanamo Bay as a gesture of goodwill to its 
opponents. It should, in the same spirit, ensure that its security forces stop the use of various 
unethical and degrading means, which include torture and humiliation of detainees, and accept 
genuinely that fairness and justice require that the standard of behaviour it demands from others 
should also be applicable to itself. Humbling itself and avoiding double standards, in spite of its 
might, would go a long way in countering extremists by eliminating those issues which terrorists 
always cite as excuses for attacking the USA and its interests elsewhere in the world. 
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